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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the system for redress of administrative grievances in 
China that was established by the Administrative Litigation Law in April 1989. The 
law added a new dimension to state-society relations that enabled ordinary people to 
use the legal system to challenge administrative decisions of administrative organs. 
The process of making an administrative appeal is examined, beginning with the 
imposition of an administrative penalty by an administrative organ, progressing 
through administrative review which is a departmental procedure, and ending with 
administrative litigation by the courts and possibly an appeal for compensation. The 
subject matter is explored with reference to three types of administrative organs: 
public security, land administration, and industry and commerce organs. The roles of 
the players such as the applicants, the administrative organs, the courts and lawyers 
are canvassed. And the characteristics of administrative appeals in the context of 
political campaigns are assessed. 
In terms of academic disciplines, this study straddles the fields of politics and its sub-
field of public administration/public policy, and law. The primary thesis explored is 
political in nature. The dissertation argues that the system of administrative law as it 
operated throughout the 1990s is a genuine attempt to offer limited redress to 
plaintiffs while further developing the justice and legality of the administrative 
process. The system is not an empty claim to legitimacy, or a shabby attempt by the 
state to strengthen its waning control over society. The system provides measurable 
redress for some plaintiffs, although these cases are usually selected carefully from 
the range of appeals and tend to support the state's political or economic goals. In the 
final summation, however, the system tends to reinforce the power of administrative 
organs. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Beijing winter and early spring of 1989, as Chinese university students were 
meeting in groups on their campuses to discuss problems facing the nation, 1 the final 
touches were being made to a piece of legislation that was soon to come before the 
National People's Congress. The Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic 
of China (ALL) ( 9:t $ A ~ # tJ 00 fJ ~ W 10 ~ ) was passed by the 
Congress on 4 April 1989.2 In hindsight, the timing was significant. If this piece of 
legislation had not been passed by the Congress at that point - prior to Hu Yao bang's 
death and the escalation of public demonstrations - then it is likely that it would have 
been delayed for several years. 3 
1 
As it turned out, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed the legislation in the Great 
Hall of the People, which sides the western edge of Tiananmen Square, barely two weeks 
before the square began to fill with mourners for Hu Y aobang. 4 Hu was a former 
Communist Party general secretary and a noted reformer, and his death was the catalyst 
for what turned out to be prolonged public demonstrations on Tiananmen Square at the 
heart of Beijing. Students had a range of grievances to air, chief among them the 
corruption of the regime and the general lack of opportunities for citizens to participate in 
government affairs. Within a couple of months the regime enforced its will violently 
against the students and workers who had subsequently joined the demonstrations. By this 
time the new law that enabled citizens and other legal entities to sue the government in 
court for certain types of alleged illegal administrative decisions appeared to be stillborn. 
Against the backdrop of violent action by the state, the concept of 'people sue 
1 For an account of these "salons" see Craig Calho
1
un, Neither Gods nor Emperors - Students and the 
Struggle for Democracy in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), Chapter One. 
2 People's Daily, 10 April 1989, p.l. 
3 Interview with a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Law Institute, Beijing, 1998. 
2 
officials' cR 1!f W), which the new litigation law allowed, appeared anomalous. This 
dissertation draws together these two apparently divergent strands: the development of an 
administrative grievance system that allows citizens limited redress against illegal or 
unfair administrative decisions that have been imposed by a regime that is still 
authoritarian. 
It was another year before the new litigation law was to become legally effective,5 but in 
practice the first cases to be tried in court under this law did not emerge until early in 
1991. The administrative grievance system was further bolstered by the promulgation of 
the Administrative Review Regulations (ARR) (fr iE){ ~ i..){ ffe i9~) in November 
1990,6 which allowed individuals and other legal entities to use the legal system to appeal 
directly to an administrative organ that has made a concrete, as opposed to an abstract,7 
administrative decision that the recipient regards as illegal or unfair. The organ in 
question then has the legal duty to follow a set procedure to reconsider the administrative 
decision. In many cases, if no satisfaction is gained the plaintif~ then has the right to 
appeal to the court under the ALL. The ARR have subsequently been rescinded by the 
issue of the Administrative Review Law (ARL) 
( ~ ~ A R # :fo 00 fr iE){ ~ 15{ ~ ) , promulgated on 29 April 19999. 
The dissertation was written in 1999 and uses material available to the end of 1998, thus 
the discussion is based on the ARR, not the ARL. However, to avoid the work being 
overtaken by events, the provisions of the ARL will be considered in Chapter Three along 
side those of the ARR. As Chapter Four contains a detailed study of the process of 
administrative review, the potential effects of the new law will also be considered therein. 
4 People's Daily, 16 April 1989, p.l. 
5 1 October 1990. 
6 People's Daily, 28 December 1990, p.3. These regulations were subsequently modified on 9 October 1994 
to account for some initial problems that had developed in the early implementation period. See People's 
Daily, 16 October 1994, p. 5. Hereafter these regulations are referred to as the ARR. 
7 The provisions of the legislation discussed in the dissertation are clarified in Chapter Three. 
8 
"Plaintiff" is a legal term denoting the individual, organisation or legal entity that lodges the complaint. 
When it is used in the dissertation it has this meaning. "Defendant" is used to denote the administrative 
organ that has been accused of an illegal or unfair administrative decision. 
9 Legal Daily (internet version), 30 April 1999, p.3. 
The time lapse is not yet large enough for sufficient case material to emerge that reflects 
the impact of the ARL, thus conclusions as to its efficacy can only be speculative. 
The ALL, the ARR and the ARL, together with some aspects of the State Compensation 
, 
10 
stand at the heart of the new 
system of administrative law in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and we will deal 
with their contents more fully in Chapter Three. 
A new approach 
3 
To lodge a suit under the ALL is an activity that challenges an arm of the state. It is a 
formal process involving applications, submission of evidence, laws, and possibly a court 
hearing. It may also involve informal processes of mediation and negotiation between the 
parties. Literature on this topic 11 is dominated by legal scholars who naturally tend to 
focus on questions of interest and application to legal practitioners. Such writings are 
often limited to the administrative litigation process. Other approaches include 
quantitative analysis of the number of cases that occur, and these too only examine 
administrative litigation. 
This dissertation takes a broader purview of the procedures that begin with the imposition 
of an administrative penalty on a citizen, travel through administrative review in the 
administrative organ, may involve administrative compensation, and end with 
administrative litigation in court. Rather than just focus on issues of interest to the legal 
profession, the dissertation endeavours to contribute to our understanding of 
administration in China and the state's interaction with its citizens. 
The development of this new system of administrative law is not an attempt by the state 
to make an empty claim to legitimacy or to strengthen its repression over society. My 
research persuades me that it is a genuine attempt to offer some limited redress to 
10 Passed on 12 May 1994 and effective from 1 January 1995. See People's Daily, 13 May 1994, p.3. 
11 A full review of literature follows below. 
4 
plaintiffs while further developing the justice and legality of the administrative process. 
Its significance is to be understood in the context of the varied pressures posed by reform, 
the retreat of politics, the development of the legal system, internationalisation, and the 
continued push for modernisation and professionalisation. The starting point is to ask: 
what is it like for an individual or enterprise to use this new system to challenge an 
administrative decision? What are the obstacles? Who or which institution holds the 
power to adjudicate? How do the power holders interact along the path of dispute 
resolution? And is it worth using the system? 
The dissertation is presented as a study in one aspect of the changing nature of state-
society relations in the PRC. Although it may be debated whether the state under Mao 
was totalitarian, what is not doubted is that its relationship with society has changed 
dramatically during the reform era. Politics is in retreat, economics is hegemonic, the 
state has lost part of its capacity but at the same time has colonised society in different 
ways. Just what the final relationship will settle into is not yet known, but in the 
meantime numerous developments that feed into this relationship can be examined. This 
new system of administrative law is one of these. 
In terms of academic disciplines, this study straddles the fields of politics and its sub-field 
of public administration/public policy, and law. It will not take a technical legal approach 
or address purely legal questions. Nor will it deal purely with Chinese public 
administration, as that topic tends to focus on the issues of personnel, finance, and 
management. What it will do is examine the process of administrative review and 
administrative litigation from a political science perspective of state/society relations. In 
institutional terms this will involve a number of distinct overarching administrative 
systems C~m), as this analytical framework, widely used in China, is the best way to 
categorise Chinese government institutions. Administrative institutions have two distinct 
roots - politics and management - that mesh with each administrative organ's distinct 
culture to affect the handling of disputes with citizens or enterprises. The judicial system 
itself is another, operating with distinct features that affect the handling of administrative 
5 
disputes. 
Administrative law regulates the relationship between citizens' rights and state authority. 
The implementation of government and Party policy by the bureaucracy is essentially 
political action in the PRC, and given the Party's claim to overall policy guidance, 
citizens and enterprises have not previously had much legal redress against government 
actions. What is the role of the new system of administrative law in controlling 
bureaucratic action? By this we mean "law" in the large sense as including both the 
bureaucracy's own methods of handling administrative appeals as well as the influence of 
the courts on administrative appeals. Chinese courts have not been, and are not, 
independent actors in the system of Chinese government. Nevertheless, they do play a 
role in this new administrative law system. What is it intended to be and how does it 
work out in practice? My starting point for this dissertation covers all these discipline-
specific questions. 
Due to the overwhelming dominance of the Communist Party of China, the field of 
state/society relations in the PRC is heavily influenced by political considerations. But the 
nature of politics in the PRC is changing, and perhaps never more than in the years that 
straddled the close of one century and the arrival of the next. Law increasingly influences 
government action in the PRC, so we must account for this in any analysis of the political 
structure of the state. But the way in which law is shaping the Chinese state is perhaps 
best understood by considering the social and political implications of law. This study 
attempts to hold all these issues in mind while exploring the new administrative grievance 
system in the PRC. 
Administrative law 
Administrative law encompasses much more than one or two pieces of legislation, but I 
have limited the dissertation to examining the ramifications of the ALL and the ARR 
together with some reference to the State Compensation Law. This is for two main 
reasons: first, a dissertation in the social sciences cannot pretend to deal thoroughly with 
6 
the entire body of Chinese administrative law; second, the development of the ALL and 
ARR together form a highly significant change in state-society relations in the PRC. As 
we shall see when examining more closely the nature of administrative law in general, 
this new system in China fundamentally, in theory at any rate, alters the balance of power 
between state and society by giving citizens and other legal entities the right to sue the 
government over a limited range of alleged illegal or unfair administrative acts. This right 
has been granted before in the history of the PRC, but this time it has real, measurable 
benefits for citizens. It is not just another piece of political-legal rhetoric. There are real 
court cases involving real people who sometimes obtain real redress for their 
administrative grievances. I am not pretending the system is better than it is, or that 
practical justice in the PRC has taken a huge swing in the direction of defending citizens' 
rights. Problems are legion, as we would expect. Nevertheless, this new system is an 
improvement on what existed before and points to a path of development that, if 
continued, will radically alter the characteristics of the PRC state in the future. 
One of the most well known expositions on the nature of administrative law is by an 
English jurist, H.W.R. Wade. I have chosen Wade's work to use at this point because his 
description is clear and unambiguous, thus it provides a helpful framework from which to 
examine China's administrative law system. It should be noted, though, that Wade's 
descriptions refer to the British system, which is echoed in the Australian and American 
systems but not in those of other European states such as France. 
Wade defines administrative law as "the law relating to the control of government 
power" .12 Administrative law is thus based on the twin premises that it is possible for a 
government to abuse its power, and that government power should be controlled. Wade 
describes another element of administrative law as "the body of general principles which 
govern the exercise of powers and duties by public authorities." 13 Here Wade 
distinguishes between laws that define the composition and structure of governments 
12 H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, Fifth edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p.4. Hereafter referred 
to as Administrative Law. 
13 Ibid, p.5. 
(which properly lies outside the scope of administrative law) and laws that govern the 
manner in which governments must carry out their functions. Administrative law, 
therefore, compels a government to act within the bounds of the law. As a branch of law 
it flows from constitutional law, which determines the structure and powers of the state. 
In summary, Wade ascribes to administrative law the role of balancing power between 
citizen and state in the quest for administrative justice. 14 
7 
Within this broad role there are specific areas that administrative law covers: 15 
administrative authorities such as the central and local governments, the police, and 
public corporations; administrative functions such as compulsory purchases of land, 
urban and rural planning, housing, and health; judicial control over the limits of 
administrative power; discretionary power which requires that government authorities act 
reasonably, with due relevance, and not arbitrarily; natural justice which requires 
independent and fair consideration before punishment is imposed; specific remedies and 
liabilities, which cover the mechanisms for quashing illegal acts and provision of 
compensation for damage caused by government action; and legislative and adjudicative 
procedures which cover actual laws, regulations and rules that in the British model may 
be overturned by a court if they are found to be unlawful. 
The new system of administrative law in the PRC, comprising the ALL and the ARR, is 
more properly a system of administrative remedies. The system provides formal, legal 
avenues through which citizens may seek redress for wrong administrative acts. It is part 
of the supervision system over government organs and is firmly linked to the issue of 
government accountability. As Pitman Potter explains, the ALL "establishes general 
principles and a procedural framework for the exercise of judicial review over 
administrative action". 16 It does not set out the procedures that administrative organs must 
follow when making decisions nor does it provide procedural protection for persons 
14 Ibid, p.6. 
15 Ibid, pp.7-11. 
16 Pitman Potter, "The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial Review and Bureaucratic 
Reform" in Pitman B. Potter (ed.), Domestic Law Reforms in Post-Mao China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1994), p.270. Hereafter referred to as "The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC". 
8 
affected by government decision-making such as are found in the Administrative 
Procedure Act of the U.S.A. 17 Administrative law in the PRC has not always had this 
focus. In earlier periods it was aimed more at the framework and organisation of 
government, and this has a direct influence on how the current system works. I will deal 
with this more fully in Chapter Two, which sets out the historical and institutional context 
of this new system. 
Here it serves our purposes to note in broad terms what the thrust of the new system is 
and where it fits into the body of administrative law generally. It is a series of remedies 
that sets out the conditions under which administrative organs and courts may review 
administrative decisions and the procedures to be followed. Naturally, this function is 
impinged upon by many other aspects of administrative law, such as the administrative 
functions of government, the question of discretionary power, natural justice, and 
legislative and adjudicative procedures. But I will only touch on these issues as they 
affect some aspect of implementation of the new administrative law system. 
Impetus for development 
This new system is informed by, and has developed out of, the coalescence of a number 
of events and pressures during the reform era, many of which had their origins in the pre-
reform era. The first is the general policy of economic reform, of which reform in the 
structure of state-owned enterprises is just one part. 18 Enterprises are increasingly 
required to compete in the marketplace and are keen to reduce administrative 
interference. 19 The ALL is a formal, legal framework through which administrative 
disputes can be resolved. 
The second major change during the reform era that has given rise to this new system is 
17 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Text, Third edition (St Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1972), pp.8-9. 
18 Susan Finder, "Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone? Administrative Litigation in the People's 
Republic of China", Journal of Chinese Law, 3, 1, 1989, pp.1-28. Hereafter referred to as "Like Throwing 
an Egg Against a Stone". 
19 Jiang Ming'an, "Administrative Law and the Market Economy" in Guiguo Wang and Zhenying Wei 
(eds.), Legal Developments in China - Market Economy and Law (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), 
9 
the general trend to codify and legalise rights and powers as one aspect of constructing a 
solid, reliable legal system.20 Rule by law rather than "rule by man" in the form of the all-
powerful Party secretary of the Maoist era is much touted these days in China. The laws 
governing administrative review and litigation are a part of this trend. Reopening the 
courts to receive cases, recommencing publication of legal journals and monographs, and 
strengthening legal education have all contributed to this. 
But there is also a third factor that has given rise to the development of the new 
administrative law system in China: reform in the Chinese bureaucracy. Deng Xiaoping's 
administrative reforms included a reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, strategies to 
recruit better educated officials, and strategies to make the bureaucracy more efficient, 
responsive, and accountable.21 The old dichotomy of "red versus expert"22 finds an 
expression here as the state struggles to increase professionalisation as a perceived tool to 
modernisation and development, without losing the cohesion that was once provided by 
ideology. 
A fourth factor is the trend throughout the reform era for PRC domestic political actions 
to be influenced, in part, by international opinion. This is particularly so in the field of 
commerce. International business wants a more regularised and reliable system of dispute 
resolution as part of the environment in which to conduct business with the PRC. The 
development of the Chinese International Economic Trade and Arbitration Commission 
(CIETAC), which has a good reputation, is a response to this. This body resolves civil 
disputes23 and cannot provide redress for illegal administrative acts by the government. 
The administrative dispute resolution system fills this gap in the system. Human rights is 
pp.21-26. 
20 Susan Finder, "Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone". See also: Stanley Lubman (ed.), China's Legal 
Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Introduction; June Teufel Dreyer, China's Political 
System: Modernization and Tradition, Third edition (London: Macmillan, 2000), Chapter Eight. 
21 Stephen Ma, Administrative Reform in Post-Mao China: Efficiency or Ethics (Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1996). 
22 A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1967), pp.54, 431-32. 
23 This means the dispute is between two or more parties of equal standing such as business partners. It does 
not involve a government administrative organ as one of the parties to the dispute. 
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another area in which international influence has modified (albeit slightly) domestic PRC 
political action. Until the granting of Permanent Normal Trade Relations with China, the 
USA's annual decision according MFN status was influenced by the PRC's human rights 
record. The new system of administrative law is seen by both the PRC and the 
international community as a positive step for the betterment of human rights in the PRC. 
The introduction of administrative law legislation to facilitate the market economy and to 
improve the justice of the administrative process must be seen against this complex 
background. Law reform designed solely to facilitate market development will usually 
reduce the regulatory framework and the costs of administrative decision-making rather 
than increase them,24 so China's law reforms must be seen as multi-purpose. 
LITERATURE 
Research on administrative law in the PRC is a relatively new field and has been 
dominated by lawyers, who tend to address issues that are of applied interest to legal 
practitioners, such as the content and scope of the relevant laws. In order to place this 
dissertation in the context of the state-society relationship I have had to reach much more 
broadly than this and to cover literature from the fields of politics and society, and 
politics and law. As Chinese administrative law has not been handled extensively from 
these vantage points before, it is difficult to engage in direct debate with other scholars 
over issues of treatment, methodology, and so on. To overcome this I have explored the 
different themes from each field and then formed questions and hypotheses in response. I 
will deal with these in tum. 
Politics and society 
The different extant models for explaining Chinese politics and society have been 
determined, in part, by access to empirical information about the system, but also strongly 
by the prevailing ideology of the time. The early view of PRC politics as totalitarian was, 
24 P. McAuslan, "Law, Governance and the Development of the Market: Practical Problems and Possible 
Solutions'', J. Faundez (ed.), Good Government and l.Aw - Legal and Institutional Reform in Developing 
Countries (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1997), pp.25-44. 
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in the view of a recent study, "a child of the Cold War" .25 Many of the influential earlier 
studies, though, such as those by A. Doak Barnett, admit the anomalies within the 
totalitarian model. 26 These anomalies were observed not just at the elite level in the form 
of conflicting views about the nature and pace of development, but also at the local level, 
as studies about political participation revealed more varied behaviour than the 
monolithic model allowed. 27 
This led to a search for a more accurate paradigm, and the factionalism model emerged.28 
The factionalism model draws our attention to different groups that operate across the 
political spectrum, but it tends to be elite focused. Ordinary people have little impact on 
administrative decision-making from the perspective of factional politics. 
A more recent variation of factionalism is the clientelism framework proposed by Jean Oi 
and Andrew Walder.29 It has been suggested that the clientelism model, rather than only 
focusing on the elite political arena, encompasses elite-mass relations as well, in a way 
that allows the individual citizen to be seen as a significant political actor.30 This model 
may serve well as an analytical framework for examining factory or other group contexts, 
but it tends to separate the individual from the formal political-legal process. What of 
people who are outside a factory or workplace context? How do they seek to assert their 
views regarding some aspect of the state and to influence decision-making? 
25 Flemming Christiansen and Shirin Rai, Chinese Politics and Society - An Introduction (London: Prentice 
Hall, 1996), p.3. 
26 A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1967). 
27 See James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1967); Victor Falkenheim, "Political Participation in China'', Problems of Communism, 27, May-
June 1978, pp.18-32; Marc Blecher, "The Contradictions of Grass-roots Participation and Undemocratic 
Statism in Maoist China and Their Fate", in Brantly Womack (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.129-152. 
28 See Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics" The China Quarterly, 53, 1973, pp.34-66; 
Jing Huang, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
29 See Jean Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); 
Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism - Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press), 1986. 
30 F. Christiansen and S. Rai, Chinese Politics and Society-An Introduction (London; New York: Prentice 
Hall/Harvester Wheat-Sheaf, 1996), p.6. 
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Marc Blecher neatly captures these two dimensions of state-society relations in a study 
that aims to "reopen analysis of popular politics in Maoist China a decade after its 
demise. "31 Blecher shows that the kind of politics that enables grassroots participation 
and influence vis-a-vis the formal system (Walder's could be described as such) is 
qualitatively different from the type of politics that is required to block or alter the 
implementation of state policies (factional politics could be described as such). Blecher 
makes the point that local participatory politics in Maoist China was primarily concerned 
with basic existential questions about food and daily life, and that this had virtually no 
impact on the formal policy process at the regional or national level. 32 This can be said 
too of the contemporary state-society relationship to some extent, albeit not as much as in 
the Maoist era. The state retains the right to set policy direction, but there has been 
increased regularisation of modes of political participation that enable the citizen to more 
easily hurdle the gap between basic existential questions and the formal policy process. 
The new administrative law system is one of these. 
In a study that helps make the link between these two modes, Alan Liu argues that public 
opinion has played an influential role in shaping major political outcomes in the PRC.33 
Another study, by Tianjian Shi, demonstrates the diversity, complexity and depth of 
contemporary political participation in one Chinese city.34 Individual actors may, it 
seems, have influence on official policy and politics. 
31 Marc Blecher, "Structural Change and the Political Articulation of Social Interest in Revolutionary 
China", in Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner (eds.), Marxism and the Chinese Experience, Political 
Economy of Socialism Series (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), pp.190-209. 
32 Marc Blecher, "The Contradictions of Grass-roots Participation and Undemocratic Statism in Maoist 
China and Their Fate", in Brantly Womack (ed.), Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 129-152. 
33 Alan P. Liu, Mass Politics in the People's Republic - State and Society in Contemporary China (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), p.3. 
34 Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). For an 
earlier study on political participation see James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). Townsend includes some elements of the legal system 
such as people's tribunals and people's assessors as forms of political participation, but does not discuss the 
ways in which individuals could modify government decision-making for their own benefit. 
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Studies also have focused on civil society and pluralist interest groups operating as 
political actors. Do these exist in any sphere of PRC society, let alone in administrative 
law in the form of class (or group) suits against the government? Generally there is little 
support for the civil society thesis in China,35 which is built on the premise of organised 
group activity. But this position must be balanced against the increasing amount of formal 
political participation that has been facilitated by new legal modes such as administrative 
law. 
None of these studies accords much, if any, attention to the role of law in the state-society 
nexus.36 Tianjin Shi's work includes a chapter on appeals, but this covers all types of 
appeals, not just those relating to administrative grievances, so there is insufficient detail 
to give us a clear picture of how the new system of administrative law works to the 
benefit or otherwise of the citizen. However, based on the underlying assumptions of this 
body of literature, we can consider this question about contemporary China: 
o If China is an authoritarian state, is the new system a ritualised form of political 
behaviour? Is it an avenue through which the state seeks to maintain control over 
society? 
As the model of the authoritarian state insufficiently accounts for the diversity in political 
life, this is unlikely unless the new system forces its users into atomised roles, which 
affords the state significant opportunity to further its own aims at the expense of the 
citizen's. By way of contrast, the clientelism model draws our attention to the range of 
35 There is a general consensus that the seeds of civil society may exist in Chinese society at present, but 
growth into a strong, healthy institution is not likely in the short term. See Christiansen and Rai, Chinese 
Politics and Society -An Introduction (London; New York: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheat-Sheaf, 1996), 
pp.14-15; AL. Rosenbaum (ed.), State and Society in China - The Consequences of Reform (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1992), p.17. 
36 Kenneth Lieberthal takes a long view of how China has been governed in Governing China - From 
Revolution Through Reform (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1995) but the chapter on state and society is 
limited to traditional political variables such as cadres, human rights, incomes, gender, political inequality, 
and so on. Victor Falkenheim, on the other hand, includes a chapter on legal reform in the volume he 
edited, Chinese Politics From Mao to Deng, Professors of World Peace Academy Books (New York: 
Paragon House, 1989), pp.203-235, as does June Teufel Dreyer in China's Political System - Modernization 
and Tradition, Second edition (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996), Chapter 8. Tang Tsou also mentions legality 
as one of the emerging principles of legitimacy, but he does not explore this in "Marxism, the Leninist 
Party, the Masses, and the Citizens in the Rebuilding of the Chinese State", in Stuart Schram (ed.), 
Foundations and Limits of State Power in China (London and Hong Kong: SOAS and Chinese University 
opportunities that citizens have within their work places to further their own aims and 
assert their will on the state. Walder's neo-traditionalist theory, in his own words: 
... posits a rich subculture of instrumental-personal ties through which 
individuals circumvent formal regulations to obtain official approval, 
housing, and other public and private goods controlled by low-level officials.37 
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This may work to the advantage of citizens as they challenge the state bureaucracy, 
providing they have an institutional context within which to manoeuvre. But if they are 
outside the workplace system, or their workplace system fails to adequately maximise the 
individual's benefit, what options are left? 
o Does the administrative law system serve as a link between factional elite-level 
political decision-making, workplace-based assertiveness, and widespread public 
opinion? 
o Can citizens use the new administrative law system in groups, as in one type of 
civil society, or do their efforts remain atomised? 
Politics and law 
There are a number of themes commonly explored in debates concerning politics and law. 
The first is that the operation of any given legal system is highly dependent upon and 
connected to the state's political structure. This is, of course, one of the outstanding 
features of the Chinese judicial system. In the past it has been subject to intense political 
influence via, for example, the role of the Communist Party's Political Legal Committees 
(i.5t ~ * ITT %), which were the structural link between the Chinese Communist 
Party and the court system. The court system has not been, and is not, independent of 
political influence.38 The Communist Party retains the right to lead all sectors of society, 
Press, 1987), pp.257-289. 
37 Andrew Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986), pp.6-7. 
38 On this topic see: Liao Kuangsheng, "Independent Administration of Justice and the PRC Legal System", 
Chinese Law and Government, 16, 2-3, 1983, pp.123-152; H. Koguchi, "Some Observations About 
'Judicial Independence' in Post-Mao China" (Reprinted from Boston College Third World Law Journal, 7, 
1987), in R.H. Folsom and J.H. Minan (eds), Law in the People's Republic of China-Commentary, 
Readings and Materials (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff and Kluwer, 1989), pp.189-197; Margaret 
Woo, "Adjudication Supervision and Judicial Independence in the P.R.C.", American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 39, 1991, pp.95-119. 
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including the judicial sector. The weak position of the courts may have been somewhat 
strengthened, however, by reforms that attempt to make the bureaucracy more 
accountable, and by the general trend to codify and legalise rights in the PRC. Susan 
Finder explores this theme in relation to the PRC's Supreme People's Court and concludes 
that the reform period has brought a greater degree of autonomy to that court,39 so it is 
reasonable to expect this development elsewhere in the court system. An important 
question must be stated clearly here: 
o Why would an authoritarian regime that has political control over its courts allow 
citizens to sue the government in these very courts? And if the redress gained is 
genuine in some cases, does this indicate an emerging role for the courts, or perhaps a 
disintegrating state? 
A further aspect of the first theme is that in certain political circumstances judicial review 
or legal doctrine alone does not usually account for the greater part of the relationship 
between judicial and executive authorities. A study of preventative-detention laws in 16 
British Commonwealth and former Commonwealth jurisdictions concludes that national 
power politics, the political history of the country, the nature of the regime, and the 
politics and culture of the judiciary are much more significant variables.40 In these 
situations, S. Greer's study claims that judicial review is designed to serve the interests of 
the state by creating a false impression that executive decisions are reviewed by an 
independent body. The value of judicial review thus depends upon political culture. In 
China there is no pretence that courts act independently of executive control; but this does 
not mean that the administrative law system is an empty attempt to create a false 
impression of justice, inasmuch as this would not promote the regime's integrity. William 
Alford expands on the theme of law in the PRC acting as a bolster to regime credibility, 
but by its very function therefore working to expose the regime's lack of integrity.41 This 
39 Susan Finder, "The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China", Journal of Chinese law 
7, 2, 1993, pp.145-224. 
40 S. Greer, "Preventative Detention and Public Security: Law and Practice in Comparative Perspective", 
International Journal of Sociology of law, 23, 1995, pp.45-58. 
41 William P. Alford, "Double-edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law and Legitimacy in the People's Republic 
of China", Daedalus, 122, 2, 1993, pp.45-69. 
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position isolates the PRC legal system from the variety of pressures that bear upon it and 
tends to view it as too distinct from the political superstructure. I am working on the 
premise that the new system is not a complete sham but neither does it effectively control 
government power. So the question arises: 
o What exactly is the courts' role in this new administrative law system if it is not to 
provide for independent reviews? 
Another commonly researched question associated with this theme involves the ways in 
which the characteristics of state and government structures affect the legal system. Issues 
raised in this research as it relates to the Maoist period are often interspersed with 
political science material on the organisation of the bureaucracy42 and policy-mak:ing.43 
Terms such as "cellularity", "mutual interdependence", and "hierarchical" are often used 
to describe the Party and state bureaucracies. 
o Decision-making is both personalised and institutional, and is often influenced by the 
pervasive effects of personal connections(~ '*) . How does this affect the system 
of administrative redress? 
Studies on the relationship between state structures and legal processes claim that in 
circumstances where a state is hierarchically organised, disputes between state agencies 
are rarely litigated, but rather are submitted to a common hierarchical superior for 
settlement.44 China could be described as such a state, so an important issue to examine is 
what happens to disputes that are similar in substance to administrative law disputes but 
are not resolved through that procedure. This will give us further insight into the actual 
role that administrative appeals are playing as an avenue for seeking redress. 
o The other side of this coin is to ask how the new system of administrative law is 
affecting the political structure. Has it rendered the political structure less 
42 See Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966); Harry Harding, Organizing China: The Problem of Bureaucracy 1949-1976 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1981). 
43 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China - Leaders, Structures and Processes 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 
44 M.R. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). 
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· personalised and more institutionalised? 
A second common theme in the politics and law debate is that particular regulations serve 
the economic or political interests of particular classes in society. Marx's often quoted 
views about law being an instrument of class oppression reflect this idea. Edward J. 
Epstein, for example, argues that various fields of Chinese law have been used 
instrumentally by the regime to achieve political, social, or economic goals.45 He claims, 
for example, that mediation is a tool of ideological and social control, that economic 
contract law is a tool of planning, and that marriage law is a means of destroying the 
political form of the traditional family, while criminal law is a weapon against hostile 
political interests. Whether we agree with Epstein on all these points or not, it is generally 
accepted that law in China has primarily served Party/state instrumental purposes in the 
past. 
o Does the new system of administrative law serve primarily as a top-down tool of state 
administration and as yet another way for the state to assert its dominance in 
administrative management over society? 
But the instrumental view of law fails to seriously consider the texture and variations 
within the political-legal system, especially under the pressures of reform and 
internationalisation. The development of the new administrative law system forms part of 
a corpus of new legal reforms. Modern democratic states have a system of administrative 
law that seeks to protect individual rights from state encroachment and to circumscribe 
government power. China wants to be part of the modern, developed world and thus is 
slowly putting in place the various "pieces" that are perceived to be part of such a world. 
Law in China is also said to function as ideology.46 Part of its role in legitimating state 
power must be to function ideologically by providing a common and widely accepted 
framework for dispute resolution. This notion has much to recommend it in considering 
45 Edward J. Epstein, "Law and Legitimation in Post-Mao China", in Pitman Potter, (ed), Domestic Law 
Reforms in Post-Mao China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p.24, Note 31. 
46 Ibid, p.19. 
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legal reform in the PRC. The push for rule of law/rule by law rather than "rule by man" is 
receiving an increasing amount of attention in political-legal discourse in the PRC47 and 
is a significant trend that will likely endure.48 It has been further bolstered by 
amendments to the state Constitution to incorporate rule by law as one of the fundamental 
principles of the country.49 
o It is clear that the dominant norms of governance in China are moving away from 
arbitrary Party diktat and personal decision-making, which dominated the start of the 
reform era, to permanent recognition of greater institutionalisation in politics and law. 
What is the contribution of the new system of administrative law to this trend? 
The third theme is a corollary of the second. Under some circumstances, law in the PRC 
has served instrumental purposes on behalf of the state, and the state is now in retreat 
from its prior efforts to control all aspects of society. We must consider whether there is 
room for citizens to use the legal system to assert their claims over the state. Studies have 
shown that in other historical circumstances, even when the state uses law hegemonically, 
the ruled classes also assert their right to use the law to defend or claim their rights. E.P 
Thompson examined the passage of the Black Act in eighteenth-century England which 
introduced the death penalty for people caught stealing deer or timber from the local 
landowner's forest.so Thompson concludes that although the penalties were severe and 
used to oppress the local peasants, the ordinary people also used the statutes to their own 
advantage to help define their use rights vis a vis land and property.s1 
o We can similarly expect to find instances where citizens use the new system to defend 
and clarify their rights against state encroachment. In what specific types of cases 
does this occur? 
47 See Beijing Review, Nov.30-Dec.6, 1998, p.20. 
48 
''The New Milestone of Socialist Democratic Legal System Construction", * ~ (Seeking Truth), 16 
Nov. 97, No.22, pp.8-14. 
49 Instituted at the second session of the NPC on 15 March 1999: Beijing Review, March 8-14 1999, p.13. 
50 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters - The Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975). 
510n a similar theme see: J.M. Sellers, "Litigation as a Local Political Resource: Courts in Controversies 
over Land Use in France, Germany, and the United States", Law and Society Review, 29, 3, 1995, pp.475-
516; Canan, Kretzman, Hennessy, and Pring, "Using Law Ideologically: The Conflict Between Economic 
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Administrative law 
The literature available on the topic of administrative law in the PRC can be divided into 
three broad groups: analytical work in the form of either journal articles or monographs; 
texts for teaching; and case material that can be found in monograph collections or 
interspersed with the teaching material. 
The analytical work has mostly been carried out by Western scholars who are legal 
specialists and often focuses on issues that Western scholars would examine in their own 
countries' administrative law systems. Pitman Potter, for example, examines the scope 
and content of the provisions of the ALL,52 as does Epstein.53 Fred Burke made a good 
start on administrative law issues related to the Chinese State Bureau of Standards and 
alluded to possible instrumental use of the subdivisions for standards in managing 
international trade but had no cases or substance to back it up, most likely because his 
was a very early piece in this field. 54 
Jianyang Yu examined the review process for patent infringement in the PRC and drew 
out the problems caused by the dual functions of the body responsible for patent 
administration: this body both supervises all parties to a patent application as well as 
acting as a dispute resolution body when disputes arise. Yu's article signals an important 
theme for this dissertation, which is that the new administrative law system must be 
analysed in the context of other options available to resolve similar disputes.55 Parties to a 
and Political Liberty", Journal of Law and Politics, 8, 3, 1992, pp.539-558. 
52 Pitman Potter, "The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC", 1994. 
53 Edward Epstein, "Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens can Sue the State but not the Party", China 
News Analysis, 1386, 1 June 1989. 
54Fred Burke, "Administrative Law of Standardization in the PRC", Journal of Chinese Law, 1, 2, 1987, 
pp.271-301. 
55 Jianyang Yu, "Review of Patent Infringement Litigation in the People's Republic of China", Journal of 
Chinese Law, 5, 2, 1991, pp.297-347. The structure of the dissertation reflects this idea, which I have also 
borrowed from Peter Cane, An Introduction to Administrative Law, Second edition (Oxford, England: 
Clarendon Press, 1992). Donald Clarke, "Dispute Resolution in China", in Tahirih Lee (ed.), Contract, 
Guanxi, and Dispute Resolution in China, Chinese Law: Social, Political, Historical and Economic 
Perspectives (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1997), pp.369-421 develops a similar theme by 
examining the different institutions that engage in dispute resolution in China. Clarke draws out the pros 
and cons of the various institutional settings and this has also given me some clues for the dissertation. 
(Clarke's article is also available at: Journal of Chinese Law, 5, 1991, pp.245-296.) 
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patent dispute may take their case directly to court, or they may take it to the patent 
administration authority, which has the power to act like an administrative court. The 
patent administration authority is able to provide more technical expertise than a regular 
Chinese court, and this is a significant factor in the dispute resolution process for all 
administrative disputes. 
One of the finest analytical pieces on this topic to date is by Minxin Pei.56 Pei's basic 
theme is that the new Administrative Litigation Law does result in some effective redress 
for citizens. The strength of Pei's work is that it uses a quantitative approach: the reader is 
given lots of statistics about who sues whom, and so on. But Pei's paper does not entail 
qualitative assessment of the new administrative law system. This dissertation is 
attempting just that: 
o What is it like for an individual who tries to use the new system? What obstacles are 
encountered, what can be done to overcome them, and who or which institutions have 
the most power? 
The teaching material, in both English and Chinese, has been prepared for law courses or 
by legal practitioners for a specific audience. This includes English-language material by 
Lin,57 Come,58 Finder59 and Potter.60 
Similar Chinese-language material is found in books on administrative review, 
administrative litigation, or administrative law in general. These books contain lots of 
56 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins: Administrative Litigation in China", The China Quarterly, 152 
December 1997, pp.832-862. Pei's work is hereafter referred to as "Citizens v. Mandarins". A similar 
approach was used by Jyh-pin Fa, and Shao-chuan Leng, "Judicial Review of Administration in the People's 
Republic of China", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 23, 3, 1991, pp.447-462 
(reprinted with revisions as Judicial Review of Administration in the People's Republic of China, 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 1 (Baltimore, Md: University of 
Maryland, 1992). Pei's work is more thorough in scope and depth. 
57 Lin Feng, Administrative Law: Procedures and Remedies in China, The China Law Series (Hong Kong: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996). 
58 Peter Corne, Foreign Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1997). 
59 Susan Finder, "Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone". 
60 Pitman Potter, "The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC: Changing the Relationship Between the 
Courts and Administrative Agencies in China", Chinese Law and Government, 3, 24, 1991. 
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details about definitions, scope, concepts, penalties, participants, jurisdiction, and so on, 
and usually contain a section of illustrative cases.61 Some of these books provide answers 
to specific legal questions,62 but these tend to reiterate the concepts and ideas found 
elsewhere rather than probe difficult issues. 
The illustrative cases provided in all of these latter books are useful as guides to the 
handling of cases, but should not necessarily be taken as an accurate record of the actual 
case in question. The cases are usually presented through an account of the events, 
followed by an editorial comment or explanation by the books' editors. These editorial 
comments are sometimes enlightening, especially as they state on occasion that the court's 
decision about the case in question was incorrect, and then proceed to explain what 
should have been the decision. 
One of the problems with the law-related research in China is that court and agency 
records are not as comprehensive, systematic, or publicly available as court reports in the 
West. Actual cases must be collected from case compilations.63 This poses a problem 
when conducting case-based research, but I have tried to get around this by using 
fieldwork to interview Chinese administrative law scholars, teachers, officials, lawyers, 
and petitioners. Cases that are recorded in these sources cannot be taken as faithful 
records of the actual events, as they are compiled primarily for the purpose of teaching 
61 Fang Xin (ed), .fi iE)t W 10 :f~ j¥j (A Guide to Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: The People's 
Press, 1990); Fang Xin (ed), .fi iE)t ~ 1.J<. :f~ j¥j (A Guide to Administrative Review) (Beijing: The 
Legal Press, 1991); Liu Tianxing (ed), i:f III .fi iE)t ~ .fi iE)t W 10 ~ ~ ::¥: ~ 19~ ~ #! 
(Selected Cases for Teaching Chinese Administrative Law and Administrative Litigation Law) (Beijing: 
,,_ -:'Cff ,,_ -"J... -llt.t ')\. 
The People's Courts Press, 1992); Liu Yong'an, 1T J1.A.1T /'J w.; 1t'.. (An Introduction to 
Administrative Behaviour) (Beijin[.. China Legal Press, 1992). 
62 A Jiang et al, .fi iE)t W 10 Xl ~ ~ ~ (Explanation of Difficult Problems of Administrative 
Litigation) (B~i~ing: Chinese Peo£le's Public Security University Press, 1992); Huang Jie (ed), 
.fi iE)t W 10 iZ ~ :ffil ~ J[ ffr ~ (Opinions and Interpretation of the Implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law) (Beijing: Chinese People's Public Security University Press, 1992). 
63 Liu Tianxing (ed), i:f III .fi iE)t ~ .fi iE)t W 10~~::¥:~19~ ~ #! (Selected Cases for 
Teaching Chinese Administrative Law and Administrative Litigation Law) (Beijing: The People's Courts 
Press, 1992); A~~~ ~19~ ~ (Selected Cases from the People's Courts) (Beijing: Supreme 
People's Court Press, annual volumes); High-level Ju~es Training Centre of China and Chinese People's 
University Law Institute (eds), i:f III'$' -¥!J ~ 19~ * .W: (Important Chinese Trial Cases) (Beijing: 
Chinese People's Public Security University Press, 1992). 
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judges how to handle cases. To this end they may be extensively rewritten. This problem 
aside, the cases can be used as a guide to how the regime would like the administrative 
law system to work, and thus are valuable for our purposes. 
Methodology and issues 
At the outset, my aim was to examine the PRC's new system of administrative law by 
following the process from the point where an administrative penalty is imposed, through 
to the court process of administrative litigation, and to compare and contrast the process 
in at least three types of administrative organs. The intention was to see how it was 
handled in different policy contexts but to also draw out the common elements. 
One can never be sure how the fieldwork will proceed in the PRC, so I cast my net wide 
at first and covered material relating to four types of administrative organs: public 
security, land administration, industry and commerce, and environmental protection. I did 
not expect to be able to cover all four with equal depth when conducting the fieldwork. 
My preference was for the first two, public security and land administration, because 
these organs have the largest number of appeals lodged against them under the ALL. 
Industry and commerce organs were the third choice because their power, position, and 
functions, particularly in relation to public security organs, illustrate many important 
features of the new administrative law system. The dissertation also makes reference on 
occasion to other organs. 
I spent nearly five months conducting fieldwork in Beijing, from April to August 1998. I 
was hosted by the Centre for Constitutional Law and Administrative Research in the Law 
Department at Beijing University. The head of the Centre, Professor Jiang Ming' an, was 
warm and generous with his time and greatly assisted my research by arranging 
introductions to colleagues, administrative officials, graduate students, lawyers, and 
judges. I am also indebted to Judge Jiang Huiling of the Supreme People's Court of the 
PRC, who I had earlier met in Australia and who welcomed me as a friend and colleague. 
Judge Jiang greatly facilitated my research by arranging introductions to fellow judges 
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and by being generous with his own time and insights. 
I was unable to gain the in-depth access to administrative organs and their departmental 
review processes that I had hoped for. I wanted to talk at length with the officials 
responsible for administrative review: that is, those whose daily work involved 
processing applications to review an administrative decision. This did not eventuate. For 
several types of organs - the land administration, environmental protection, and industry 
and commerce - I interviewed the directors of the legal affairs offices, but this did not 
yield the detail that I was seeking. Part of the problem with examining administrative 
review is that it appears not to be taken very seriously and many organs lack dedicated 
officers to handle it. 
I did, however, gain good access to judges who know a great deal about how the litigation 
system operates. This is because members of China's legal system take administrative 
litigation more seriously. I was also able to view an administrative litigation trial at a 
district court in Beijing which, despite the academic hazards of attending an officially 
approved trial, proved not to be too "cleansed of all injustice" and so was of benefit in 
filling in another part of the picture. 
Despite the problems encountered in fieldwork, I was able to build up a picture of what it 
is like for an individual to use this new system to challenge the government. A 
combination of written case material, interviews, secondary sources, official documents 
and informal conversations with officials at all levels has been utilised.64 Whilst in 
Beijing I collected many sources that had been published in recent years about the PRC's 
new system of administrative law. The material on this subject increasingly reveals 
problems in the system and is slowly becoming more analytical rather than simply 
descriptive or formulaic, which renders it more useful for research. The judicial system 
has become better organised and more systematic in recent years in producing volumes of 
case records that are used as teaching materials for judges. 
64 Records of interviews are kept on file with th author. 
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Public security organs 
The PRC's public security organs are responsible for both investigating crime and 
conducting some elements of public administration. In general terms they are authorised 
to safeguard national security, maintain public order, protect the personal safety, freedom, 
and property of citizens, protect public property, and prevent, check and punish criminal 
activities.65 They are responsible for everything from household registrations (which are 
part of their administrative duties) to investigating serious crimes. A public security organ 
has the authority to handle what in the West would generally be seen as minor criminal 
matters by imposing administrative punishments, which may be a fine or a detention, 
without taking the case to court. Efforts to overturn administrative punishments, such as 
these, feature regularly in the administrative litigation system. In the course of a lifetime 
most people will deal with the public security organ at least several times because of its 
far-reaching role in regulating social life in the PRC, which also contributes to the high 
number of administrative litigation cases involving this organ. 
The administrative powers of a public security organ enable the organ to detain a person 
for up to 15 days for minor criminal offences without a trial or any judicial investigation. 
This is a much-criticised part of PRC police powers. But these non-judicial powers also 
extend to detaining a person for up to three years under the re-education through 
labour (Jf :q; ~ ~) regulations. Technically speaking, these regulations are not an 
administrative punishment but are described as a coercive measure c:Sm '$J m 1m ).66 
This measure can be imposed for a wide range of minor offences, especially for repeat 
offenders. Those penalised under this measure are permitted to challenge the decision in 
court under the ALL.67 There has been speculation that these regulations may be repealed 
65 PRC People's Police Law, Article 2. 
66 Interview with a judge of the Supreme People's Court, Beijing, 1998. See also 
n i;IJ ~ ~ ut IT .... j} ~ (Re-education Through Labour Trial Measures), 21January1982 in 
q:t .$ A R .ft :fo 00 ~ 4$ ± 45 (Compendium of Laws of the People's Republic of China) 
(Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989), pp.1583-1589. 
67 Fang Xin (ed.), IT~ -w 1* 1~ m (A Guide to Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: The People's 
Press, 1990), pp.27-30. See also the ALL, Articlel 1, Clause 2. 
25 
or modified,68 but for the present they remain in force. 
The public security organs do not enjoy a good reputation when it comes to arrests, 
investigations, detention, and treatment of detainees.69 They are known for their frequent 
use of beatings, including the use of electric batons, other forms of torture, illegal 
detention, and generally poor treatment of those in custody. They are known to be lax 
towards proper administrative processes and frequently violate procedural correctness in 
favour of substantive justice. Some of the officers accept bribes, extort bribes, and engage 
in corruption. A different type of problem is that public security organs sometimes 
conduct business ventures in conjunction with local courts, which further undermines 
police and judicial impartiality. 
Land administration organs 
Land administration organs are another powerful group of bureaucracies that have wide-
ranging powers. These organs draft policies, laws and regulations, conduct the 
administration of all aspects of land management, and act to settle land disputes. As all 
land in the PRC is notionally state-owned, these organs are responsible for issuing 
certificates of use rights to various state entities and individuals, including the procedures 
for transferring land from one user to another. They also have the important task of 
leading the coordination of a land management plan in conjunction with other less 
powerful organs that have functions related to the land, such as departments of 
agriculture, forests, fisheries, water resources, city construction and housing management. 
These organs conduct land inspections to ensure that the land is being utilised for the 
purposes for which it has been allocated, a function that gives rise to many administrative 
68 Zhang Xuelei, ~ T 1f iJJ ~ =* ~J Jt B'tJ i! # ,@ ~ (Reflections on the Re-education 
Through Labour System) in .fi iE)t 'iji' ~'lj ~ Xl IBJ ~ ~ 1Q- (A New Discussion on the 
Difficulties of Administrative Trials) (Beijing: The People's Courts Press, 1996), pp.30-44. See also 
Ronald Brown, Understanding Chinese Couns and Legal Process: Law with Chinese Characteristics (The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), p.13. 
69 On this topic generally see June Teufel Dreyer, "Crime and Punishment: The Legal System of the PRC", 
China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition, Second edition (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1996), 
pp.178-181. 
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disputes. A typical scenario is that a person has been allocated a piece of land for 
agricultural purposes, but builds a house on it instead. Other disputes arise when a person 
has been allocated a certain amount of land for the purpose of building a house, but 
occupies extra land. The land organs handle two types of legal disputes: civil and 
administrative. Civil disputes arise between two individuals over some aspect of land use, 
and in such cases the land organs provide arbitration to resolve the problem. 
Administrative disputes occur when a land management organ issues a decision in 
relation to a land management violation, and one of the parties to the dispute disagrees 
with the decision. These different roles and interests of the organs challenge the 
independence and fairness of the organs as they carry out their functions. 
Industry and commerce organs 
Industry and commerce organs supervise and manage the conduct of commercial markets. 
They draw up policies, laws and guidelines; supervise the registration of commercial 
enterprises; supervise the drafting and ratification of economic contracts; handle 
trademark applications and registration, as well as make final decisions on trademark 
disputes; regulate business practices; and supervise the advertising industry.70 
Like all administrative organs, the industry and commerce bureaus have branches at 
municipal, provincial, county and local levels. They have the authority to issue fines, 
order closure of a business, seize fake products and take other measures to maintain order 
in the marketplace. Some of the regulatory functions associated with the marketplace 
bring these organs into contact with public security organs, and this causes jurisdictional 
problems that are sometimes settled during the course of an administrative litigation case. 
These organs have a military, authoritarian style; the market regulation officers wear a 
green army-style uniform, and some officials have been known to be violent when 
handling marketplace regulation. 
70 This information is derived from a booklet distributed by the SAIC to explain its functions: 
c:p ~ A ~ # *1 00 00 * I ~ fT i)( ~ JI ~ • iR. (A Brief Introduction to the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of China). 
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Structure of the dissertation 
The primary thesis to be explored is political in nature. The system of administrative law 
as it operated throughout the 1990s is a genuine attempt to offer limited redress to 
plaintiffs while further developing the justice and legality of the administrative process. It 
is not an empty claim to legitimacy or a shabby attempt by the state to strengthen its 
waning control over society. 
Chapter Two sets the historical and institutional context of the new administrative law 
system. It briefly recounts the purposes and functions of law in the early PRC, 
highlighting the systems of redress of grievances that were available to citizens, some of 
which survive today, such as the letters/visits office. The roles of the state's Ministry of 
Supervision and the Party's Discipline Inspection Commission are touched upon to 
explain the behaviour of state officials. The stages of development of the new 
administrative law system are discussed, as this draws out some of the problems with its 
current operation. A brief account is given of the alternatives to the new administrative 
law system that citizens may utilise: administrative review (which is sometimes part of 
the process of administrative litigation, and on other occasions is the only option 
available for redress); the letters/visits system; the media; big character posters; 
mediation; and administrative litigation, which forms part of the new administrative law 
system. 
Chapter Three examines the theoretical and policy background to the new administrative 
law system, and then explains the provisions of the Administrative Litigation Law, the 
Administrative Review Regulations and the State Compensation Law. The paradigm used 
by Chinese legal scholars to describe the new system is examined, together with 
discussion of the political ideas expressed at the time the ALL was promulgated. 
Chapter Four examines the process of administrative review by following in the steps of 
an applicant. Examples of the application forms used in the process are provided and 
analysis made of how applications are handled by the reviewing organ. Numerical data on 
the handling of the formal process shows that there is an extremely slim chance of 
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success for the applicant, and that the system aims more at improving the regularity and 
accuracy of the administrative process than in providing an effective avenue of redress. 
Chapter Five explores the role of compensation in gaining redress for administrative 
grievances. Applications for compensation are filed either before or in conjunction with 
administrative litigation applications. The effect of mediation at this stage of the process 
is shown to be especially detrimental to the applicant's chance of success. Administrative 
organs frequently use this phase of the process to pressure the applicant to withdraw an 
application to the court for administrative litigation. 
Chapter Six explores the environment in which administrative litigation applications are 
made. The role of administrative litigation as part of the system of judicial supervision is 
canvassed. The criteria used by courts to determine the legality of a specific 
administrative act are shown to have particular interpretations in the context of the new 
administrative law system. Most importantly, the influence of the various players in the 
system is examined: courts and judges, administrative organs, lawyers and the applicant. 
Chapter Seven examines the final step in the applicant's pursuit of justice. This chapter 
shows that the application for administrative litigation is probably the most crucial phase 
of the process, as courts play an extremely important role in determining which cases to 
accept. An account of an administrative litigation trial is given, the purpose of a judicial 
recommendation is explored, and the effect of court fees on the process is shown to be a 
weak point. Numerical data are used to weigh the outcomes of the administrative 
litigation process. 
Chapter Eight revisits the list of hypotheses/issues/questions introduced earlier in Chapter 
One and draws conclusions about what the new administrative law system tells us about 
state-society relations in the PRC. 
H.R.C. Wade has noted that it is in the implementation of administrative law that the 
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principle of rule of law is most visible.71 That is to say, any instrumentalist rhetoric or 
insincerity on the part of a state in relation to its claims to be ruled by law will be most 
clearly visible in administrative law, as this is where state power and law directly interact. 
This dissertation will help illuminate this important aspect of state power and citizen 
rights that in the coming years will underpin legal and political development in the PRC. 
71 Wade, Administrative Law, p.22. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE NEW 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SYSTEM 
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One of the universal problems of government is how to ensure the accountability of, and 
control over, those who implement government policy. Administrative law, as noted in 
Chapter One, can operate from a number of angles to tackle this problem. It may regulate 
the structure of the government and its administrative organs, it may regulate the 
processes which officials must use to implement policy, and it may provide remedial 
mechanisms that can check policy implementation after the event. The new 
administrative law system in the PRC is a remedial mechanism designed to check on 
policy implementation after the event. It is the third attempt the PRC state has made 
during the twentieth century to institute a legal framework that allows citizens to directly 
challenge the government's administrative decisions in court. 
The fact that it is the third attempt to institute a legal remedial system, not to mention the 
maintenance of other forms of control such as supervision by other parts of the 
government or Party bureaucracy, informal complaint mechanisms for citizens, and 
political controls in the form of campaigns to eliminate bribery, corruption and other 
problems, raises a few questions for this dissertation: 
o How is the new system different from its predecessors? 
o Has the new system been introduced because the previous ones did not work? 
o What is the dispute resolution context in which the new system operates, and if other 
types of controls still operate what is the advantage or significance of the new system? 
In examining what went before, we are concerned mainly with locating institutions that 
may have fulfilled similar functions to those of the new system of administrative law. 
These institutions need not be "administrative litigation" systems in the proper sense, nor 
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do they need to involve a court as a reviewing body. The essence of what we are looking 
for involves options available to individuals to challenge government administrative 
action. Further, we are looking for institutions that remedied government decisions that, 
in substance, are similar to today's specific administrative decisions. Broadly, these 
include administrative penalties imposed by the state's police system; regulatory decisions 
relating to taxation or business operations; and instances where an administrative organ of 
the state infringes on the personal or property rights of an in di vi dual. In this task we are 
hampered by the lack of sufficient empirical materials on earlier institutions, particularly 
case records. There is, however, enough information available to warrant a brief look at 
the earlier periods of the People's Republic, followed by a more detailed look at the 
reform period. 
The People's Republic of China: 1949-1978 
The revolutionary ideology held by the Communist Party when it came to power in 1949 
was the basis for wide-ranging political, legal, economic and social reforms. The regime, 
intent on establishing its power networks, gave little serious thought to providing avenues 
of redress through which citizens could challenge government decisions. The prevailing 
ideology was that the revolution was to benefit the proletariat through radically 
transforming China, a concept that allowed little room for individuals who might oppose 
government decisions. Indeed, any opposition was interpreted as politically motivated and 
therefore subject to political repression. 
The regime implemented a variety of methods aimed at controlling its officials, but 
methods utilising courts and laws did not feature prominently. The new government 
abolished all the existing Nationalist government laws, including the 1932 Administrative 
Litigation Law. 1 In its place, the Common Programme of 1949 gave PRC citizens the 
1 This law, together with the Organic Law of Administrative Courts, was promulgated by the Nationalist 
government. The laws established an administrative court to hear cases brought by legal entities against a 
5~vernr;ien,t administrative organ. Very few cases were heard under these laws. See Fang Xin 
11i){W10 ~~ f$j (A Guide to Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: The People's Press, 1990), p.10. 
constitutional right to lodge a complaint with the state's supervisory or judicial organs.2 
The 1954 state Constitution modified this right slightly by allowing citizens to lodge 
either a written or oral complaint with any state organ, and also to claim compensation 
where personnel of a state organ encroached upon the rights of citizens.3 Very little 
material exists that demonstrates this right to appeal was exercised by individuals. 
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In substantive laws, there was also quite a mixed record. The state was willing to provide 
judicial redress for plaintiffs who disagreed with a decision of a people's government in 
relation to land reform,4 but not for disagreements over the public security organs' public 
order management powers.5 The only option here was to petition for the process of what 
is now known as administrative review, which allowed for a higher level of the public 
security organ to reconsider the decision. Jerome Cohen reports a public order 
management case where this occurred,6 attesting to the implementation of the 
departmental review process, but I have been unable to find any record of cases of any 
type that were challenged by citizens in court. The PRC author of a book on the ALL 
admits that even though the laws were in place in the 1950s, routine operation of the 
system was never established.7 Western-based scholars concur by describing these laws 
2 q:t 00 A ~ ~ i'Et t>JJ i1lf' ~ 1.5< .ft n:tf ~~ :@! (Chinese People's Political Consultative 
r+t .£!;. 1 ~ .:!::!:_ ~ 6tl .:-.+ Jr.if. ".+ .:!:JJ.t. A. -h' Conference Common Programme), 1954, Article 19, T , J'. ~ , . -'!'I-I ~ 12' w 12' Ni..~ T.J 
(Compendium of Laws and Regulations of the People's Republic of China) (Beijing: China Democratic 
Legal System Press, 1994 ), vol. l, pp.1-4. Hereafter referred to as Compendium of Laws and Regulations. 
3 q:r $ A ~.ft :fa 00:3)e1* (The Constitution of the People's Republic of China) 1954, Article 97, 
Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 1994, vol.l, pp.4-10. 
4 q:r $ A ~ .ft :fa 00 ± it!l. '& lj£ ~ (Land Reform Law of the People's Republic of China) 
1950, Article 31,. Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 1994, vol.6, pp.935-937. 
5 q:r $ A ~ .ft :fa 00 i'Et 3(- ff f1. ;9l .fiJ %' 19~ (Public Order Management Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China) 1957, Article 18, Clauses 4-7, Compendium of Laws and Regulations, 1994, 
vol.3, pp.99-102. See also Lung-Sheng Tao, "Politics and Law Enforcement in China: 1949-1970", 
American Journal of Comparative Law, 22, 1974, pp.753-756 (reprinted in Tahirih Lee (ed.), Law, the 
State, and Society in China (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1997); Stanley Lubman "Form and 
Function in the Chinese Criminal Process", Columbia Law Review, 69, 4, 1969, pp.535-575. 
6 Jerome Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China 1949 -1963: An Introduction 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 224-227. 
7 Fang Xin (ed.), fr~ W i:1C :J~ ffl (A Guide to Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: The People's 
Press, 1990), p.10. 
as "political-philosophical declarations (rather) than legally binding norms".8 This 
deficiency draws our attention to an important consideration for the study of 
contemporary administrative law: that is, are the newly promulgated laws mainly 
political-philosophical declarations, or do they have much more practical effect for 
plaintiffs than did provisions during the early years of the People's Republic? 
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The lack of a judicial review option in the early years of the PRC is not, however, an 
indicator of the Chinese authorities' lack of commitment to providing avenues of redress 
against illegal or unfair administrative decisions. The most effective way for an individual 
to gain redress at that time was to use the letters/visits system, which requires individuals 
to lodge a written or oral complaint directly with the offending administrative organ. This 
mechanism still operates in the PRC, so we will discuss it in detail below. 
Other methods included establishing behaviour-control institutions and conducting 
political campaigns. At least three institutions - the Ministry of State Control (Guojia 
kongzhi bu), the Ministry of Supervision (Jiancha bu), and the Central Discipline 
Inspection Commission (Zhonggong jilu jiancha weiyuanhui) (CDIC) - were established 
in the early 1950s to combat a range of bureaucratic problems in state and Party organs: 
incompetence, economic waste, corruption, violations of discipline, and criminal 
offences.9 These bodies usually responded to complaints that were forwarded by other 
bureaucratic organs, although occasionally a letter of individual complaint found its way 
to the Ministry of Supervision. Yet this body, like the others, was often powerless to act 
on problems it discovered. Both ministries were abolished in 1959 and the CDIC in 1968. 
8 Jyh-pin Fa and Shao-chuan Leng, Judicial Review of Administration in the People's Republic of China 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series, Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 1 (Baltimore,Md: University of 
Maryland, 1992), p.3. 
9 See: A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.61-63; Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist 
China, Second edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), Chapter Five; Lawrence Sullivan, 
"The Role of the Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977-83", Asian Survey, 24, 6, 1984, 
pp.597-617. 
The Ministry of Supervision and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission have 
been re-established in the reform era with clarified roles for each. 10 
Political campaigns were also conducted. 11 In1951 the Three Antis(= JX) campaign 
was implemented against corruption, waste and bureaucratism. The Five Antis 
(Ii JX) campaign was aimed more at particular problems associated with the 
bourgeoisie, such as bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property and 
economic secrets. 
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It is generally accepted that these early attempts to establish accountability over 
administrative behaviour had limited success. 12 It is important to consider the reasons for 
this, as we cannot discount the possibility that the failure was due to factors other than 
defective institutions. Part of the way that the new administrative law system operates is 
by giving more autonomy to the courts, but if the real problem lies with political 
deficiencies, then individual plaintiffs may have very little success in appealing to a court 
under the new administrative law system. 
Lawrence Sullivan explains some of the organisational and functional deficiencies that 
fed the early failure of the Party's discipline control mechanisms. He claims the lack of an 
administrative structure below the provincial level made the inspection mechanisms 
subordinate to party committees, 13 and that this made it extremely difficult for control 
organs to discipline Party members at the local level. 
This problem re-emerges in the implementation of the new administrative law system and 
is often explained ultimately as a financial imperative: party committees control the funds 
10 See Yasheng Huang, "Administrative Monitoring in China'', The China Quarterly, 143, 1995, pp.828-
843. The Ministry of Supervision is a government body concerned with administrative officials (both Party 
and non-Party members) who work in state institutions. The CDIC is a Party body concerned with Party 
members working in Party organisations. 
11 See Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, Second edition, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968), p.318. 
12 Ibid, Chapter Five; Lawrence Sullivan, "The Role of the Control Organs", pp.597-617. 
13 Lawrence Sullivan, "The Role of the Control Organs'', p.601. 
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of local courts~ therefore they control the courts' decisions. 14 But this is too simplistic an 
explanation and does not sufficiently account for the influential role of political culture in 
a state. Australian courts are similarly funded by the governments of the states in which 
they are located, but this has not led to the application of political power to judicial 
decision-making in Australia on a scale comparable to that which plagues the PRC. 
Individual plaintiffs who use the new administrative law system in the PRC still face this 
administrative and political interference. This will be examined more closely in Chapters 
Six and Seven. 
Sullivan cites the complex process required for an individual to bring a complaint as 
another reason for the early failure of control mechanisms. No less than 27 steps were 
apparently necessary for a citizen to bring a complaint against an important person. In 
comparison, the new administrative law system is simple to use, although it can be very 
slow, so complexity is unlikely to be a barrier to contemporary use of the administrative 
law system. In fact, the new system was consciously designed to be simple yet effective,15 
which may indicate a genuine intention on the part of the regime to offer citizens a real 
means of obtaining redress for administrative abuses. 
The reform era 
In the reform era, politics has moved from centre stage, and the pressure to modernise has 
brought changes to almost every sector of PRC life, including the business of 
government. The state's commitment to law as a means of regulating society and 
providing justice has strengthened, 16 as has the position of the individual in relation to the 
state. There is now more variety permitted in terms of dress, occupation, pastimes, 
consumption habits, political thought, and, significantly for this dissertation, avenues 
through which individuals can modify state actions. 
14 
"Legal Protection and Judicial Efficiency", Inside China Mainland, November 1998, pp.15-18. 
15 Fang Xin (ed.), ff iE){ ji[ 1.)( :f~ ffl (A Guide to Administrative Review) (Beijing: The People's 
Press, 1991), Chapter One. 
16 The start of the reform era is generally referenced to the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Central 
Committee in December 1978. 
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The new administrative law system began with the promulgation of the Administrative 
Litigation Law of the PRC in 1989. We will look closely at the drafting process for that 
law below, as it demonstrates the progression of thought in PRC legal circles associated 
with the concept of 'people sue officials'. But first we will briefly cover the early reform 
period to see what exactly individuals could do to defend their rights against state 
encroachment, as this will demonstrate some of the imperatives for the new 
administrative law system. 
The development of administrative law during the 1980s has been described by Professor 
Jiang Ming' an of Beijing University Law Department as occurring in four stages: 17 
theoretical preparation; judicial experimentation; administrative litigation law research 
and drafting; and formal drafting and implementation of the administrative litigation law. 
I will use Jiang's stages with wider references where necessary. 
First stage - theoretical preparation 
The first stage began in 1978 with the reform era and lasted until about 1982. The most 
significant shift was that courts were able to hear administrative cases in practice, rather 
than just having the legal authority to do so but not acting upon that. Existing laws such 
as the Land Reform Law had, at least on paper, provided for judicial redress against 
administrative action, and new laws such as the People's Congress Electoral Law of 1979 
also provided similar redress. 18 The approach was to make provision in individual laws 
rather than a blanket legal provision. At the same time, a great deal of research into 
foreign administrative law systems was undertaken. 
Second stage - judicial experimentation 
The second stage began with the promulgation in 1982 of the Civil Procedure Law (for 
trial implementation) 
17 For a full description of the four stages see Jiang Ming'an, IT lE)I: W * ~ ¥ (Jurisprudence of 
Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1993), pp.31-37. 
18 Edward Epstein, "Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens Can Sue the State but not the Party", China 
News Analysis, 1386, 1 June 1989, p.2. 
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19 
and lasted until 1986. 
This law provided generally for administrative cases to be heard in the courts where 
specific regulations allowed, and this occurred in the following sectors: (1) food hygiene, 
(2) land administration, (3) forest management, (4) administration of industry and 
commerce, (5) some aspects of administrative decisions relating to patents, (6) some 
aspects of administrative decisions relating to taxation, (7) health management and (8) the 
marine environment.20 
Over 130 such individual regulations authorised courts to hear administrative cases 
before the Administrative Litigation Law was passed in 1989.21 As a guide to the 
implementation of these provisions, courts accepted over 21,000 administrative cases 
between 1983 and 1988 that were heard according to the Civil Procedure law.22 But the 
infrastructure lagged behind the legal provisions and most administrative cases were 
heard in the economic division of the courts.23 This limited the type of cases which could 
be effectively handled to economic administration cases. 
That the Administrative Litigation Law had its origins in the Civil Procedure Law is 
significant for understanding its functions in the current system of justice. Many disputes 
in the areas referred to above can be handled as civil disputes if the administrative organ 
wishes to do so. If, on the other hand, the organ issues an administrative decision about 
the dispute, then the case becomes administrative in nature. There is some evidence to 
suggest that administrative organs in the PRC habitually channel such disputes into civil 
19 cp $ A R .:#- :fo III~ 1$-± 45 (Compendium of Laws of the People's Republic of China) 
(Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989), pp.389-404. 
20 Jiang Ming'an, ff :iE)i: W 10 ~ ¥ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.34. 
21 Zhang Shangzhou, iJ.t 1:~ 1Jt III EfJ ff :iE)i: W 10 ili'J ~ :fo ff :iE)i: W 10 ~ (A 
Preliminary Discussion on the Administrative Litigation System and the Administrative Litigation Law) in 
cp III~¥ (Chinese Jurisprudence) 1, 1989, pp.3-10, reprinted in 
1t EP :f~ flJ ~ ~ ~ ¥ (Reprints From the Press - Law) (Beijing: People's University Press) 4, 
1989, p.96, hereafter referred to as: Reprints from the Press - Law. 
22 Ibid, p.93. 
23 Jyh-pin Fa and Shao-chuan Leng, Judicial Review of Administration in the People's Republic of China 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series, Contemporary Asian Studies, Number 1 (Baltimore.Md: University of 
Maryland, 1992), p.5. 
mediation or litigation, thereby avoiding legal responsibility for their administrative 
decisions. This will be further discussed below. 
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The limitations posed by hearing administrative cases in the economic divisions of courts 
became even more apparent with the promulgation of the 1986 Public Order 
Management Regulations ( :}t:i 3f ;g :fl'* 19~) , which replaced the 1957 
regulations24 . The regulations allowed for public order administrative decisions to be 
appealed in court if no satisfaction was obtained from administrative review within the 
public security organ. Such cases could clearly not be heard in the economic division of 
the courts. Many cases of citizens challenging public security organ decisions began to be 
heard in courts, causing overloading of the system, and the subsequent establishment of 
an administrative division in the courts to hear administrative cases, most of which were 
public order cases. 25 This led to the third stage in the development of the new 
administrative law system. The new Public Order Management Regulations have also 
been influential in determining the role and character of the administrative law system in 
general, as the two types of organs which have their decisions challenged most often 
under the ALL are the public security organs and the land management organs. 
Third stage - administrative litigation law research and drafting 
Suggestions for an Administrative Litigation Law were made from as early as 1986, 26 but 
concerns were expressed over private law versus public law issues. Mediation, for 
example, which dominates as a dispute resolution procedure in private law, was said to be 
unsuitable for administrative cases because of the unequal power relationships between 
citizens and administrative organs. Another pressing concern which arose in the wake of 
the promulgation of the 1986 Public Order Management Regulations was whether to 
24 ~ $ A R # :fa 00 :}1:! 3f ~ JI ::Rt W ffe 19~ (Public Order Management Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China) 1986, Article 39, ~$AR# :fo 00 ~ :1* ± 45 (Compendium of 
Laws of the People's Republic of China) (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989), pp.1529-1534. 
25 Jiang Ming'an, fT? ? W 10' ~ #: (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.40; FBIS - China Daily Reports: 11February1987, K.l; 29 January 1988, 
pp.6-7; 25 August 1988, p.28. 
26 People's Daily, 11August1986, p.4; China Legal News, 15 August 1986, p.3; China Legal News, 8 
October 1986, p.3. 
establish a separate administrative court after the style of the French system, or to 
continue with the administrative divisions in the ordinary courts.27 
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In October 1986 the initial drafting stage was established by a special research group of 
legal scholars set up under the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing 
Committee.28 This group composed an initial draft of the ALL based on the experiences 
and concerns outlined above, after consultation with government organs and courts.29 The 
draft was ready for a more public discussion in August 1988. 
Fourth stage - formal drafting and implementation 
The fourth and final stage, from August 1988 to 1990, was characterised by a high level 
of consultation in law-making. The responsibility for drafting the ALL lay with a special 
group of the NPC's Legislative Affairs Commission, which set about incorporating as 
many views as possible. 
The group organised a four-day forum in Beijing in August 1988 to discuss the 
preliminary draft. The forum was attended by delegates from the courts, procuracy, 
relevant departments of the State Council, democratic parties and mass organisations.30 
Delegates argued and consulted about issues such as the scope of cases the courts should 
accept, the use of administrative rules as a basis for court judgements, whether 
administrative review should be included in the scope of the administrative litigation law, 
and how much power to give the courts to overrule administrative decisions.31 
27 China Legal News, 8 October 1986, p.3; Jurisprudence, 12, pp.9-10, 27. 
28 Jiang Ming'an, IT iE)1: W ~ ~ :'.l¢ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.35. 
29 Ibid, p.36. See also: Edward Epstein, "Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens Can Sue the State but Not 
the Party", China News Analysis, 1386, 1 June 1989, p.3; Jyh-pin Fa and Shao-chuan Leng, Judicial Review 
of Administration in the People's Republic of China Occasional Papers/Reprints Series, Contemporary 
Asian Studies, Number 1 (Baltimore, Md: University of Maryland, 1992), p.6. 
30 ,,~ :r,ff .::c::. ~\. .:-.+ ~ Jiang Ming' an, 1T JJ-A. 1,11' ~ fz;;- + p.36. See also: FBIS - China Daily Report, 16 August 1988, 
pp.29-30; People's Daily 10 November 1988, p.1. 
31 These issues are explained in Chapter Three. They had been widely discussed and commented upon even 
before the forum, which was part of the process of determining the contents of the new law. See, for 
example, Jiang Ming' an and Liu Fen]ming 
IT iE)1: W ~ ~ ,'1 ~ ~ ~ T IOJ It :wl- ".tL (Certain Questions for Research on the 
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The changing political environment appeared to be engendering a process of consultation 
in other policy-making arenas at the time too, as noted by Kenneth Lieberthal, Michel 
Oksenberg, and David Lampton.32 Murray Scot Tanner has observed that China's law-
drafting system has generally become more consultative, but notes that the consultation 
does not include citizens.33 A similar "bureaucracy dominated" imperative has been noted 
by Pitman Potter, who maintains that in drafting the ALL there was tension right from the 
start between the legal reform constituency and bureaucratic interests.34 
The debate continued at the NPC Standing Committee's fourth session in October 1988,35 
where it was decided to publish the draft in order to "facilitate the discussion of important 
issues by the people of the country". 36 The draft was duly published in the People's Daily 
in November 1988 with the aim of soliciting opinions from anyone who cared to 
contribute,37 a move that has been described by one scholar as "an extraordinary step in 
China's law drafting practice".38 Debate was especially encouraged among provincial 
governments, ministries, commissions and other government agencies.39 
Administrative Litigation Law), reprinted from :jz 1$ ~ >J ~ ::wT 1£ (Legal Study and 
Research) 1988, 3, 16-19 in Reprints from the Press - Law, 1989, 1, 121-129; Jiang Bixin 
1~ IT iE)1: W i:1t 9:t tf-J OJ :jz ~ ]! ~ (A Discussion on the Power of the Courts to Alter 
Administrative Decisions in Administrative Litigation) in :jz ~ ::wT 1£ (Studies in Law), 6, 1988, 
pp.31-34. 
32 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China, Leaders, Structures, and Processes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton (eds.), 
Bureaucracy, Politics and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1992). 
33 Murray Scot Tanner, "The Erosion of Communist Party Control over Lawmaking in China", The China 
Quarterly, 138, 1994, pp.381-403. 
34 Pitman Potter, "The Administrative Litigation law of the PRC: Judicial Review and Bureaucratic 
Reform", in Pitman Potter (ed.), Domestic !Aw Reforms in Post-Mao China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1994), p.273. 
35 Edward Epstein, "Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens Can Sue the State but Not the Party", China 
News Analysis, 1386, 1 June 1989, p.3. 
36 People's Daily, 4 December 1988, p.4. 
37 People's Daily, 10 November 1988, p.4. 
38 Edward Epstein, "Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens Can Sue the State but Not the Party", China 
News Analysis, 1386, 1 June 1989, p.4. 
39 People's Daily, 20 November 1988, p.4. 
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In December 1988 the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC sponsored a 
symposium in Beijing that was attended by local congress delegates and administrative 
officials, as well as delegates from the courts and general legal circles.40 Wang Hanbin, 
director of the Legislative Affairs Commission at the time, reported that the Commission 
had received over 100 letters from workers, farmers, administrative officials, justice 
officials, university professors and students in regard to the draft ALL.41 By the time the 
draft was ready for submission to the NPC the following April, the Commission had 
received over 300 opinions from individual citizens since its publication in November 
1988.42 
The accuracy of Potter's assessment, flagged above, is partly demonstrated by comments 
publicised by the Chinese media just prior to the promulgation of the ALL in April 1989. 
Deputies to the NPC at the time were reported to have variously described the draft ALL 
as "significant for democracy", "not worth that much", or likely to be a "disaster for the 
govemment" .43 The public security system in particular, signalled its likely reluctance to 
cooperate when a reporter from its newspaper pointed to financial and manpower 
shortages as barriers to effective implementation of the ALL in the public security 
system.44 
The drafting process was thorough and consultative, although we do not have any 
information available to indicate whether the views of private citizens were actually 
incorporated into the final version of the ALL. However, in the light of the unusual step 
to publish a draft and solicit public opinions prior to forming the law, it must be 
acknowledged that even if the legal reform constituency was motivated by a desire to 
strengthen its position rather than to protect the rights of citizens, as Potter maintains, this 
does not detract from the fact that ordinary people were advised, consulted, and included 
in the drafting process. 
40 FBIS - China Daily Report, 15 December 1988, p.4. 
41 Ibid. 
42 FBIS - China Daily Report, 28 March 1989, pp.7-8. 
43 FBIS - China Daily Report, 29 March 1989, pp.8-9. 
44 FBIS - China Daily Report, 30 March 1989, pp.15-16. 
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The passage of the ALL was long in the making. China has never had a strong foundation 
of rights-based law, and the new ALL, on the surface, appeared to offer some progress 
towards this. The question remains as to what degree this version of the ALL represents a 
more genuine intention by the regime to protect citizens' rights than any earlier 
administrative litigation legislation in China. Any system of redress against illegal or 
unfair administrative decisions must be viewed within the context of other existing 
options. Mention has been made of the letters/visits system, and other forms of redress 
such as petitions and so on. It is worth looking at these in some detail because all these 
avenues continue to exist alongside the ALL. If a citizen of contemporary China has an 
administrative dispute what are the options that can be pursued for redress? 
Other options 
Administrative review 
The provisions of the administrative review system are examined in detail in Chapter 
Three and the implementation of the system is examined in Chapter Four, so we will 
confine this discussion to the distinctive role that administrative review can play in 
contrast to administrative litigation and the letters/visits system. Administrative review 
provides for internal review of an administrative decision at a higher level within an 
administrative organ.45 This avenue of redress has been available throughout the life of 
the People's Republic, but has only been formalised in the wake of the ALL's 
promulgation.46 It provides for review of any specific administrative act that a person 
believes has infringed on his or her lawful rights. 
Edward Epstein describes the Administrative Review Regulations as "a conservative 
reaction, typically restoring to administrative authorities the power they feared was lost to 
45 Generally on administrative review see Fang Xin (ed.), fT :iE51: ~ i.)< f~ f-W (A Guide to 
Administrative Review) (Beijing: The Legal Press, 1991). 
46 The Administrative Review Regulations were promulgated on 24 December 1990 and were modified on 9 
October 1994. 
the courts" in the Administrative Litigation Law.47 Epstein rightly claims the locus of 
power remains within the bureaucracy involved. However, this overstates the role of 
administrative review in China's system of law and government. Rather than provide 
effective control over bureaucratic behaviour, the regulations on administrative review 
were promulgated in the wake of the ALL to bring greater regularity to administrative 
review and to provide continuity of procedure between administrative review and 
administrative litigation.48 
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Each administrative organ is required to have dedicated review organs and personnel to 
handle this work, but in effect few do.49 Most of the applications for review are simply 
handled by a higher level in the organ. It is most frequently a written procedure, but it 
does allow for evidence to be sought and a hearing to occur. In some matters, 
administrative review is required by law as a first step prior to administrative litigation. 
This seems to be required of high-volume cases such as public order and land 
management disputes in order to reduce the number of cases that proceed to litigation. 
The fact that most administrative review decisions can subsequently be taken forward to 
administrative litigation is, for some scholars, an indicator of the justice of the system.so 
This system allows a plaintiff to bring the complaint directly to the organ concerned, 
which promotes swifter resolution, instead of having to rely on the ombudsman-type 
route of the letters/visits office. 
There are, however, several recurrent problems with the administrative review system in 
the PRC that diminish its ability to be an effective avenue of redress.s 1 The system is 
generally not trusted by the populace. The review organ is regarded as being part of the 
47 Edward Epstein, "A Matter of Justice" in Kuan Hsin-chi and Maurice Brosseau (eds.), China Review 
1992 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1992), 5.21. 
48 See the discussion on the scope of re;lation (of the ALL) in Jiang Ming'an and Liu Fengming 
,..~ 7Clt .::i::. .::J\ ".+ ..)... ".+ Ht +.+ ..:r. '::;t :t.n. ~ 1T .jl.JI.. llt- ~ iz: .lL. iz: i:i'J :;ft" T IOJ 1!11 Jt.. (Certain Questions for Research on 
Administrative Litigation Legislation) from ~ # # ">J ~ fVf 'JL (Legal Studies and Research), 
1988, 3, pp.16-19 in Reprints from the Press - Law, 1989, 1, pp.122-123. 
49 Interview with an official from the State Council's Office of Legislative Affairs, Beijing, 1998. 
50 Lin Feng, Administrative Law - Procedures and remedies in China (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1996), pp.92-93. 
51 The reasons given here are taken from my fieldwork interviews with legal scholars, judges, and so on. 
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same system that made the offending decision in the first place, and therefore is not seen 
as independent. The regulations that require administrative review as a first step are thus 
obeyed perfunctorily by plaintiffs as a necessary stage on the road to administrative 
litigation, which is regarded as providing slightly more justice. 
A second problem is that in a vast number of cases, administrative organs simply refuse 
to accept cases for review, thereby preventing complaints from proceeding any further 
along that track. In such cases the courts may accept cases without the required 
administrative review having been carried out. This problem is compounded by the lack 
of provisions in the ARR to penalise organs that are at fault on this point. The Legislative 
Affairs Office of the State Council anticipates that this problem will be remedied by the 
new Administrative Review Law (ARL) which compels organs to accept all applications 
unless there is a valid reason not to, and allows for the applicant to bypass the reviewing 
organ and apply to the next higher level of the organ if necessary.52 Whilst the new ARL 
contains these provisions (see Chapter Three) and stipulates penalties for organs and 
officials who fail to comply, it remains to be seen whether this law will be sufficiently 
enforced to remedy the problem. 
Furthermore, despite provisions in the new Administrative Review Law to penalise those 
responsible in an administrative organ if the organ does not accept a case for review ,53 the 
impact is softened by the law's provision that legal affairs offices may only suggest 
( ~ i..5<) to an administrative organ that non-acceptance of a case be penalised.54 Final 
authority over penalisation still remains within the administrative organ at a higher level 
than the review organ, and the weakness of external legal authority is exacerbated. If 
these new provisions have any positive effect in achieving a higher rate of acceptance of 
52 Interview with an official from the State Council's Office of Legislative Affairs, Beijing, 1998. See 
Administrative Review Law, Article 20 in the Legal Daily (internet version), 30 April 1999, p.3. 
53 Administrative Review Law, Articles 34-38. 
54 Ibid, Article 38. 
cases by review organs, they are likely to simply result in a higher rate of automatic 
confirmation of the administrative decision.55 
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Automatic confirmation of administrative decisions by review organs is the biggest 
problem in administrative review, and there are several reasons for this: 56 (a) officials 
generally protect other officials in their section of the PRC administrative bureaucracy; 
(b) review organs do not want to create trouble for lower-level organs on whose 
cooperation they rely in their regular working relationships; (c) the review organ does not 
want to be the defendant in any administrative litigation that may result from the review 
decision.57 These problems suggest that direct complaints to the offending administrative 
organ are not an effective means of obtaining redress, and that a third party is necessary to 
play an intervening role. The letters/visits system provides for such a third party, but does 
it offer a more effective means of redress than administrative review? 
The letters/visits system 
The system that allows for government organs to receive letters of complaint and visits 
d1§f i,jj ) from individuals originated in the early years of the People's Republic58 and 
continues to the present. The system has a history of dealing not just with complaints 
about specific administrative decisions, but also with complaints of corruption and 
bribery among cadres, and broader social problems such as famine and unemployment. 
During the early years of the People's Republic a significant proportion of problems 
brought to the letters/visits office were passed to a local mediation committee for 
handling because they concerned marriage problems, family financial disputes and 
55 Interview with a teacher of administrative law from the Wuhan Institute of Politics and Law, Beijing, 
1998. 
56 These reasons were repeated, either together or individually, by nearly all interviewees that I approached 
about this matter. 
57 The ALL states that where a decision has been reviewed and confirmed, the organ responsible for the 
original decision becomes the defendant. Where the decision is overturned by the review organ, the review 
organ becomes the defendant (ALL, Article 25). Thus there are legislative factors that work against 
administrative review being an effective avenue ofredress. 
58 qt .:_!:t 1t ~ -m 1i + ~ (Chinese Communist Party History, Volume 50), (Beijing: Chinese 
Communist Party History Publishing Co., 1994), pp.116-131. 
property issues.59 In the initial post-Mao era, 80% of cases related to requests from 
individuals seeking redress after the Cultural Revolution.60 During the reform period 
complaints have more often been about quality standards in state owned enterprises, 
reflecting the new priorities of economic development.61 
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The letters/visits system is broad in scope and can accept any problem at all, and this is a 
major advantage compared to administrative review. It is not limited to concrete 
administrative acts, nor is it limited to the decisions of administrative organs. It also sets 
much looser time limits within which a complaint must be lodged,62 so in some ways it is 
more flexible than administrative review. Some scholars regard the letters/visits system as 
being superseded by administrative review ,63 but in view of its broader role and greater 
degree of flexibility this does not seem to be so.64 Plaintiffs at the letters/visits office are 
first encouraged to seek administrative review if time limits allow,65 but this is only 
possible if the dispute involves a specific administrative decision. In the current context, 
writing a letter of complaint is often a course of action taken if an application for 
administrative review or litigation is unsuccessful, but it is important to note here the 
barrier to effective complaint that illiteracy may pose. Those who are unable to write their 
claims may ask someone to write on their behalf, or more realistically, are limited to the 
option of visiting a government office to lodge their complaint orally. These special 
offices are established in all government organs, but for those in the countryside this may 
mean a considerable journey to a large town. 
59 Diao Jiecheng A~ w i.JJ ~ere (A Brief History of the People's Letters/Visits), (Beijing: 
Beijing Economic Institute Press, 1996), p.89 reports that from January to April 1956, 304 cases were 
passed from a county letters/visits office to a township a(~) mediation committee, constituting 76% of 
cases received by the county office during that period. 
60 Yasheng Huang, "Administrative Monitoring in China", The China Quarterly, 143, 1995, p.834. 
61 Diao Jiecheng A ~ w i.JJ ~ ere (A Brief History of the People's Letters/Visits), (Beijing: 
Beijing Economic Institute Press, 1996), p.295. 
62 These time limits are a relatively recent addition to the letters/visits system. See 
W i.JJ ~ 19~ (Regulations on Letters and Visits) 28 October 1995, Diao Jiecheng 
A ~ w i.JJ ~ ere (A Brief History of the People's Letters/Visits), (Beijing: Beijing Economic 
Institute Press, 1996), pp.403-409. 
63 Edward Epstein, "A Matter of Justice", Kuan Hsin-chi and Maurice Brosseau (eds.), China Review 1992 
(Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1992), 5.21. 
64 Lin Feng also maintains the two systems are supplementary: Lin Feng, Administrative Law - Procedures 
and Remedies in China, The China Law Series (Hong Kong: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996), p.92. 
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A number of different types of complaint can be made at a letters/visits office.66 An 
appeal($ W shensu)67 is initiated when a citizen files a complaint to a relevant organ 
or a judicial organ claiming that his or her lawful rights have been violated or encroached 
upon, and demands that there be rectification. The most important complaints relate to 
administrative decisions that are alleged to be unlawful(~ if~) or unreasonable 
(~if tf ). Illegal decisions exceed the limits of an organ's statutory authority, whereas 
unreasonable decisions relate to the fairness of the administrative decision. Unreasonable 
decisions are sometimes presented in administrative case records as improper 
(~ 3) decisions. The appeal involves identifying the responsible official and reviewing 
the legality of the original decision, and may be associated with appeal for administrative 
review or litigation. 
If a citizen wishes to charge, accuse, or complain ~ 1ef konggao ), he or she goes to the 
relevant organ or judicial organ and reports an action that is either illegal or involves a 
neglect of administrative duty. This type of petition differs from shensu in that it does not 
necessarily involve a demand that an administrative decision be remedied, but is more 
often a general complaint about administrative behaviour. 
A more dramatic type of complaint about official behaviour is the denunciation to 
authorities (tli ~ jianju) of actions that are either illegal or involve a neglect of duty. 
The jianju differs from konggao in that the konggao may include appeals against personal 
injustice to the plaintiff, whereas ajianju petition does not. It differs from a shensu in that 
shensu petitions always relate to the person making the complaint whereas ajianju 
denunciation relates to a third party. 
65 ARR, Article 21. 
66 Wang Chengdong et al, .h- -:ctt ~.:;\'I 1 J ~A.  10. (Administrative Review), (Beijing: China University of 
Politics and Law, 1993), pp.49-50. 
67 There are several types of shensu: (1) shensu against the judiciary; (2) shensu against an administrative 
agency; (3) shensu against the Party; (4) shensu against an electorate. See Margaret Woo, "Adjudication 
Supervision and Judicial Independence in the P.R.C.", American Journal of Comparative Law, 39, 1991, 
p.104. 
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Written or verbal petitions about any kind of administrative offence or questionable 
behaviour can also be submitted to any level of the People's Congress or to a People's 
Political Consultative Conference at county level or above.68 The congress or conference 
is then supposed to pass the problem to the relevant organ for rectification. Mostly these 
petitions are written to the authorities at the congress, but sometimes the petitioner will 
stand at the door of the meeting and shout out the complaint to draw attention to his or 
her plight. 69 
There are several recurring patterns in the system of written complaints, that probably 
also applies to visit-based protests. Political movements affect the amount of, and content 
of, the letters that are written. 70 John Bums notes that at the start of a political campaign 
in the pre-reform period there was an increase in the number of complaint letters that was 
directly attributable to the campaign. Similar patterns can be noted for the reform period, 
as letters of complaint and visits tend to be made by individuals or groups that are 
affected by new policies.71 
The main advantage of the letters/visits system is that it provides for a third party to 
intervene in a dispute, but this is undermined by the system's lack of legal authority to 
directly remedy a problem. The letters/visits organs can only pass the complaint back to 
the organ where the problem originates, a course of action that often results in retribution 
being taken against the plaintiff, or on to a higher authority. In either case, redress for the 
plaintiff is not likely because there is no procedure in place that requires any of the parties 
to actually carry out a process of considering the complaint. In many cases, the letters and 
68 Yang Fengchun (ed.), .fi iE)t ~ :fo .fi iE)t ~JI (Administrative Law and Administrative 
Management) (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1990), pp.134-143. These practices are still common: see 
"CPPCC National Committee Session gets 3,093 Proposals", FBIS - China Daily Report, 12 March 1999; 
"NPC Said Deluged With Suggestions, Complaints", FBIS - China Daily Report, 12 March 1999. 
69 Shouting and physically intruding on the congress' proceedings is reputedly not common, but it does 
happen. Interview with a lecturer from the Department of Law, Beijing University, Beijing, 1998. 
70 See John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), Chapter 7. 
71 Diao Jiecheng, A ~-@ i.JJ ~ ere (A Brief History of the People's LettersNisits), (Beijing: 
Beijing Economic Institute Press, 1996), p.295. 
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records of complaint are simply filed and forgotten. All of the interviewees for this study 
regard the letters/visits system as a mechanism that belongs to the Mao era, and even 
though it still operates it is not held in high esteem. It is seen as lacking the legal teeth 
that is provided by the ALL, which clearly sets out the procedures to be followed when an 
application is received. It must be noted, however, that the ARR also sets out a required 
procedure for handling complaints, but this does not strengthen the departmental review 
system. Nor does the new Administrative Review Law add much on this score, as the 
supervision of administrative power remains predominantly within the domain of 
administrative organs. 
The media 
There are at least two ways in which the Chinese media serves as an avenue for redress of 
administrative grievances. Complainants may contact a media outlet which may then print 
or broadcast the complaint, or journalists may initiate their own investigations in response 
to outside pressures. Writing letters of complaint to newspapers and other media outlets is 
a practice that began in the 1950s, continued throughout the Mao era, and is still 
popular.72 Like the letters/visits system, the subject matter of letters is broad, ranging 
from maladministration to general grievances such as retrenchment. One of the 
advantages of complaining to the media rather than through the administrative system is 
that complainants hope to obtain rectification without the retribution that is common in 
the letters/visits system.73 
When journalists in China initiate their own investigations about an administrative or 
other abuse, it is done either as a response to a letter of complaint from an individual, or 
because of factional political interests, in which case the impetus comes from a higher 
level in the administrative hierarchy. For example, the Lawyers News 
(~ 00 !$ mu jg ) is under pressure from several sources: its readers who are mostly 
72 See: John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), Chapter 7; Hugh Thomas, editor and translator, Comrade Editor: Letters to the Peoples' Daily 
(Beijing: The Joint Press, 1980); "NPC Said Deluged With Suggestions, Complaints", FBIS - China Daily 
Report, 12 March 1999. 
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lawyers, citizens who read the newspaper and want help with a problem, and from other 
media colleagues. 74 When an administrative or other abuse is "exposed", this means it is 
made public in the press. Such exposures may be isolated cases, or may coincide with 
political campaigns initiated from the higher levels of the bureaucracy.75 
Many of the problems for an individual complainant are similar to those encountered in 
the operation of the letters/visits system and administrative review: investigations are 
obstructed by the office or official about whom the complaint had been made; higher 
level authorities often prevent the matter from being exposed in the newspaper; and 
usually there is little action taken to rectify the problem even if the matter is publicised.76 
Further to these problems, letters tend to reflect government policy of the time. If there is 
an anti-corruption campaign in progress, for example, letters tend to be about corruption 
among officials. The media has a considerable advantage in that it can play the role of the 
third party in an unobtrusive way, as it can pass on information about administrative 
abuses without publicising it, but its lack of legal authority to act on complaints limits its 
effectiveness. 
Television, radio and film also play a similarly important role in the grievance redress 
system. "Focus" was first broadcast on CCCTV in 1994 and was designed to play a 
supervisory role by focusing on problems that occur during the implementation of major 
reform policies. The program has boldly exposed incidents of corruption among 
government officials, and abuses in the sensitive area of the grain distribution system. It 
aims to go beyond reporting to resolving the problem, thereby promoting implementation 
of government policy.77 "News in Length and Breadth", broadcast by the Central People's 
73 Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985), p.123. 
74 Interview with a reporter from the China Lawyers News, Beijing, 1998. 
75 See T. Wing Lo, Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1993), Chapter Three, for an account of anti-corruption campaigns in the late 1980s in China and how well 
known figures were censured by public vilification in the press as part of factional political struggles. Also 
see Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp.156-187 for an account of the 
diverse ways in which the Chinese media can serve as an avenue of redress. 
76 John P. Burns, Political Panicipation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 
p.141. 
77 
"Mass Media Play Supervisory Role'', Beijing Review, January 11-17 1999, pp.9-11. 
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Broadcasting Station, fills a similar role, as does the Zhang Yimou film "Qiu ju Goes to 
Court", which recounts the story of a village woman who files a suit against the village 
head who injured her husband. The woman does not seek punishment for the village 
head, but is happy just for an apology,78 an outcome that dilutes the responsibility of the 
state to ensure its officials behave justly. 
As with print, these media are driven by the government's agenda: they expose problems 
the government wants resolved, and resolves them in a manner sanctioned by the 
government. Some court cases are now televised in China in an attempt to persuade the 
public that there is open government, but these are usually commercial in nature, such as 
a copyright case,79 and probably serve the government's wider international political 
agenda of persuading the United States of its firm commitment to crack down on 
copyright fraud. 
Big character posters 
The right to use these posters is currently banned in the PRC, but what can be learned 
from the occasions on which they were used? Big character posters ck* =tR) have a 
long history in the PRC dating from at least the 1940s80 and continuing throughout the 
reform era. The right to use big character posters as a form of political expression and 
complaint was, for a time, included in the PRC Constitution, but was subsequently 
removed. The content of these posters has ranged from major political-legal issues 
through to more mundane complaints about individual officials or problems, including 
administrative grievances. 
Big character posters have been most effective, historically, in two types of situations: 
elite-level factional political struggles, and as a means of expressing important political 
ideas, although the two are not necessarily unrelated. Posters were particularly used 
78 Beijing Review, 2-8 November 1992, pp.32-34. 
79 Beijing Review, July 27-Aug 2 1998, p.4. 
80 Hua Sheng, "Big Character Posters in China: A Historical Survey", Journal of Chinese Law, 2, 4, 1990, 
pp.234-256. 
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during the Cultural Revolution, for example, to further the aims of factional political 
struggles.81 In the post-Cultural Revolution climate, on the other hand, big character 
posters such as were used in the Li Yizhe debates were critical of the regime and 
demanded a return to socialist democracy and legality,82 while the Democracy Wall 
Movement of the late 1970s demanded democracy and other political reforms. But 
interspersed with the high-profile demands for democracy during this latter movement 
were more ordinary demands for redress of specific grievances as part of the post-Cultural 
Revolution reappraisals. 83 As a means of gaining redress for more mundane problems, big 
character posters were ineffective because they were swamped in significance by posters 
such as Wei Jingsheng's "The Fifth Modernization." 
Mediation 
There are several types of mediation in the PRC84 but only one type, so-called people's 
mediation, is an alternative option to administrative litigation.85 Mediation is long-
established institution in the PRC, and there is some evidence to suggest that significant 
numbers of disputes that are administrative in nature are channelled into mediation as 
civil disputes. This allows the administrative organ several advantages over the protesting 
individual: the organ, which often provides the mediation service, can exercise its power 
over an individual and coerce the individual to accept its view; the organ can save face; 
and the organ can avoid being called to account legally for its actions. 
81 John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 
Chapter 7; Hua Sheng, "Big Character Posters in China: A Historical Survey", Journal of Chinese Law, 2, 
4, 1990", pp.239-243. 
82 For translations of some of the documents used in these debates and an edited introduction to them see: 
Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger (eds.), On Socialist Democracy and the Chinese Legal 
System - The Li Yizhe Debates (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1985). 
83 Hua Sheng, "Big Character Posters in China: A Historical Survey", Journal of Chinese Law, 2, 4, 1990", 
p.245; John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), pp.150-151. 
84 Courts may conduct mediation prior to formally adjudicating a civil dispute; arbitration organs may 
conduct mediation as a preliminary step prior to formal arbitration; and people's mediation committees 
handle ordinary civil disputes such as divorce: see Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the 
People's Republic of China (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 1992), pp.171-175. 
85 For two comprehensive studies of people's mediation see Donald Clarke, "Dispute Resolution in China", 
Journal of Chinese Law, 5, 1991, pp.245-96; Stanley Lubman, "Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute 
Resolution in Communist China", in Ralph Folsom and John Minan (eds.), Law in the People's Republic of 
China (Dordrecht; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff and Kluwer, 1989), pp.89-113. 
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People's mediation committees were originally set up in 1954 to handle ordinary civil 
disputes, minor criminal cases and to educate people about state law.86 They operate 
under the jurisdiction of local governments. The minor criminal disputes referred to 
included those administered by the public security organs in accordance with the 1957 
Public Order Management Regulations, that is, disputes that would now be classified as 
administrative in nature. However, the mediation regulations were upgraded in 1989 and 
the category of "minor criminal cases" was removed from the scope of mediation. But 
Donald Clarke maintains that such cases continue to be subject to mediation.87 If true, 
this may mean that there are many more complaints made against public security organs' 
decisions than official statistics show. 
Some disputes may be either administrative or civil in substance, depending on how far 
the parties involved want to take the matter, and how the administrative organ responds. 
Public order offences, for example, may be handled informally by the public security 
organs, by giving a verbal warning or by sending the disputing parties to mediation. Or a 
more formal method would require the organ to impose an administrative penalty.88 
Public security organs should only recommend mediation to the parties in civil disputes, 
as mediation is voluntary.89 Only if an administrative punishment is imposed, does the 
dispute become formally administrative in nature and therefore able to be challenged 
under the new administrative law system. There does not seem to be sufficient 
information to determine the degree to which public security organs may channel 
86 Donald Clarke, "Dispute Resolution in China", Journal of Chinese Law, 5, 1991, pp.272-273. 
87 Ibid, p.279. 
88 Zhu Fucheng (ed.), .IC 3( ff iE)1: =!:tL :Ji IBJ * (Questions and Answers About Public Security 
Administrative Enforcement), Internal distribution (Beijing: Police Officials Education Press, 1992), pp.10-
11. On the aspect of discretion in the exercise of police powers in the PRC see Sarah Biddulph, "Review 
of Police Powers of Administrative Detention in the People's Republic of China", Crime and Delinquency, 
39, 3, 1993, pp.337-354. On the aspect of the relationship between between police discretion and crime 
statistics (which includes whether an offence is handled as criminal, administrative or civil) see Michael 
Dutton and Lee Tianfu, "Missing the Target? Policing Strategies in the Period of Economic Reform", Crime 
and Delinquency, 39, 3, 1993, pp.316-336. 
89 Jiang Bo and Zhan Zhongle (eds.), .IC 3( ff iE)1: :Ji (Public Security Administrative Law) (Beijing: 
China Personnel Press, 1994), pp.123-127. 
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administrative disputes into the civil dispute resolution system, but we do have evidence 
for land disputes. 
Land management disputes that go to mediation are so prolific because the Land 
Management Law of the PRC gives priority to mediation and encourages the parties to 
reach a mutually agreeable solution.90 If a joint decision cannot be reached then the 
dispute should be handed to the local government at county level or above for resolution. 
It is at this point that the dispute may be handled either as civil or administrative. If the 
government handles the dispute as civil in nature, then any subsequent litigation is also 
civil. If, on the other hand, the government imposes an administrative penalty on one of 
the parties, then the dispute may become administrative in nature and any subsequent 
litigation may involve the government organ as defendant. Thus, the government has a 
vested interest in directing disputes of this nature to the mediation committees. 
Knowledge of this is important when making an assessment of the extent of 
administrative disputes between citizens and the state. Published figures show that in 
1996 the courts across China settled nearly 14,000 land management administrative 
litigation disputes.91 At the same time, the mediation committees that handled housing 
and other land matters handled nearly 600,000 cases.92 In short, many housing and land 
disputes are channelled by the government into administrative mediation rather than 
administrative review and litigation.93 
Administrative litigation as an option 
For a complainant to choose administrative litigation as the preferred avenue for dispute 
resolution means that he or she is interested in gaining redress by getting the off ending 
administrative decision overturned and possibly by also obtaining compensation. A 
90 Wang Jiafu and Huang Mingchuan, ± :!& ~ tfJ l.f i.t ~ ~ ~ 
Land Law) (Beijing: People's Daily Press, 1991), pp.296-297. 
91 '°.+ .la ./r I!& iz: -w -'t"" $:" 1997 (Law Yearbook 1997), p.1057. 
92 .;-.+ .1a -1r 1!& iz: -W-'t"" $:" 1997 (Law Yearbook 1997), p.1075. 
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plaintiff is best situated to use this option if the administrative decision in question is not 
technical or commercial in nature; for these types of disputes, administrative arbitration is 
most appropriate. The structure of the PRC administrative dispute-resolution system 
gives professional administrative bodies primary jurisdiction (and sometimes sole 
jurisdiction) over areas that are regarded as commercial or technical in nature. 
Administrative litigation plays a more general role in ensuring the legality of any 
particular administrative decision. 
There are two types of disputes that dominate the administrative litigation system: land 
management disputes and disputes involving the public security organs. Lack of 
professional knowledge on the part of the courts tends to hamper judicial handling of land 
disputes. Land management organs would prefer that the courts not have the authority to 
review the facts of a land case but only the authority to review the application of law,94 
arguing a need for professional knowledge in the resolution of such administrative 
disputes. The implication of such an argument is that to allow the courts to review all and 
any administrative actions may not necessarily result in greater justice for the plaintiffs. 
Courts are professionally better suited to handling administrative litigation suits against 
public security organs because the courts and public security organs are within the same 
administrative system. Problematically, though, this closeness also undercuts the courts' 
authority. Regardless of the shortcomings, courts overturn approximately the same 
proportion of public security decisions as land management decisions when national 
figures are used as the measure,95 suggesting that professional knowledge by the courts is 
not a key determinant of the outcome of administrative litigation. Chapter Seven will 
observe important local distinctions in judicial activity which shed further light on the 
93 Michael Palmer has observed a similar process of dispute resolution to be common for environmental 
pollution disputes: Michael Palmer, "Environment Regulation in the People's Republic of China: The Face 
of Domestic Law'', The China Quarterly, No.156, 1998, pp.802-805. 
94 Interview with the director of the Department of Policies, Law and Supervision in the State Land 
Administration of the PRC, Beijing, 1998. 
95 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, pp.845-846. 
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relationships between the courts' level of professional knowledge, administrative justice, 
and the outcome of administrative litigation. 
In this chapter we have examined the historical evolution of the new system and 
canvassed a range of dispute resolution methods, identifying their shortcomings. In a 
significant shift from the provisions of the early years of the People's Republic, it is clear 
that the regime intends the new system to curb illegal or unfair administrative actions. 
There has also been a growing realisation that the po.wer of administrative organs in 
contrast to that of individual citizens has been a stumbling block for justice and that the 
new system must be designed to overcome this imbalance. It has been designed, though, 
in the midst of bureaucratic turf battles rather than with a strong individual-rights-based 
framework. 
Other options for redress, such as the letters/visits system and approaching the media, 
face the problem that the role of a third party in the resolution of administrative disputes 
must be underpinned with legal authority to redress the problem. Moreover, all other 
options are clearly subject to coercion by the political environment which undercuts the 
provision of a regularised redress system. A key factor we are looking for in examining 
the new system is whether it too is subject to political manipulation. 
The new system of administrative law is better than the previous systems. In the context 
of other options it is also the best way, apart from informal means such as using one's 
personal relationships, to get a specific administrative decision changed because it is 
specifically designed to do so. Theoretically, anyone can use it, at any time over any 
specific decision. To be sure, the required procedure is not always carried out and organs 
often simply refuse to accept an application for administrative review. Courts, too, cannot 
be relied upon to accept all of the cases that they should. The initial point of filing an 
application for administrative litigation in the court will be shown to be the most 
important phase for the plaintiff. If the court accepts the case for review, there is 
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approximately a 40% chance that the administrative decision will be either overturned or 
revised by the administrative organ to the advantage of the plaintiff.96 However, it is 
extremely difficult to get one's case as far as being accepted by a court. The policy 
background of the new system, together with an examination of the legislation's 
provisions, will enable a fuller understanding of what individuals face when they 
approach the state through this system. 
96 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.862. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THEORY, POLICY AND LEGISLATION 
The pre-existing political-legal-cultural milieu, together with the provisions of the new 
administrative law system, significantly affects a citizen's chance of success when he or 
she uses the system to gain redress from an illegal or unfair specific administrative 
decision. We will deal here with the following factors that impinge upon this milieu: the 
concept of administrative law in the PRC, including the so-called balance theory; the 
reasons for developing the new system; and the provisions of the Administrative 
Litigation Law, the Administrative Review Regulations, the Administrative Review Law, 
and the State Compensation Law. In examining the provisions and ideas that informed the 
final versions of these pieces of legislation, I shall weave in alternative positions that 
were considered but not included in the law, in order to demonstrate possible sources of 
resistance to the system's implementation. I shall also draw out the ways in which the 
provisions benefit either the state or the plaintiff, the implication of which is that the state 
may have designed an unjust law. 
The concept of administrative law 
In the PRC, administrative law has a broad conceptual framework, including both the 
function and structure of government authorities, with1he ALL fulfilling a remedial 
function. 1 Administrative law also determines the organisation of administrative organs, 
including their specific tasks, scope of authority and working procedures; the personnel of 
administrative organs, including their tasks, qualifications and supervision; the drafting 
and promulgation of administrative laws, regulations and rules; the legislation for 
administrative penalties; the process and structure of administrative supervision; and the 
scope and procedures for legislation regarding administrative litigation. Administrative 
law is said to coordinate (p}} 1jaJ ) management between state administrative organs and 
1 Yang Fengchun (ed.), fr if){~ :la fr if){ iW JI (Administrative Law and Administrative 
Management) (Beijing: Economic Science Press, 1990), pp.24-25. 
other state organs, social groups, and so on.2 Another term used to describe the role of 
administrative law is to adjust, regulate or revise (iJa.f ~ ). (This term is used by 
Professor Jiang Ming' an, Head of the Administrative and Constitutional Law Centre in 
the Department of Law at Beijing University). 
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This broad conceptual framework has given rise to conflict over precisely what the aims 
and structure of the Administrative Litigation Law should be. On the one hand, some 
PRC legal scholars conceptualise administrative law as a set of procedures to ensure that 
administrative organs are able to efficiently carry out their duties. To this end, 
administrative law should primarily focus on the structure of government by defining the 
tasks, scope of authority, and working procedures of administrative organs. On the other 
hand, some other PRC legal scholars conceptualise administrative law primarily as a 
means to protect individual rights and control state power. To this end, administrative law 
should focus on defining the scope and procedures for legislation regarding 
administrative litigation. The provisions of the ALL reflect these different influences. We 
will examine them here to aid our understanding of the ALL's provisions. The "balance 
theory" has been coined as a theoretical construct to represent these different views, and 
no doubt also as an attempt at inclusiveness. 
The 'Balance Theory' 
Chinese legal scholars have constructed their own paradigm of administrative law: the 
"balance theory" (.3f :fjj fl it pingheng lilun).3 The balance theory of contemporary 
Chinese administrative law is not to be confused with the theory of the three-way 
separation of powers that underpins the structure of many Western states by maintaining a 
separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers c= 1,Q.1J\ ,'; san quanfenli). 
The theoretical structure of the institutions of political power in China considers 
2 Sun Ninghua (ed.) ;f5<. TI ~ i!i'J tf:J -IT :iE)I: ~ ::wf- '1: (Power and its Control - Administrative 
Law Research) (Beijing: Science and Technology Documents Press, 1995), pp.18-19. 
3 Luo Haocai (ed.), l..{ ~IT :iE)I: ~ ~ -1fZ i.j :fl it (The Balance Theory of Contemporary 
Administrative Law) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1997). Hereafter referred to as "The Balance 
Theory". 
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legislative and administrative power as unitary (yixing heyi).4 The implications of this 
theoretical structure for an administrative law system are significant: administration must 
be based on law, but administrative and legislative power are unitary, thus there is no 
apparent control over administrative power. How then, is the judiciary supposed to 
supervise the administration, especially when it is part of the bureaucracy? This issue was 
at the heart of the heated debates that occurred during the preparatory phase of the ALL. 
The balance theory proposes a balance of power between the state and the citizen. The 
theory is at least partly the result of the bargaining and negotiating that took place when 
the provisions of the ALL were being determined, although its features were recognised 
prior to this.5 The theory was first expounded publicly in 1993 by Luo Haocai.6 
According to Luo, the extremes of the balance theory are management theory 
(.g fl i..Q- guanli lun) and control of power theory~ 1,R i..Q- kong quan lun).1 
Management theory stresses the instrumental role of administrative law as a tool of state 
management. Historically, administrative law in the PRC is said to be based on 
"management theory" (guanli lun). 8 As such, administrative law was visible 
predominantly in the promulgation of administrative rules that determined the 
organisation, structure, and functions of various state organs.9 This theory stresses the use 
of law as a tool of administrative regulation. The duties and powers of the administrative 
4 Yang Haikun, "The Theoretical Foundations of Administrative Law" in ;Jt "':i5r :f± ~ 5f4 :¥ (Beijing 
Social Sciences), 1, 1989, pp.139-147. 
5 See Lin Feng, Administrative Law: Procedures and Remedies in China, The China Law Series (Hong 
Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), p.3. 
6 Luo Haocao et al, "The Theoretical Basis of Contemporary Administrative Law" in 
9::t 00 ~ :¥ (Chinese Jurisprudence), 1, 1993, pp.52-59 in Reprints from the Press - Law, 4, 1993, 
pp.72-79. In 1998 Luo Haocai was a vice president of the Supreme People's Court of the PRC and a teacher 
of graduate law students at Beijing University. A collection of essays about the balance theory, from both 
positive and negative viewpoints, can be found in "The Balance Theory". 
7 Luo Haocai, "The Balance Theory", p.3. 
8 See: (author unknown) "State and Society- On the Change of Legal Concepts in Modern China", paper 
presented to the "Citizenship, Accountability and the Law" conference, 17-19 June 1996, Melbourne 
University; Lin Feng, Administrative Law: Procedures and Remedies in China, The China Law Series 
(Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), pp.7, 12. 
9 See Pitman Potter, "The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC", p.271; Lin Feng, Administrative 
Law: Procedures and Remedies in China, The China Law Series (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), 
p.7. 
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organ are of primary importance, together with ensuring that administrative organs have 
the necessary power to enforce their decisions. Rule by man rather than rule by law 
predominates, and the right to remedies is limited to petitioning. ' 0 The overall aim of the 
system is administrative efficiency, rather than justice. Disputes are settled by a common 
hierarchical superior within the administrative system. This approach was borrowed from 
the Soviet Union and influenced administrative law in China until the 1970s, although 
some scholars see its influence lasting until the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1987. 11 It 
maintains that laws governing the tasks and organisation of administrative organs are 
more important than judicial review. Thus it was clearly useful for regulating the planned 
economy and maintaining collectivism. 
Modem administrative law in capitalist countries, according to Luo, is based on "control 
of power" theory (kong quan lun). The control of power theory places most emphasis on 
the role of law as a protector of individual rights from state encroachment. This theory 
stresses the rights of the individual, and the supervision of administrative behaviour. 
According to the theory, the legal system should function as a restraint on government 
behaviour, culminating in the right to seek judicial review of administrative action. This 
theory is the outgrowth of natural law theory, liberalism, and the economic theories of 
Adam Smith. In making this assessment, Luo has drawn on the writings of well known 
Western legal scholars, among them W.H.R. Wade, K.C. Davis, Carol Harlow and 
Richard Rawlings. 
The balance theory, as explained by Luo, combines aspects of both management theory 
and control of power theory. It posits that administrative law should seek both to regulate 
and supervise administrative behaviour. Both protection of individual rights and ensuring 
that administration is carried out according to law are important. The balance theory 
10 Chapter Two examines the historical development of the PRC's administrative law system and shows that 
early forms of judicial remedies against illegal or unfair administrative action existed, but they remained 
theoretical. The most effective practical remedy was, as Luo states, to petition the relevant administrative 
organ. 
11 Lin Feng, Administrative Law: Procedures and Remedies in China, The China Law Series (Hong Kong: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), p.8. 
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allows for the existence of many different remedies for redress of administrative 
grievances apart from judicial review, such as administrative review, the letters/visits 
system, and so on. The balance theory also aims to allow for citizen participation (through 
administrative litigation appeals) while not undermining administrative efficiency. 
Thus, in terms of theoretical underpinnings, Chinese legal scholars are proposing a 
middle ground between pure socialist "pro-management" theories of administrative law 
and what they see as Western "pro-individual" theories. It must be stressed here that this 
is merely a "theory" and appears to be designed more to justify the compromises 
necessary to get the ALL in its current form passed in the National People's Congress, 
than as a basis for practice. 
The balance theory has its critics, of course. Most of such criticism is directed towards the 
fact that this theory is not universally applicable to law in general. 12 Some PRC legal 
practitioners discard it outright as having no practical use in daily problem solving. 
Nevertheless, they acknowledge that administrative law in the PRC currently is more a 
matter of management law than of control of power law (guanlifa versus kong quanfa). 
In fact, there is a tacit understanding among administrative law scholars that the balance 
theory is weighted towards management principles. One scholar I interviewed had this to 
say about it: 
The balance theory is good for China and its social conditions. The population 
is large and their educational level is low. Therefore, if we give people more power 
this will cause problems. Most people in China will break the laws rather than 
obey them, so we must give most power to the administrative organs to manage the social 
situation ..... China is not like Western countries ... This theory suits China's practical situation. 13 
This hard line view can be contrasted with the view of another scholar who was adamant 
about the role administrative law should play: 
I do not have any comment on the balance theory. I think it should be control 
12 Pi Chunxie et al, "Several Thoughts About the Balance Theory" in Luo Haocai, "The Balance Theory", 
p.79. 
13 Interview with a teacher of administrative law at the Wuhan Southern Central University of Politics and 
Law and PhD candidate in administrative law at Beijing University Beijing, 1998. 
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theory. The government has so much power; we must control it, not balance it! 14 
In summary, China's administrative law system is related to, but not coterminous with, 
administrative management. The balance theory is meant to consider the competing 
interests of administrative organs and citizens. It is a theoretical expression of the 
pressures at work in a society undergoing broadly-based reforms. Throughout the life of 
the People's Republic, administrative law has largely been management law: that is, it has 
been used as a tool of management. For example, the promulgation in 1957 of the Public 
Order Management Regulations allowed public security organs to detain offenders for 
minor offences without recourse to any judicial procedure. This regulation was purely a 
tool for the management of society; it authorised administrative organs to manage social 
order in a particular way. It was not until these regulations were replaced by the 1986 
Public Order Management Regulations that the rights of the off enders were incorporated 
into the process of managing public order, thus enabling individual recipients of these 
administrative penalties to challenge such decisions in court. The new administrative law 
system is theoretically designed to combine the old role of regulation with the new one of 
control of power. 
General aims and policies behind the new system 
In Chapter One we touched upon the reasons behind the development of the new 
administrative law system: the demands for economic development, legal reform, 
administrative reform and intemationalisation. 15 Although these factors are 
acknowledged Chinese legal scholars to be part of the impetus, they are not considered to 
be equally important drivers. 
14 Interview with a teacher of administrative law at the China University of Politics and Law, Beijing, 1998. 
15 See also Wei Zong and A Jiang, "Important Theories for Administrative Litigation Legislation" in 
q:t 00 ~ ~ (Chinese Jurisprudence) 6, 1988, pp.11-20 in Reprints from the Press - Law, 2, 1989, 
pp.99-108. 
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Economics, political pressures and a general re-assessment of the theoretical foundations 
of the state have all contributed to the development of administrative litigation. 16 
Economic reforms have produced a new type of administered state that gives more 
responsibility, and therefore more power, to enterprises and other constituent parts of the 
state apparatus to manage their own affairs. Direct interference from the government has 
been reduced in return for increased efficiency and higher output. 17 
The mode of government has also changed from the autocracy that underpinned the 
centrally planned economy, to a more rule-based system that attempts to give more 
institutionalised protection to the rights of enterprises to mange their own affairs. If 
efficiency and initiative are to be encouraged, then state encroachment in the affairs of 
business must be controlled. Administrative litigation is seen as a method that supports 
greater institutionalisation of dispute resolution. 18 
But by far the most significant impetus for change came from a desire to establish the 
concept of "people sue officials" (~ 1!f °§') as a significant element underpinning the 
structure of the state. The reformed and modernised PRC wishes to clearly establish the 
notion that state-citizen relationships are now equal in legal status to citizen-citizen 
1 . h" 19 re at1ons ips. 
The official essay chosen to accompany the announcement of the promulgation of the 
ALL in the People's Daily is titled "An Important Step in the Establishment of 
16 Jiang Ming'an, IT iE5{ W ~ ~ ~ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), pp.28-31. See also FBIS - China Daily Report, 25 July 1986, K 28-30. 
17 On the relationship between administrative law generally and reform of the economic system see Yuan 
Shuhong, "On the Role of Administrative Law in the Restructuring of the Economic System" in 
~.+. ~m~ iz: 7" WT 7L (Studies in Law) 2, 1986, pp.32-36. 
18 On the relationship between political system reform and administr~tive law ~enerally, see Zhang Shang, 
"Administrative Law and Reform of the Political System" in 9:t 00 ~ iJStJ ::f~ (China Legal System 
News), 15 August 1986, p.3. 
19 On the cluster of ideas about state responsibility, state and citizen relationships and supervision of the 
government see: Yang Haikun, "Reflections on Establishing the Administrative Litigation System" in 
~ ~ ( Jurisprudence) 8, 1987, pp.5-8, 4 in Reprints from the Press- Law, 1987, 9, pp. 108-112. 
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Democratic Politics" ( ~ .3:: JE)( ~tl ~ -& ~ --1'-~ ¥ ~ W) .20 This is a 
small piece by the paper's commentator, printed next to the text of the ALL, which 
highlights the general aims and intentions of the new law. This essay draws universal 
links between democracy (which is undefined) and rule of law, and the establishment of 
an administrative litigation system. According to the commentator, one of the features to 
be expected of a country that is improving its level of democracy and rule of law is an 
administrative litigation law. In China's case, it is claimed, the ALL is an important 
expression of socialist rule of law and socialist democratic government: 
~~•oott~~~~~-~~-~*•' 
~~•oott~~~~~~IB•~~-~•¥~• 
(This is an important event in the establishment of China's socialist 
legal system, and is also an important step in the establishment 
of China's socialist democratic politics.) 
- ~ 00 *~:a. ,'1 fJ ~ w ~ ~J ~ ' 
~~~~~OO*~~~~ili~~*~~-~-4*~ 
(Whether or not a country establishes an administrative litigation 
system is an important indicator that measures that country's standard 
of development in democracy and rule of Jaw.) 
The article points out that previously people had to appeal to higher authorities to get a 
problem solved, which often left many problems without legal resolution. Now, it is 
pointed out, the ALL will make it possible to: protect the lawful rights of citizens and 
organisations; safeguard and supervise administrative organs as they carry out their 
functions according to law; and advance honesty and clean government. 
A key indicator of the authorities' understanding of who will benefit most by the new 
administrative law system is also given, as the essay makes several references to the 
20 People's Daily, 10 April 1989, p.l. See also "The Administrative Litigation System has Important 
Implications for Socialist Democratic Politics and Construction of the Legal System" in 
9=:t 00 ~ ::¥ (Chinese Jurisprudence) 3, 1989, pp.3-10; " People Can Sue Officials' is One Part of an 
Important Law" in ~ ::¥ ~ ~ (Law Magazine) 3, 1989, pp.2-3. 
ordinary or common people (~ Ef tt ). 
JJ[ :tI ' -IT iE)I: w 1'l' ~ rot 1'fj 7 ' ~ 8 
~ ~ '$' JI -IT iE)I: ~ # (fJ ~ ff J! :tm 1C ~ 
(Now that the Administrative Litigation Law has been issued, 
ordinary people can sue the officialdom, and the procedure for courts 
to hear administrative cases has become more perfect.) 
This notion raises two contending ideas: first, universality of access to justice, as 
demonstrated by the inclusion of ordinary people in the group who will benefit; and 
second and more indicative of the intent behind the law, the idea that although the 
theoretical underpinnings of the new administrative law system advocate universal 
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access, the law might have been designed to fill a gap in the range of China's dispute 
resolution systems and more easily enable the least powerful members of society to obtain 
redress. This idea will be explored further in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Provisions of the Administrative Litigation Law 
The stated aim of the ALL is both to protect the lawful interests of citizens and legal 
persons, and to safeguard the exercise of administrative power by administrative organs.21 
This aim is a compromise between powerful bureaucratic interests which do not want 
their administrative power circumscribed and more liberal-minded legal thinkers who 
wish to favour the rights of plaintiffs. During the drafting phase of the ALL there was a 
contentious debate about the aims of the ALL. Jiang Ming' an and Liu Fengming describe 
the two contending views thus: 
One aims to raise administrative efficiency by emphasising the implementation and management 
functions of the administrative organs; the second aims to protect the lawful rights of citizens by 
controlling violations of functions and abuses of power by administrative organs.22 
Jiang and Liu explain that the fundamental aim of the legislation affects its provisions. 
Generally, legal scholars were in favour of framing the ALL entirely with the rights of 
plaintiffs in mind.23 Zhang Shuyi, a legal scholar, expressed disappointment that some 
21 ALL, Article 1. 
22 Jiang Ming'an and Liu Fengming, "Certain Questions for Research on the Establishment of 
Administrative Litigation Law Legislation" in~ 4$ $ ">] ~ :wf- JL (Legal Studies and Research), 
1988, 3, 16-19 in Reprints from the Press - Law, 1989, 1, pp.121-129. 
23 Pitman Potter (ed.), "Editor's Introduction" in Chinese Law and Government, 24, 3, 1991, p.10. 
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interests involved in the drafting process gave primary consideration to the rights of the 
administrative organs.24 Zhang maintained that administrative organs had all the power 
they needed and that the point of an administrative litigation law is not to give further 
power to the government, but to protect citizens from encroachment by state power. 
Nevertheless, the views of legal scholars were tempered by the interests of administrative 
organs, and the provisions of the ALL reflect this compromise. 
Specific Provisions 
1. The scope and mechanism of regulation 
The drafting stages of the ALL engendered lengthy discussions about a cluster of issues 
concerning the scope of the law and the mechanisms that should be established to 
implement it. Chief among them was the question of whether to establish a special 
administrative court in the European style, and if so whether to locate it within the 
administrative bureaucracy or the court system. The advantage of this type of mechanism 
for the PRC was perceived to be that such courts would have the authority to handle even 
high-level administrative organs and officials as defendants,25 thereby making provision 
for maximum accountability of administrative power. This structure was not adopted, 
however, supposedly because to establish a separate administrative court would over-
stretch the PRC's judicial personnel and resources. The fact that administrative divisions 
had already been established in the ordinary courts to hear public order management 
d. 1 d . . f 26 1sputes was a so a etermmmg actor. 
The second matter concerning scope and mechanisms of the ALL that occupied the 
drafting committee was whether to appoint specialist administrative judges to provide 
administrative adjudication in the style of the US system. Advocates of this structure 
pointed out that it can provide a degree of specialist knowledge in the resolution of 
24 Zhang Shuyi, "Examination of Several Controversial Issues in the Administrative Litigation Law (Draft)" 
in Pitman Potter (ed.), Chinese Law and Government, 24, 3, 1991, pp.47-53. 
25 Jiang Ming'an, ff iE){ w 10 ~ # (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.40. 
26 FBIS - China Daily Report, 11 February 1987, K. l; FBIS - China Daily Report, 29 January 1988, pp.6-
7; FBIS - China Daily Report, 25 August 1988, p.28. 
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administrative disputes, which furthers efficiency and fair handling of disputes.27 Most 
judges, it was argued, do not possess specialist knowledge of administrative decision-
making areas and would thus be unable to deliver fair judgement in dispute resolution.28 
But rather than employ this mechanism, which would provide a comprehensive procedure 
for the control of administrative power, the drafters of the ALL chose to limit the scope of 
cases that could be heard under the ALL to specific administrative acts that are not 
elsewhere limited by law to adjudication by administrative organs.29 Thus, drafters 
retreated again from drafting a law which would provide maximum accountability of 
administrative power, and chose instead to limit the scope of the ALL so as not to intrude 
on administrative power that is authorised in other legislation. Administrative acts that 
are excluded from the scope of the ALL, such as some aspects of trademark and patent 
disputes, will be discussed below. 
The third important issue that the drafting committee had to clarify regarding the scope of 
the ALL was the relationship between administrative review and administrative litigation. 
The discussions on this topic revealed administrative resistance to any form of oversight 
by a third party.30 The third party may be a court, or a non-judicial body that was not a 
party to the dispute, such as an upper level of the administrative organ. In this view, 
W ~ (action at law, lawsuit, litigation, proceedings) need not necessarily be conducted 
by an ordinary court, but could be carried out by a special administrative court, or 
administrative adjudication. This proposal was dismissed, however, on the grounds that 
27 ,,- :r:tr .:: i:: .:;;~ .-..+ ).U, Jiang Ming'an, 1T -11-A llt- (.l, 12' 7"- (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.40. 
28 On these issues see: Shen Guanshen&•. "Th~ Necessities for Formulating Administrative Litigation and 
Administrative Trial Mechanisms" in ~ 00 ~ {j51J lg (China Legal System News) 8 October 1986, 
p.3, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 10, 1986, p.104; Luo Haocai, "The Balance Theory", pp.122-124; 
Jiang Ming'an, IT jE)( WU~::¥ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), pp.38-40; ,w ~Liming, "Some Suggestions About the Content of the 
Administrative Litigation Law" in ~ 7- (Jurisprudence), 12, 1986, p.9 in Reprints From the Press -
Law, 1987, 2J;.129; Wang Mingyang, "Several Questions About Administrative Litigation Legislation" 
in~::¥~ ,L:!.., (Law Magazine), 1, 1989, p.3 in Reprints from the Press, 3, 1989, p.126; Zhang 
Shuyi, "The Standard and Scope of Administrative Litigation" in ~ {j51J S lg (Legal System Daily), 3 
March 1989, p.3. 
29 ALL, Article 12, Clause 4. 
30 ,,_ :r:tr .::i:: .:;;~ .::.+ ).U, Jiang Ming'an, fT-11-A llt- (.l, 12' 7"- (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), pp.38-39. 
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many of the groups who were consulted during the drafting of the ALL did not support 
the concept of litigation proceedings being conducted outside the ordinary courts. The 
view prevailed that if the PRC was establishing an administrative litigation law, then such 
a law must be limited to litigation in the courts. Administrative review, as a distinct 
procedure for administrative organs to conduct, was subsequently authorised in the 
Administrative Review Regulations, 31 the provisions of which will be discussed in a later 
section. 
The Administrative Litigation Law regulates the procedures for hearing administrative 
disputes in administrative divisions of the ordinary courts.32 Defining the limits of the 
ALL's regulatory power was a highly significant issue that sought to further determine the 
nature of state power in its administrative and judicial forms. If the broad view had been 
adopted and the ALL's jurisdiction included the procedures for administrative review, 
then its structure would be closer to a general administrative procedure law that regulates 
all administrative conduct. In deciding that the ALL should only regulate the procedures 
for administrative litigation in the courts and that administrative cases would be heard in 
administrative divisions of the ordinary courts by ordinary judges, the drafting committee 
curtailed the ALL's authority to control administrative organs and their operating 
procedures. 
2. The scope of cases to be heard in court 
The scope of cases that should be subject to the ALL was a much debated issue during the 
drafting stage of the law. 33 One option, favoured by rights-conscious legal scholars in the 
PRC, was the outline method: the courts are given general rules by which to decide 
whether a case should be heard. The disadvantage of this method was thought to be that it 
31 Promulgated 9 November 1990: People's Daily, 28 December 1990, p.3. The regulations were modified 
on 9 October 1994: People's Daily, 16 October 1994, p.5. 
32 ALL, Articles 1, 2, 3. 
33 Hu Jianmiao, "A Summary of Opinions on Administrative Litigation Legislation" in Guangming Daily, 
21 July 1987, p.3 in Reprints from the Press - Law, 1987, 8, p.90; Wei Ajiang, "An Important Discussion 
of Administrative Litigation Legislation" in cp IE~:¥ (Chinese Jurisprudence), 6, 1988, pp.11-20 in 
reprints from the Press - Law, 2, 1989, pp.99-108; Jiang Ming' an, 
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would result in a flood of administrative suits in the courts which the system would not 
be able to handle. An alternative was to specify the types of cases that courts could 
handle. There were also combinations of these two methods: to determine a general scope 
and specify a few exclusions; to determine a specific scope and specify a few general 
exclusions, and so on. The ALL in its promulgated form sets a general range of cases 
which can be heard and specifies several types of cases that cannot.34 
Courts may hear administrative disputes that arise from specific administrative acts such 
as the imposition of a period of personal detention, imposition of a fine, cancellation of a 
business permit, an order to cease production, failure to issue a licence or permit where 
the applicant believes he or she is otherwise entitled to it, and failure by an administrative 
organ to protect personal or property rights or to allocate a legitimate pension.35 
Exclusions are set out: administrative acts involving national defence or foreign relations; 
administrative laws, regulations, and rules (although some rules may now be challenged 
under the new Administrative Review Law, but this does not give the courts any 
jurisdiction over them); administrative decisions of organs that relate to rewards, 
appointments, dismissals, or punishments of administrative personnel within an organ 
(some of these too, may now be challenged under the Administrative Review Law); and 
specific administrative acts which are determined by law as being the responsibility of 
administrative organs. 36 
Some exclusions deal with issues that arise regularly throughout life, while others deal 
with issues that people would face only rarely. 
o Acts involving national defence or foreign affairs, for example, will not be regular 
issues of contention between administrative organs and citizens. The avenue for redress 
on these matters is the National People's Congress (NPC), an organ whose administrative 
h tit .::i::: .::;\ ~.+ 52 
1 J .U-J\. ut- r.t. iZ: , (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 
1993), pp.40-41; FBIS - China Daily Report, 28 March 1989, pp.8-9. 
34 ALL, Articles 2, 11, 12. 
35 ALL, Article 11. 
36 ALL, Article 12. 
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power does not come within the scope of administrative litigation. There is, however, a 
couple of ways in which this exclusion may affect an individual or business plaintiff. If a 
young man is drafted into the army, for example, even though this relates to national 
defence, such decisions are appealable under the ALL. On the other hand, if a factory that 
produces munitions is subjected to an administrative order concerning how much and 
what type of munitions it may produce, even though this may interfere with managerial 
decision-making and thus be appealable, the directive is not appealable under the AIL. 
o Administrative laws and regulations may not be challenged. The best course of 
redress on these matters is a People's Congress at the appropriate level. This exclusion 
partly reflects the civil law tradition on which the PRC legal system is based, giving 
primary importance to the legislature rather than the judiciary in determining the validity 
of statutes. But it also reflects reluctance on the part of the state to accommodate too 
many civil rights challenges. The Administrative Review Law, that has now replaced the 
Administrative Review Regulations, permits applicants to challenge rules of the State 
Council or a people's government, but not laws or regulations. 
o Decisions of administrative organs relating to rewards, punishments, dismissals, 
and appointments of their staff may not be challenged. Complaints about these matters 
must be taken to the next higher level in the administrative organ, or to the Procuracy, or 
to the personnel organs. This is another exclusion reflecting a civil law tradition, but it 
also indicates an unwillingness on the part of the bureaucracy to have an untrained 
judiciary interfere in it affairs. As one interviewee replied when questioned about this 
matter: "This is a matter of division of power and labour. These internal matters are not 
the business of the courts". 37 Administrative sanctions imposed by administrative organs 
on their own personnel can now be challenged under the Administrative Review Law, but 
this merely reinforces arrangements that were already in place; it does not give the courts 
additional jurisdiction over the affairs of administrative organs. 
o Decisions for which administrative organs have the right to make the final 
adjudication. This category typically involves decisions relating to commercial or 
technical matters. Such issues were excluded from the range of cases applicable to the 
37 Interview with a lecturer in law at Beijing University, Beijing, 1998. 
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ALL because it was considered that PRC judges do not have the required professional 
expertise to handle them.38 Economic contracts, patents, trademarks, and auditing are 
just a few such areas. 
This exclusion, like the others, signals important limits to the role for administrative 
litigation. It is meant to provide resolution of administrative disputes that are non-
technical, general in nature, or fall within the area of the courts' specialisation, that is, 
criminal or minor criminal (administrative) offences. 
Technical or commercial disputes are usually resolved by administrative arbitration. 
Specialist arbitration bodies have been established to handle these disputes, covering such 
areas as economic contracts, labour, real estate, product quality, and technology 
contracts.39 The decisions of administrative arbitration committees have legal effect, and 
if the parties do not register disagreement with the arbitration decision within a set time 
period, then the decision must be implemented. If one party does not implement it, the 
other can apply to the court to have the decision enforced. Registering disagreement with 
the arbitration decision is done by either of the parties taking the case to court in a civil 
suit. Administrative arbitration decisions are thus exempt from administrative litigation.40 
Administrative arbitration is regarded as similar to the administrative adjudication 
systems of the US and UK that give specialist arbitration commissions the first and 
primary right to resolve a dispute. A major difference to Western bodies is that the PRC 
arbitration organs are attached to administrative organs, whereas the foreign counterparts 
are established by law as legal entities in their own right. Economic contract arbitration 
committees, for example, are under the jurisdiction of the industry and commerce organs. 
38 Interview with a lecturer at the China University of Politics and Law, Beijing, 1998. 
39 9=f 00 !E)t Jf,f 1§f tf. S 5ft -± .f3 (An Encyclopedia of Chinese Government Management) 
(Beijing: Economic Daily Press, 1992), pp.439-443. 
40 See Gao Fan (ed.), IT !E)t =tl:L ~~Jiff (A Handbook on Administrative Enforcement) (Beijing: 
China Legal System Press, 1990), pp.124-126. 
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The complexity of administrative arbitration in the PRC is further compounded by the 
existence of such committees as those for review and examination of trademarks and 
patents, which also operate under the jurisdiction of the industry and commerce organs.41 
Both these types of bodies carry out the dual functions of administrative adjudication and 
administrative supervision.42 If, for example, a party makes an application to have a 
trademark registered and the application is rejected, appeal can be made to a trademark 
review and examination committee.43 This committee has the authority to make final 
decisions on requests for such reviews because the issue is considered to be a specialised 
province of the industry and commerce organs. It likewise may make final decisions if a 
trademark is registered but then opposed by a third party, or if a trademark is cancelled.44 
If, on the other hand, one party's exclusive use of a trademark has been infringed, and the 
industry and commerce organ imposes a fine or other administrative penalty on the 
offender, any dissatisfied party may request that a higher level of the industry and 
commerce organ review the decision and subsequently may initiate administrative 
litigation in court.45 
Administrative adjudication committees can co-opt suitably skilled and knowledgeable 
people from the ranks of lawyers, other professions or specialist areas, and relevant state 
offices. Thus they have the capacity to provide specialist expertise for resolving 
disputes.46 In the PRC, administrative arbitration and administrative adjudication are seen 
as important players in the range of administrative dispute resolution mechanisms. They 
41 Wang Xuezheng, I rat fJ :iE)I: 1* (Administrative Law of Industry and Commerce) (Beijing: China 
Personnel press, 1993), pp.187-189. 
42 On the operation of the patent infringement management system see Yu Jianyang, "Review of Patent 
Infringement Litigation in the People's Republic of China" in Journal of Chinese Law, 2, 5, 1991, pp.297-
347. 
43 Trademark Law Implementing Rules (Revised), 3 Januar,r. 1988, Articles 17 and 23. For a Chinese 
language version see Shen Guansheng, ft 00 rat :ii- ? ? ifjlj tr-J !.f i.-2: ~ ~ $.It (The Theory and 
Practice of the Trademark Legal System) (Beijing: The People's Courts Press, 1993), pp.311-320. For an 
English language version see China Law and Practice 2, 2, 24 February 1988, pp.53-62. 
44 Trademark Law Implementing Rules (Revised), Article 35. 
45 Trademark Law Implementing Rules (Revised), Articles 42, 43, and 44. 
46 Wang Chengdong, fJ :iE)I: ~ 1.)( (Administrative Review) (Beijing: China University of Politics and 
Law, 1993), p.46. 
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are intended to provide professional knowledge, thereby increasing efficient handling of 
disputes. 
Mention should be made here of other concrete administrative acts which cannot be 
handled under the ALL. Communist Party administrative decisions cannot be handled 
under this system,47 nor can the administrative decisions of any social organisations, or 
the administrative decisions of many other state organisations such as banks. For 
example, in 1998 the People's Bank of China decided to close down the Guangdong 
International Trust and Investment Corp (GITIC), a decision which was closely followed 
by a court decision freezing the bank accounts and assets of the organisation.48 This 
decision is beyond the scope of administrative review or litigation in the PRC. By 
contrast, if an industry and commerce organ made a similar decision in relation to an 
enterprise, the decision would be subject to administrative review and litigation. 
3. The importance to the state of administrative litigation 
The ALL stipulates that in an administrative litigation case the court must use the 
collegiate system,49 which means that at least three judges must hear the case. This 
number is contrasted with civil litigation cases which may be heard by only one judge. 
This requirement demonstrates the sensitive nature of administrative litigation cases for 
the state, and a concern that the correct decision be reached. 
4. Joint Litigation 
The ALL makes provision for cases which may have more than one party wishing to 
complain about the specific administrative act. These cases are joint actions (gongtong 
susong).50 They differ from class action suits in Western countries in that joint action 
suits in the PRC must involve plaintiffs who are directly affected by the administrative 
47 See: Edward Epstein, "Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens Can Sue the State but not the Party" in 
China News Analysis, 1386, 1June1989; William Alford, "Double-Edged Swords Cut Both Ways: Law 
and Legitimacy in the People's Republic of China" in Daedalus, 122, 2, 1993, pp.45-69; Pitman Potter, 
"The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC", pp.270-304. 
48 Reuters News Service, 21 October 1998. 
49 ALL, Article 6. 
50 ALL, Article 26. 
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behaviour in question; abstract involvement is not sufficient grounds for making a case. 
The ALL also provides for third parties to be part of a suit where they have an interest in 
the case, but their interest may not be that of the plaintiff.51 This situation usually arises 
when there are two parties to a dispute, such as a public order dispute, and the public 
security organ imposes a penalty on one of the parties. The other party may disagree with 
the administrative penalty on the grounds that it is too lenient and thus may wish to 
challenge the decision as part of the suit when the recipient of the penalty challenges it on 
the grounds that it is too harsh. 
5. The courts establish a case 
When a plaintiff files an application for litigation there are set procedures the court must 
undertake to establish whether the case is one that it can hear. The criteria set out in the 
ALL which the court must examine are general in nature: the applicant must be a citizen, 
legal person or other organisation which considers that a specific administrative act has 
infringed his or her lawful interests; there must be a clearly identifiable respondent; there 
must be a specific claim and facts upon which the application is based; and the case must 
fall within the scope of cases a court may hear, and within the specific jurisdiction of the 
court to which application has been made.52 The court is merely meant to establish at this 
point that all the elements are in place for a legal administrative litigation suit to be heard. 
The court must then accept or reject the case within seven days.53 The implication is that 
courts should accept all cases which satisfy the requirements, but in fact there is no 
obligation for them to do so.54 Authoritative Chinese sources on administrative litigation 
appear to be silent on this point, which is not necessarily an indication of collusion 
between the state and legal scholars. Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation 
demonstrate that courts do not accept all the cases they should, and that this is 
acknowledged as a shortcoming of the system, rather than as a loophole. 
51 ALL, Article 27. 
52 ALL, Article 41. 
53 ALL, Article 42. 
54 
"Editor's Notes", China Law and Practice, 3, 5, 1989, p.56. 
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6. Suspension of the administrative act during trial 
If a person files for administrative litigation in protest against an administrative penalty, 
the penalty is not suspended during the course of the trial.55 This provision also applies in 
administrative review.56 This means that a plaintiff will often have endured the penalty to 
its completion before the administrative review or litigation is complete. This rule may be 
voided in the following circumstances: if the defendant considers that the administrative 
penalty should be postponed; if the plaintiff applies for a suspension and the court agrees 
on the grounds that irreparable harm would otherwise be caused to the plaintiff, and 
public interest would not be harmed; or if a law or regulation allows for it.57 The Public 
Order Management Regulations 1986, for example, provide for bail to be paid in order to 
have the penalty suspended while the review or litigation is in process.58 This provision is 
more repressive than that in the original 1957 Public Order Management Regulations 
which allowed for a personal penalty to be postponed c1r ~ zanhuan) during the 
appeal period if the offender had a fixed local address. Where the offender had no fixed 
address he or she was obliged to find a guarantor, or to pay bail before the penalty would 
be postponed.59 The most recent provision might reflect the reform-era problem caused 
by China's itinerant floating population. 
This provision in the ALL blatantly ignores the plaintiff's circumstances. The state's 
position is that once an administrative decision has been issued it has legal effect and 
therefore the state has the right to implement and enforce it.60 Even if the action is illegal 
or unsuitable, the parties must implement it. The state maintains that if the administrative 
action were to be suspended during the time of appeal, this would adversely impinge 
upon the safety and order of the rest of society. An example used to illustrate this point is 
55 ALL, Article 44. 
56 ARR, Article 39. 
57 ALL, Article 44. 
58 Public Order Management Re~ulations 1986, Article 40 in 
~ $ A ~ .:J:t :fo 00 ~ :f$ ~ .=PJ (Compendium of Laws of the People's Republic of China) 
(Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989), pp.1529-1534. 
59 Public Order Management Regulations 1957, Article 18, Clause 7 in Compendium of Laws and 
Regulations, 1994, vol.3,klOl. 
60 Huang Shuhai, IT]'.)( ~ 1.J< ~if~ l'BJ ~ (Questions and Answers About Administrative Review) 
(Beijing: People's Daily Press, 1991), pp.106-108. 
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the supervision of food product standards by the health management organs: if a producer 
of below-standard food products is permitted to continue the business while an appeal is 
in progress, the health and safety of consumers may be seriously affected. 
The state does admit that under some circumstances this provision may harm a plaintiff's 
lawful rights. To deal with these situations the state has provided for compensation to 
cover losses incurred as a result of what is subsequently shown to be an illegal or 
unsuitable administrative decision. In some circumstances the system for compensation 
works effectively and in others it does not. For example, if a business had to suspend 
operations for a week as a result of an administrative decision that was subsequently 
shown to be illegal, then the business operator can request compensation for the direct 
economic losses incurred during that week of non-production, such as for staff salaries. If, 
however, an unemployed citizen is given a seven-day administrative detention for a 
public order violation, and the decision is subsequently shown to be illegal, then only an 
apology will be issued from the public security organ because there has been no direct 
economic loss. The State Compensation Law does not generally provide monetary 
compensation for indirect losses such as psychological trauma, but only for direct losses 
such as damaged clothing, hospital bills and so on.61 If the detainee had been beaten by 
the police while in custody and had to go to hospital to get attended to, then he or she 
could claim compensation for the medical fees and to replace any damaged clothing. But 
the plaintiff cannot claim compensation for the indirect losses incurred as a result of 
having been illegally detained. 
7. Withdrawal of a case 
A plaintiff may apply to withdraw an administrative litigation case during the course of 
the trial but the court must approve such a withdrawal. There are a number of factors that 
contribute to a plaintiff wishing to withdraw a case, which will be dealt with in detail in 
61 State Compensation Law 1994: People's Daily, 13 May 1994, p.3. This was confirmed in interview with 
an official from the State Council's Office of Legislative Affairs, Beijing, 1998; Huang Shuhai, 
IT ~ ~ i.)< ~ iJ~ IBJ ~ (Questions and Answers About Administrative Review) (Beijing: People's 
Daily Press, 1991), pp.132-133. 
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Chapter Seven. The important point to note here is that the defending organ has the right 
to alter the administrative decision during the course of the trial and that such alterations 
may contribute to a plaintiff wishing to withdraw the suit.62 
8. Enforcement of a court judgement 
When a court makes a ruling in an administrative litigation case, the ruling has legal 
effect and it must be carried out. If a plaintiff refuses to carry out the ruling, the 
administrative organ can ask the court to enforce it. If a defending organ refuses to carry 
out a court ruling such as refunding a fine or paying damages, then the court has the 
authority to order a bank transfer of money from the account of the administrative organ. 
It also may fine the organ or make a judicial recommendation (OJ ~ ~ l..){ sifa 
jianyi) to the next highest level of the administrative organ, suggesting the higher level 
take action to ensure the ruling is carried out. In extreme circumstances, criminal liability 
may be considered.63 The courts generally have more power to enforce their decisions 
over individuals than over powerful administrative organs. 
9. Compensation 
If a citizen suffers tangible losses as a result of a specific administrative decision then a 
claim can be made for monetary compensation. The administrative organ must first deal 
with the claim, and if no satisfaction is obtained then the plaintiff may take the case to 
court. Significantly for the outcomes, mediation is a lawful means of handling 
compensation claims. This becomes important when a case involves both a request to 
cancel an administrative decision and a claim for compensation.64 The compensation 
claims are paid out of public money, but the official responsible for the damages may be 
asked to pay some or all of the cost out of his/her private finances if it is shown that the 
damages were caused intentionally or by gross negligence.65 
62 ALL, Article 51. 
63 ALL, Article 65. 
64 This relationship will be examined in detail in Chapter Five. 
65 ALL, Articles 67, 68 and 69. 
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10. Foreigners and administrative litigation 
Foreigners in China who wish to conduct administrative litigation may do so according to 
the ALL with all the same conditions as citizens, providing the foreigner's country 
extends similar rights to PRC citizens. The only legal hurdle for foreigners is that if they 
wish to conduct their case through a lawyer, then the lawyer must be from one of the 
lawyers' associations of the PRC.66 
11. The responsibility to provide evidence 
The legal situation in administrative litigation is that the plaintiff(~ 1!f A yuan gao 
ren) accuses the administrative organ of an illegal act. The organ is then the defendant 
(~ 1!f A beigao ren), and must provide evidence to prove the legality of the decision. 
The plaintiff does not have to prove that the administrative organ made an illegal 
decision; the organ must provide its reasons and evidence to show that its decision was 
legal.67 The only condition under which this may vary is if the plaintiff thinks the 
defending organ has used evidence which further harms the rights of the plaintiff, leading 
the plaintiff to claim further compensation. In such circumstances the plaintiff must 
provide the evidence. 
This provision assigns more rights to the plaintiff than to the defending organ, so in this 
particular circumstance the ALL is more conscious of individual rights than of the 
prerogatives of the state. This affects the choice of redress sought by plaintiffs, as one 
interviewee pointed out: if faced with the choice of suing an administrative organ in an 
administrative suit or suing a fellow citizen in a civil suit, as often arises in land disputes 
and environment protection disputes, the best course is to choose the administrative suit . 
because the plaintiff has more rights.68 In a civil suit, the parties have equal rights. 
66 ALL, Articles 70-73. 
67 ALL, Article 32. 
68 Interview with a teacher of administrative law at the Wuhan Southern Central University of Politics and 
Law and graduate law student in the Department of Law, Beijing University, Beijing, 1998. 
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It is argued by PRC legal scholars, in support of this provision, that since it is the 
defendant's behaviour that is under scrutiny then the defendant should be obliged to 
provide the evidence. In addition to this, it was recognised that in most administrative 
cases the defendant has the evidence in hand and the plaintiff will have no legal claim to 
the necessary documents.69 Courts have the power to request documents from 
administrative organs in the course of litigation, but as will be shown in Chapters Six and 
Seven, administrative organs often refuse to cooperate. 
The alternative to this provision, considered during the drafting of the ALL, was to assign 
the responsibility for evidence on a civil law basis, which would have assigned to both 
parties equal responsibility for the provision of evidence.70 This view was based on the 
concept that the aim of administrative litigation is to resolve administrative disputes and 
in such disputes both parties have a position to advocate, and thus both parties should 
provide evidence. The overriding of this view in the ALL indicates a degree of 
recognition by the drafting committee of the power imbalance between administrative 
organs and citizens, and recognition that this must be addressed in determining 
responsibility for provision of evidence. 
12. Basis for courljudgements 
One of the most contentious issues debated during the drafting of the ALL was the legal 
basis upon which court decisions should be made.71 Should courts only be permitted to 
use laws and regulations ('~ 4$: ~ 1JlL falU fagui) as the basis for their rulings in 
administrative litigation cases, or should they also be permitted to use administrative 
rules (1J1[ jj! guizhang), which are often confusing, unclear, or contradictory? The 
69 /~ tit .::i::. .:;J~ '+ ~ Jiang Ming' an, 11.u-;r.. 111'- (.4 iz; 'T" (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.45. 
70 /~ tit .::i::. ' \, .:-.+ ~ Jiang Ming' an, 11 .u-;r.. 111'- ~ iz; 'T" (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.45. 
71 See: Hu Jianmiao, "A Summary of Opinions on Administrative Litigation Legislation" in Guangming 
Daily, 21July1987, p.3, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 8, 1987, p.90; Wang Mingyang, "Several 
Problems With the Administrative Litigation Legislation" in ~ =:¥ ~ ~ (Law Magazine) 1, 1989, 
pp.3-4, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 3, 1989, p.126; A~ .I~ 3r fg (The People's Public 
Security News), 20 October 1989, p.3. 
promulgated version of the ALL states that courts must refer to laws, regulations, 
decisions, orders, and administrative rules when making a judgement.72 
81 
Not surprisingly, administrative officials and legal scholars tended to support the use of 
guizhang as a legal basis,73 whereas judges pointed out that guizhang are not laws (/ala) 
but rather are abstract administrative behaviour.74 Judges also maintained that the aim of 
administrative litigation is for courts to supervise administrative behaviour and determine 
the legality of concrete administrative acts. If this decision-making were to be done on the 
basis of guizhang which are determined by an administrative organ, then there would be 
no legally effective supervision. 
13. Judicial review 
The ALL is not the sort of all-embracing judicial review law found in many Western 
countries which empowers the courts to review any administrative act, including 
legislation. The ALL of the PRC empowers the courts to determine the legality of a 
specific administrative act only against given criteria.75 
In contrast to the concept of judicial review being an integral part of the three-way 
separation of powers that is common in Western countries, the widely supported view of 
judicial review in the PRC is that it helps determine the division of labour among a state's 
administrative organs, with the aim of accountability.76 This concept leaves 
administrative litigation to provide a legal review of concrete administrative behaviour, 
thus realizing judicial supervision and regulation of administration.77 
72 ALL, Article 53. 
73 Zhan& Shuyi, "Reexamination of Several Controversial Issues in the'Draft Administrative Litigation Law" 
in ~ ~ (Juri~rudence), 3, 1989, p.8. 
74 Jiang Ming' an, .fr if){ W ~ ~ ~ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.43. 
75 ALL, Article 5. 
76 /~ -:th ~ i:: .:'.+ ).U, Jiang Ming' an, 1T .jl..}<.,. vi-? ? iz: + (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), p.44. 
77 See also: Yang Haikun, "Reflections on Establishing the Administrative Litigation System" in 
~ ~ (Jurisprudence), 8, 1987, pp.5-8, 4, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 9, 1987, pp.108-112; 
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14. How the court may adjudicate 
When a court hears an administrative litigation case it is authorised to determine the 
legality of the administrative decision but not the fairness of it. The fairness or suitability 
of an administrative decision is considered to be the province of administrative organs 
and only they have the authority to review a decision on those grounds. Thus, the ARR, 
the provisions of which are discussed below, authorises administrative review organs to 
overturn a lower-level decision if it is found to be unsuitable, but courts may not. Courts 
may, however, consider the fairness of an administrative decision if the decision is 
extremely unfair (so unfair as to be illegal), but in normal circumstances it is limited to 
examining the legality of an act. The determinants of legality are: evidence, facts, laws 
and regulations, statutory procedures, excess of authority and abuse of power.78 
If the evidence is conclusive and the correct laws and regulations have been used then the 
administrative act should be upheld. Where any of the determinants of legality are 
insufficient the court may overturn all or part of the administrative decision and may 
order the administrative organ to make a new decision. 79 The organ may not make a new 
decision that is the same as, or very similar to, the one which the court overturned if the 
same facts are used as the basis. 80 
15. Administrative review as a prerequisite 
The ALL permits the courts to accept any case where the plaintiff is unhappy with a 
specific administrative decision except for the four categories of exclusions examined 
above.81 Administrative review is not a prerequisite for administrative litigation as a 
general principle, but it is specifically required in some cases. Public order disputes 
Wan~ Mingyang, "Several Problems With the Administrative Litigation Legislation" in 
~ ~ ~ ~ (Law Magazine) 1, 1989, pp.3-4, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 3, 1989, p.126. 
78 ALL, Article 54, Clause 2. 
79 ALL, Article 54, Clauses 1, 2. 
80 ALL, Article 55. 
81 ALL, Article 12. 
involving the public security organs, for example, must first go through administrative 
review.82 
83 
The arguments put forward in support of administrative review as a prerequisite maintain 
that administrative review can promote promptness and accuracy in dispute handling 
because upper levels of administrative organs can provide specialist knowledge about 
their field. Furthermore, it is claimed that administrative review provides an opportunity 
for upper level administrative organs to supervise the lower levels, and facilitate the early 
correction of mistakes. There was also the recognition that administrative review as a 
prerequisite is common in foreign countries as part of judicial review. 83 More practical 
considerations, however, include the aim of using administrative review as a sifting 
process to reduce the large number of cases being litigated.84 
There are other administrative disputes for which laws and regulations determine the path 
allowed for plaintiffs. For example, disputes involving auditing cannot go to court but 
may only be handled through administrative review.85 Rather than list all the types of 
cases that cannot be accepted by the courts, the All was framed for more general 
provisions. 
Still other disputes allow the plaintiff to choose whether to apply for administrative 
review first or to go direct to administrative litigation. The disadvantage to the plaintiffs 
of first choosing administrative review is that upper-level administrative organs usually 
protect their lower levels by automatically confirming the lower level's administrative 
decision. If, however, the organ provides genuine and fair review, then the plaintiff 
82 Public Order Management Regulations 1986, Article 39 in 
9=t $ A ~#;fa 00 ~ # ±-=PJ (Compendium of Laws of the People's Republic of China) 
(Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989). 
83 Jiang Ming'an, .fi jf)l: "W fl'~~ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), pp.44-45; Zhang Shuyi, "Reexamination of Several Controversial Issues in the 
Draft Administrative Litigation Law" in ~~ (Jurisprudence), 3, 1989, p.8. 
84 Interview with a teacher of administrative law at the China University of Politics and Law, Beijing, 1998. 
85 Dong Jianguo, .fi jE)I: jt 1-5< f. Jiff- (A Handbook on Administrative Review) (Beijing: China Legal 
System Press, 1991), p.2. 
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obtains quick, cheap, and hassle-free redress, as administrative review is largely a written 
procedure and does not require the applicant to attend a hearing. 
16. The power of the courts to amend administrative decisions 
The issue of judicial authority to alter an administrative decision was, together with the 
legal basis for court judgements in administrative litigation, a highly contentious issue 
because it is at the heart of the relationship between judicial and administrative power.86 
The ALL provides that courts have the authority to order that an administrative decision 
be altered if it is clearly unfair. 87 But this power does not mean that the court directly 
issues the new decision. The court has the power to cancel either part or the whole of the 
decision and order the administrative organ to issue a new decision. 88 For disputes about 
the fairness of an administrative punishment, the courts have no power to order alteration 
of the decision. 
The arguments for assigning to courts the power to alter an administrative decision were 
vigorously opposed by administrative organs on the grounds that judicial power should 
not usurp administrative power.89 The organs claimed exclusive knowledge about 
administrative decision-making and therefore exclusive rights to decide when, and under 
what conditions, an administrative decision should be altered. The courts, in response, 
generally supported the provision and pointed out that judicial power to alter an 
administrative decision can provide better protection for the lawful rights of plaintiffs. In 
86 Hu Jianmiao, "A Summary of Opinions on Administrative Litigation Legislation" in Guangming Daily, 
21 July 1987, p.3, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 8, 1987, p.90; Xu Ruibai, "Administrative Litigation 
and Judicial Power to Alter an Administrative Decision" in 9=f 00 ~ "lj5IJ ::ff,t (China Legal System 
News), 7 October 1987, p.3; Wei Zong and A Jiang, "Important Theory in Administrative Litigation 
Legislation" in 9=f 00 ~ ¥ (China Jurisprudence) 6, 1988, pp.11-20; Jiang Bixin, "Judicial Power of 
Change in Administrative Litigation" in ~ ¥ :uJl-~ (Studies in Law), 6, 1988, pp.31-34; Wang 
Mingyang, "Several Problems About Administrative Litigation Legislation" in ~ ¥ ~ Z (Law 
Magazine) 1, 1989, pp.3-4, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 3, 1989, p.126. 
87 ALL, Article 54, Clause 4. 
88 Ma Yuan (ed.), IT iE)t W ~:\Ea iH );( $. (Administrative Litigation Knowledge Series) 
(Beijing: Beijing Teachers' College Press, 1991), p.45. 
89 For a summary of this discussion see: Jiang Ming'an, IT !E)t W ~ ~ ¥ (Jurisprudence of 
Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1993), p.46; Edward Epstein, 
"Administrative Litigation Law: Citizens Can Sue the State but not the Party" in China News Analysis, 
1386, 1 June 1989, p.6. 
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support of this argument, the courts claimed that although administrative organs do have 
the experience required to make administrative decisions, some personnel within the 
organs do not have sufficient experience to do this. In such cases the courts are not 
always able to overturn the administrative decision outright, and even when they do so 
the administrative organ does not always cooperate. Thus the real issue is under what 
conditions the courts can provide adequate protection for plaintiffs' lawful rights. Some 
administrative decisions also rest on a fine line between legality and illegality: an 
administrative decision may still be within the scope of the law but clearly unfair, and if 
the courts cannot change it then the ALL's aim of rights protection is not fulfilled. 
The promulgated version of the ALL provides that courts may cancel an administrative 
decision in whole or in part if it is found to be illegal or clearly unfair, but the 
bureaucratic resistance to this power is considerable. This adversely affects the 
implementation of the administrative law system, as will be shown in subsequent 
chapters. 
17. Mediation 
The ALL prohibits the use of mediation as a tool to settle administrative disputes,90 but 
provides for its use during proceedings for damages.91 The first administrative litigation 
cases heard during the reform era were handled under the Trial Civil Litigation Law92 
which permits, even encourages, the use of mediation in dispute resolution. This 
background inevitably raised concerns during the drafting stage of the ALL as to whether 
mediation should be permitted in administrative litigation. As the status of the parties in 
administrative litigation is unequal, it was realised that mediation is inappropriate.93 
90 ALL, Article 50. 
91 ALL, Article 67. 
92 See Chapter Two. 
93 Shen Guansheng, "The Necessities for Formulating Administrative Litigation and Administrative Trial 
Mechanisms" in 9=t 001* i!itJ :J'l;t (China Legal System News) 8 October 1986, p.3, in Reprints from the 
Press - Law, 10, 1986, p.104; Hu Jianmiao, "A Summary of Opinions on Administrative Litigation 
Legislation" in Guangmi'ng Daily, 21 July 1987, p.3, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 8, 1987, p.90. 
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Further to this, the court's role in administrative litigation is to establish the legality of the 
administrative decision in question, and legality is not a matter than can be mediated.94 
Those in favour of using mediation to settle administrative litigation cases tended to 
regard the courts as a general dispute resolution body that should aim to negotiate a 
lasting agreement between the parties.95 Further to this, it was thought that mediation 
would provide an opportunity to sort out any misunderstandings that may have 
contributed to the dispute, and this would enable the courts to publicise the state's 
policies. 
18. Qualifications to be a plaintiff 
Qualifications to be a plaintiff in an administrative litigation suit are limited to citizens, 
legal persons and other organisations whose lawful rights have been infringed by a 
specific administrative act.96 There were questions raised during the drafting stage about 
whether organisations such as the Trade Union, the Women's Federation and the 
Individual Labourer's Association should be permitted to be plaintiffs in an administrative 
litigation suit.97 The decisions of such bodies are not challengeable under the ALL, but it 
was debated as to whether they should be permitted to challenge specific administrative 
decisions of bureaucratic organs. The main question was whether the rights of these 
bodies could be harmed by specific administrative behaviour.98 It was decided that there 
was no real connection between specific administrative behaviour and the activities of 
94 ,,- ';t.ft .::c::. .::,>\. .;-.+ ~ Jiang Ming' an, 1T •A ~t- r.L. iz: + (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), pp.47-48. 
95 See Hu Jianmiao, "A Summary of Opinions on Administrative Litigation Legislation" in Guangming 
Daily, 21 July 1987, p.3, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 8, 1987, p.90; Jiang Ming'an, 
h ';t.ft .::c::. .::,>\. .;-+ St 
1 J •A ~t- r.L. iz: , (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 
1993), pp.47-48. 
96 ALL, Article 2. 
97 Jiang Ming' an and Liu Fengming, "Several Questions for Research on Administrative Litigation" in 
~ # ~ ":s::J ~ ¥f- ".1L (Legal Studies and Research), 3, 1988, pp.16-19, in Reprints from the Press 
.1- ';t.fr.::C::..::,.\.;o+ ~ 
-Law, 1, 1989, pp.121-129; Jiang Ming' an, 1T •A ~t- r.L. fz;; + (Jurisprudence of Administrative 
Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1993), p.45. 
98 Jiang Ming'an and Liu Fengming, "Several Questions for Research on Administrative Litigation" in 
~ # ~ ":s::J ~ ¥f-".1L (Legal Studies and Research), 3, 1988, pp.16-19, in Reprints from the Press 
- Law, 1, 1989, pp.121-129; Jiang Ming'an, D ~ W ~ ~ ~ (Jurisprudence of Administrative 
Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1993), p.45. 
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these bodies, and thus there was no need to include them as possible plaintiffs. But this 
decision masks concern that such organisations might be used as proxy plaintiffs by 
individuals who were afraid to sue an administrative organ themselves,99 thereby gaining 
a powerful organisation as an ally against an administrative organ of the state. 
Provisions of the Administrative Review Regulations 
This section refers primarily to the Administrative Review Regulations (ARR) because 
the Administrative Review Law (ARL) was not promulgated until April 1999, by which 
time the dissertation was in the writing-up phase. The primary thrust of the ARR have not 
been overtaken by the ARL, thus it is still useful for the reader to be aware of their 
provisions. Where the provisions of the ARL differ from those of the ARR in ways that 
may affect the implementation of the administrative law system, such provisions will be 
discussed below. 
Aims of the regulations 
The formalization and codification of the procedures for administrative review in the 
form of the Administrative Review Regulations 100 ( D :iE){ ~ 1..5( -%' 19~ ) marked a 
significant step forward in the structuring of accountability systems that operate within 
each administrative xitong. Administrative review existed in form and reality in the PRC 
as early as 1950, but the procedures were not codified and therefore not transparent. A 
significant advantage of the ARR for applicants is that they now know the criteria and the 
processes used by administrative organs when conducting administrative review. This 
strengthens the position of the applicant in relation to the administrative organ compared 
to the situation before the ARR, when applicants for administrative review knew they had 
the general right to ask for review but had no idea of whether the administrative organ 
was conducting the process fairly. 
99 Jiang Ming'an and Liu Fengming, "Several Questions for Research on Administrative Litigation" in 
~ :1$ $ ">J ~ :wf- Jt (Legal Studies and Research), 3, 1988, pp.16-19, in Reprints from the Press 
-Law, 1, 1989, pp.121-129; Jiang Ming' an, fr Jf5r W ft~$ (Jurisprudence of Administrative 
Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1993), p.45. 
100 These regulations were promulgated on 9 November 1990 (People's Daily, 28 December 1990, p.3) and 
were amended on 9 October 1994 (People's Daily, 16 October 1994, p.5). 
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In most cases administrative review provides for vertically organized reconsideration of a 
specific administrative decision. This means that the review organ most often will be a 
higher level organ within the administrative xitong that made the disputed administrative 
decision, though in some cases the review organ will be at the same hierarchical level as 
the unit which made the disputed decision. 
In general terms the review organ is charged with reconsidering the decision's legality 
and suitability, IOI although the suitability provision may only be used to overturn a 
decision that is extremely unsuitable. The issue of administrative discretion as to whether 
the applicant merited, for example, seven days detention or three days detention is not 
provided for in the ARR. This is disappointing because a significant advantage of 
organizing a review at a higher level in the same system is that the higher-level organ can 
step into the shoes of the original decision-maker and make an assessment as to the 
suitability or merit of the decision that is informed by knowledge of how the system 
operates. Theoretically, if the lower-level organ was disbanded or otherwise could not 
make its administrative decisions, the work could be transferred to the upper level. This 
should mean that providing a review of the decision's merit should be easy and quick for 
the upper level. Its omission from the scope of provisions limits the power of 
administrative review to provide redress on matters of general, rather than specific, 
legality. Excluding administrative discretion from the scope of the regulations is the type 
of provision that would be more suitable for a system of redress where the reviewing 
authority was external to the original administrative organ which made the disputed 
decision, such as a court. 
The ARR were adopted in the wake of the Administrative Litigation Law. Once it was 
determined that the ALL would be limited to determining the court procedure for 
handling administrative disputes, it was realized that this left the procedures of 
administrative organs for handling administrative appeals unregulated except for the 
101 ARR, Article 7. 
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traditional system of letters/visits. 102 The ARR set out the procedures that administrative 
organs must follow when a plaintiff applies for review of an administrative decision. The 
form, structure, and provisions of the regulations are designed to provide continuity 
between administrative review and administrative litigation. 103 
The purpose of the regulations is to safeguard and supervise administrative organs as they 
perform their powers of office, prevent and rectify illegal or unsuitable specific 
administrative acts, and protect the lawful rights and interests of citizens, legal persons 
and other organisations. 104 
There was considerable debate during the preparation phase of these regulations as to 
precisely what the purpose of administrative review should be. By far the most common 
view was that administrative review is a dispute resolution system alongside 
administrative arbitration, administrative adjudication and administrative mediation. 105 
Despite this framework of dispute resolution, which strongly informed the regulations, 
legal drafters made it clear that administrative review organs should not be like 
administrative arbitration organs, which are under the jurisdiction of administrative 
organs and yet operate independently. Nor should they be like the administrative courts or 
the administrative tribunals of foreign countries. 106 A widely held view was that 
administrative review should be firmly designed as a supervisory mechanism,107 together 
102 See Chapter Two. 
103 Zhou Hegang, "A Chat About Several Problems in Administrative Review" in ~ 115tJ ~ 19; (Law and 
Order) 5, 1990, pp.12-13; "The Role of Administrative Review" in ~.2 Br ~ ~ (Economy and 
Law), 4, 1991,]p.35-36; Yang Haikun, "Establishing a Cohesive Administrative Review System" in 
jE5/: if! ~ ~ # (Politics and Law), 3, 1990, pp.23-26, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 8, 1990, 
pp.55-58. On the Administrative Review Regulations generally see: "Some Problems About the New 
Administrative Review" in ~£Br ~ ~ (Economy and Law), 6, 1990, pp.16-18; Ma Zaixue, Zhang 
Longming and Zhao Shoutie, "Certain Problems for Research on Administrative Review", 
9::t m jE5/: ~ :¥ ~:¥:;Ht (Journal of the Southern China Politics and Law Institute), 3, 1990, 
pp.59-62, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 1, 1991, pp.59-62. 
104 ARR, Article 1. 
105 Su Jian, "Timely Formulation and Promulgation of the 'Administrative Review Regulations' " in 
.;-_+~ 
12' ~ (Jurisprudence) 8, 1990, pp.19-22. 
106 Ying Songnian, "Research on Administrative Review Mechanisms and Jurisdiction" in 
~ :¥ ~ ~ (Law Magazine), 4, 1990, pp.4-6, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 9, 1990, pp.40-42. 
107 Su Jian, "Timely Formulation and Promulgation of the 'Administrative Review Regulations' " in 
~ :¥ (Jurisprudence) 8, 1990, pp.19-22; Yang Haikun, "Establishing a Cohesive Administrative 
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with a strong perception that it should strengthen the core work of administrative 
litigation by acting as a filter to reduce the numbers of cases that are filed for litigation. 108 
The first significant difference to the ALL to be noted is that administrative review organs 
are authorised to rectify not just illegal administrative behaviour, but also unsuitable 
administrative behaviour, which may lie within the bounds of the relevant laws but is 
grossly out of proportion to the offence committed. Determining the suitability of a 
specific administrative act is regarded firmly as the responsibility of the relevant 
administrative organ and administrative review organs, thus any tendency by the court to 
stray into this area is heavily criticised. 
Plaintiffs are the same as for administrative litigation: citizens, legal persons and other 
organisations may appeal a specific administrative act. 109 Close relatives of citizens who 
would be qualified to appeal may also do so if the citizen is dead, as may the citizen's 
legal representative. 110 This provision reflects the principle that administrative review is 
not just about dispute resolution but is also about administrative supervision and justice, 
which may require that administrative behaviour be rectified or compensated for, even 
after the death of a person. There was a strong push to have social organisations also 
included as plaintiffs, 111 but as for the ALL, this was not carried through. Plaintiffs were 
limited to those with a direct complaint or their legal representatives. 
Review System" in :a:){ 1t:f ~ #: 4$ (Politics and Law), 3, 1990, pp.23-26, in Reprints from the Press -
Law, 8, 1990, pp.55-58; "The Role of Administrative Review" in 3;.£ m ~ #: (Economy and 
Law), 4, 1991, pp.35-36. 
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(Politics and Law), 3, 1990, pp.23-26, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 8, 1990, pr,.55-58; Su Jian, 
"Promptly Formulate and Promulgate Administrative Review Regulations" in #: :¥ (Jurisprudence), 8, 
1990, pp.19-22; "The Role of Administrative Review" in 3;.£ m ~ #: (Economy and Law), 4, 
1991, pp.35-36. 
109 ARR, Article 2. 
110 ARR, Article 26. 
111 Tan Zonghe and Wang Lianchang, "Establishing the Administrative Review System" in 
.:-.+. ~ t.t.-± 12' 'T ~ •!!.• (Law Magazine), 3, 1990, pp.10-11. 
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As in administrative litigation, mediation is prohibited, 112 and this provision was widely 
supported. 113 But the ARL does not appear to specifically preclude or permit mediation. 
Also as in administrative litigation, laws, regulations, rules, decisions, and orders all have 
authority as a legal basis for administrative review .114 
The administrative acts which may be appealed include: an administrative penalty such as 
a fine, personal detention penalty, cancellation of a permit or licence, order to suspend 
production or business operations, or confiscation of property; seizure of property; 
infringement upon managerial decision-making autonomy; refusal to grant a licence or 
failure to respond to an application for a licence for which the applicant believes he/she is 
qualified; refusal or failure of an administrative organ to respond to an application for the 
carrying out of statutory duty to protect one's personal or property rights; failure of an 
organ to pay pensions for the disabled or deceased; requests to perform unlawful acts; and 
infringement of personal or property rights. 115 
This is a standard list of concrete administrative behaviours covering both positive acts 
and acts of omission. The list of acts which are excluded from appeal is similar to the list 
in the ALL but it has been modified to account for an unexpectedly large number of 
appeals in some sectors. The original list of exclusions covered: 
o administrative regulations/decisions/orders; 
o decisions on awards, penalties, appointments or dismissal of personnel in 
administrative organs; 
o decisions relating to conciliation or mediation or other handling of civil disputes; 
o and acts of state such as national defence and foreign affairs. 116 
112 ARR, Article 8. 
113 Shao Weiming, "My Humble Opinion on Administrative Review Procedures" in ~.::It~$ 
(Hebei Law), 6, 1990, pp.41-43, in Reprints from the Press - Law, 3, 19?1,_gp.53-55; Tan Zonghe and 
Wang Lianchang, "Establishing the Administrative Review System" in ~ -T ~ :2:-: (Law Magazine), 
3, 1990, pp.10-11. 
114 ARR, Articles 41-43. 
!15 ARR, Article 9. 
!16 ARR 1990, Article 10: People's Daily, 28 December 1990, p.3. 
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In the 1994 amendments to the regulations, the work of administrative organs in handling 
civil disputes remained excluded from administrative review, because the work is not 
regarded as administrative in nature, but certain categories of civil disputes are no longer 
excluded. The current list of exclusions is: 
o administrative regulations/decisions/orders/rules; 
o decisions on awards, penalties, appointments or dismissal of personnel in 
administrative organs; 
o decisions relating to conciliation or mediation or other handling of civil disputes, 
except disputes concerning ownership or use rights of land, minerals, forests and 
other natural resources; 
o acts relating to national defence or foreign affairs. 117 
That is to say, handling of civil disputes relating to ownership or use rights of land, 
mineral resources, forests and so on, can now be appealed against in administrative 
review. This revision was made supposedly because land disputes were overloading the 
courts, and it was thought an administrative review option might sift some of these out. 
For the same reason, public order disputes are required first to go through an 
administrative review before going to the court for litigation. 118 However, this reasoning 
may have been spuriously made by the organs concerned to bolster their control over the 
reviews relating to their work, and keep such cases out of the courts. 
The ARL does not contain such a list of exclusions. The new law permits some 
administrative rules and some internal punishments imposed on administrative personnel 
to be challenged. And it directs potential challengers of civil disputes to apply for 
arbitration or to file a suit at a court. It makes no mention of acts of national defence or 
foreign affairs, but as these decisions were excluded already, the ARL has not revoked 
any rights. 
117 ARR 1994, Article 10: People's Daily, 16 October 1994, p.5. 
118 Interview with a lecturer at the China University of Politics and Law, Beijing, 1998. 
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The institution of administrative review is meant to take precedence over the letters/visits 
system for complaints about specific administrative decisions. The ARR stipulates that 
where a complaint is made to a letters/visits office that is within the time frame allowed 
for administrative review, then the letters/visits office must advise the plaintiff to apply 
for administrative review at the relevant office. 119 This stipulation leads to the 
interpretation that the letters/visits office is being downgraded as a dispute resolution 
function in favour of more "legal" methods, and is now a final backstop if a citizen wants 
to complain about an administrative behaviour some time after the event. The 
letters/visits office is still used, however, to gather complaints of a more general nature 
against the administration. 
The rules on jurisdiction to accept an application for administrative review were amended 
to account for the various sources of authority that impinge upon administrative organs, 
particularly at the local level. Administrative organs in the PRC are subject to both 
vertical and horizontal lines of control, except at the local level where administrative 
tasks are performed jointly by the local government. The problem arises in administrative 
review as to whether an administrative decision carried out by a local government should 
be reviewed by the next higher level of government or by the next higher level of the 
administrative organ which has the relevant specialised knowledge. 120 The original 
regulations were framed to give jurisdiction for a review predominantly to the next higher 
level of the relevant administrative organ for disputes that arise from decisions of a local 
government. 121 
The amended regulations were designed to account for both sets of circumstances by 
naming the responsible review organs as the people's government at the same level as the 
organ which made the offending administrative decision, or the administrative organ at 
119 ARR, Article 21. 
120 Su Jian, "Promptly Formulate and Promulgate the 'Administrative Review Regulations'", 
~ $ (Jurisprudence), 8, 1990, pp.19-22. Also see: Ying Songnian, "Research on Administrative 
Review Mechanisms and Jurisdiction" in ~ $ ~ Z: (Law Magazine), 4, 1990, pp.4-6 in Reprints 
from the Press - Law, 9, 1990, pp.40-42; Tan Zonghe and Wang Lianchang, "Establishing the 
Administrative Review System" in ~ $ ~ Z: (Law Magazine), 3, 1990, pp.10-11. 
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the next higher level. 122 Some PRC legal scholars interpret this as meaning that the 
applicant may choose the organ from which he/she is likely to obtain the fairest review. 123 
However, normally jurisdiction belongs to the next higher level administrative organ, and 
only in exceptional circumstances does it belong to the people's government at the same 
level. 124 Review organs should establish a dedicated review office if the workload 
demands it or appoint specific personnel to handle review applications. 125 
Applications for administrative review are made in writing and are normally handled by 
the reviewing body on paper. There is provision for a hearing to occur if necessary, 126 
although the ARR does not define the circumstances. The ARL permits an applicant to 
lodge an oral application, which requires the administrative review organ to record the 
relevant details on the spot. An application for review is supposed to be accepted within 
ten days if the following conditions are met: the applicant believes the administrative act 
has infringed his/her lawful rights and interests; there is a specific defendant; there are 
facts as the basis for the request; and the administrative act falls within the jurisdiction of 
the organ to which application for review has been made. 127 If the organ cannot accept the 
application it must advise the applicant and provide reasons for the rejection. If some 
required details are missing from the application then the organ may return it to the 
applicant for further attention. 128 
The new ARL shortens the time frame allowable for review organs to accept a case from 
ten days to five days, which appears to be an attempt to improve administrative efficiency 
and accountability. However, this will probably have minimal impact on the justice of the 
administrative review process, as will be shown below and in Chapter Four. 
121 ARR 1990, Article 11. 
122 ARR, Articles 11, 12, 13. 
123 Ying Songnian, "New Legal Mechanisms for Supervision over Government Agencies in China", paper 
delivered at the "Citizenship, Accountability and the Law" conference, 17-19 June 1996, Melbourne 
University. 
124 Tan Zonghe and Wang Lianchang, "Establishing the Administrative Review System" in 
.:-.+ ).l2, t.t -± 12' -T ?F- ''~" (Law Magazine), 3, 1990, pp.10-11. 
125 ARR, Article 23. 
126 ARR, Articles 32 and 37. 
127 ARR, Article 31. 
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As for administrative litigation, one of the significant features of administrative review is 
the requirement that the specific administrative act not be suspended during the period in 
which a plaintiff conducts application for review .129 This stipulation can, however, be 
waived if any of the following conditions occur: the defending organ believes its 
administrative action should be suspended; the reviewing organ believes the action 
should be suspended; the plaintiff asks the defending organ to suspend the action and the 
organ has good grounds for agreeing to the request; and laws or regulations stipulate that 
the action must be suspended. 130 
This particular article in the ARR favours the duties of administrative organs as they 
manage state affairs. The right of a plaintiff for relief from what he or she believes is an 
unjust behaviour takes second priority. Just as for administrative litigation, this provision 
may or may not cause injustice to the applicant, depending on the situation. For example, 
if a business permit or licence is cancelled for a week or so and the cancellation is 
subsequently shown to be unlawful, then the plaintiff can apply for monetary 
compensation to cover salaries and other expenses that had to be paid even while 
production had ceased. Loss of intangibles, however, such as profits, good will, and 
business reputation, are not covered. More will be said about this in Chapter Five which 
examines the operation of administrative compensation. 
This provision causes injustice, however, when a citizen is detained under public order 
management regulations. Under these regulations an application for administrative review 
of the detention decision must be made within five days, and then the review must be 
completed within another five days. 131 By the time the review is complete the plaintiff has 
128 ARR, Article 34. 
129 This feature was not discussed during the preparation phase at all, indicating that the only issues that 
were publicly discussed were those that both curtail the power of administrative organs and about which 
there was disagreement. 
130 ARR, Article 39. 
131 Public order management regulations 1986, article 39 in 9=1 ft-A~~*° 00 ¥t:W~-1=5 (Compendium of 
Laws of the People's Republic of China) (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989), p.1534. 
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often been detained for up to ten days, and as the maximum period for detention under the 
public order management regulations is 15 days, the review is often carried out after the 
period of detention is complete or is close to completion. Thus the review has no 
substantive effect on the plaintiff's situation. 
The ARR provides considerable flexibility for both parties during the period of review. 
Either party may choose to change their course of action: the plaintiff may decide to 
withdraw the case, or the defending organ may decide to alter or retract its administrative 
decision. 132 But once a plaintiff withdraws an application for review, he/she cannot make 
application again based on the same facts. 
The criteria upon which the review organ makes its decision about the administrative act 
are basically the same as those used by the courts: the facts, the application of law, the 
legal limit of authority, correctness of statutory procedures, and the suitability of the 
decision in view of the offence committed133 (this last criterion being unique to the 
authority of the review organ). Another aspect that is unique to the administrative review 
role is the authority to examine the procedures used to make the administrative decision 
and decide whether any inadequacies exist in the procedure. If there are, then the review 
organ has the authority to order the defending organ to make rectification. This provision 
may appear to be straightforward, but it will be shown in Chapter Four that the way this 
clause is interpreted leads to a bias in its implementation. 
The written record of the review organ's decision is an important step in the system. The 
record should contain relevant personal details about the applicant, the defendant, the 
request and all associated details, the review organ's decision, and significantly, a notice 
advising the applicant of the time limit within which he/she must make application to the 
court for administrative litigation. 134 This last step is a crucial part of advising plaintiffs 
of their rights. The general guide is that plaintiffs must make application to the courts 
132 ARR, Article 40. 
133 ARR, Article 42. 
134 ARR, Article 45. 
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within 15 days of receiving the written notice of the review organ unless other time limits 
are stipulated in laws relating to the particular case. It is worth noting at this point too, 
that if a review organ confirms a lower level decision and the plaintiff takes the case to 
court, then the original organ is the defending organ in court. If the review organ 
overturns a lower level decision then the review organ becomes the defending organ. This 
procedure is stated in the Administrative Litigation Law135 but not the Administrative 
Review Regulations. It is worth noting at this point because any possible responsibility 
for litigation affects the implementation of the ARR. 
Unlike the Administrative Litigation Law, these regulations do not specify which party 
has the responsibility for provision of proof. The applicant is merely obliged to state 
clearly the request and the reasons for which he/she is applying for review, 136 and the 
reasons must have a basis in fact. 137 Pitman Potter interprets this lack of provision as an 
attempt "to impose on the applicant at least a burden of persuasion if not proof." 138 Potter 
further claims that the provision of vertical jurisdiction for administrative review where 
upper levels of an administrative organ provide the review, also reinforces the 
presumption of correctness by failing to provide for an independent review. 139 
But these arguments do not take sufficient account of the broad range of aspects which a 
review organ is required to investigate. The organ must consider whether the facts are 
clear; whether the application of laws, regulations, and so on is correct; whether the 
procedures used to make the administrative decision were adequate; whether the legal 
limits of authority have been exceeded, or abuse of power is evident; 140 and whether the 
administrative decision is clearly inappropriate. 141 These criteria are not all able to be 
established by an applicant. An applicant would be unlikely to know, for example, 
135 ALL, Article 25. 
136 ARR, Article 33. 
137 ARR, Article 31, Clause 3. 
138 Pitman Potter, "Editor's Introduction", in Pitman Potter (ed.), Chinese Law and Government, 24, 3, 
1991,p.17. 
139 Pitman Potter, "Editor's Introduction", in Pitman Potter (ed.), Chinese Law and Government, 24, 3, 
1991, p.17. 
140 The meanings of "excess of power", "abuse of power", and so on will be explained fully in Chapter Six. 
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whether the correct laws and regulations were used as a basis for the decision. Although it 
is true, as Potter claims, that the applicant must provide a factual basis for the claim for 
relief, there are other factors which contribute to the review organ's decision. The review 
regulations are designed to provide oversight and supervision as well as administrative 
dispute resolution. 
Potter's second claim as to the purpose of vertical jurisdiction overlooks the reason that 
the review system was designed that way. As discussed above in the section on 
jurisdiction, upper levels of administrative organs are perceived as being able to provide 
the relevant specialised knowledge for a fair review decision. As one of the main 
purposes of review is to ascertain the appropriateness of the decision, it seems appropriate 
that review be carried out within the administrative xitong in which the offending 
decision originated. This provision certainly fails to provide an independent review organ, 
as Potter argues, but this is not sufficient grounds to presume that the review framework 
thereby requires more of the applicant than it does of the reviewing organ. On the 
contrary, given that the locus of administrative knowledge in China resides within 
administrative systems, if an organisationally independent organ were to review an 
application for administrative review, the applicant would likely need to provide even 
more solid grounds for appeal, or else the review organ's authority would be limited to 
confirming that the decision had been made according to the correct procedure. This 
would leave the appropriateness of an administrative decision as unappealable. 
One area in which the ARL improves notably on the ARR is that of stipulating 
procedures for applicants who find that a review organ refuses to accept a valid 
application. The applicant may then appeal to a higher level of the organ concerned, or 
file a suit at a court. The law also stipulates penalties for administrative organs that do not 
accept a valid case for review. These include demerits, administrative sanctions, 
demotion or dismissal. The effect of these stipulations will not be known until case 
141 ARR, Article 42. 
material begins to emerge in several years time, but the low standard of administrative 
accountability in the PRC does not raise high hopes. 
Provisions of the State Compensation Law 
The State Compensation Law of the People's Republic of China 
was promulgated by the 
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Standing Committee of the NPC on 12 May 1994. 142 The law provides for both 
administrative and criminal compensation where state organisations cause harm to 
individuals and legal persons in the course of their work. One of the key issues discussed 
during the preparation phase of this law was the difference between civil and 
administrative compensation, 143 and the related aspect of whether the administrative 
official or the administrative organ itself should be made responsible. 144 A key feature of 
the promulgated version is that compensation is linked to acts committed by 
administrative officials during the course of performing their duties, not to administrative 
officials as individuals when not performing administrative duties. 145 But in order to 
encourage lawful behaviour by administrative officials, the organ responsible for paying 
the compensation is authorised to demand part or all of the compensation payment from 
the offending official. Further to this, the organ also has the authority to impose a 
disciplinary punishment on the official concerned. 146 
There are two broad categories in which administrative compensation is considered 
payable: first, infringements of personal rights such as the illegal detention of citizens or 
the deprivation of personal liberty, physical injury or death through assault, physical 
injury or death through the use of illegal weapons or police gear; 147 and second, 
142 State Compensation Law: People's Daily, 13 May 1994, p.3. 
143 See Chen Quansheng, "My Humble Opinion on State Administrative Compensation Responsibility" in 
---+~~~ iz: 7-'" WT .IL. (Studies in Law), 4, 1990, pp.28-32. 
144 See Zhang Hui, "Several Problems on Establishing a Compensation System for Administrative 
Damages" in ~ ~ 5fl- :$! (Jurisprudence), 1, 1990, pp.24-28, in Reprints from the Press -Law, 4, 
1_99'Lfp.55-59; Ma Huaide, "The Nature of State Compensation Responsibility" in 
~ 7-'" ~ jt: (Studies in Law), 2, 1994, pp.16-21. 
145 SCL, Article 5, Clause 1. 
146 SCL, Article 14. 
147 SCL, Article 3. 
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infringements of property rights such as the illegal imposition of fines or revocation of 
business licences, illegal confiscation of property, collection of illegal property charges, 
and other property damage that occurs through an illegal act. 148 
A compensation claim must first be taken to the administrative organ that would be 
responsible for paying the claimed damages. The new ARL stipulates that applicants for 
administrative review may request compensation at the same time as making the 
application for review, but this clause merely codifies a pre-existing practice, as will be 
shown in Chapter Five. If no satisfaction is obtained then the plaintiff may file a suit with 
the court. The SCL draws a connection between an illegal administrative decision and 
possible claims for compensation by suggesting plaintiffs file the compensation claim 
when they file for administrative review or litigation. 149 This connection becomes 
significant in the implementation of the administrative law system and will be examined 
in Chapter Five. 
An important aspect of the SCL that affects claimants is the method used for calculating 
the amount of compensation. If a claim relates to losses incurred while personal freedom 
was violated then the amount payable is calculated on the basis of the average state 
worker's wage for the previous year, 150 which means that the level of compensation is 
very low. Other direct losses such as medical expenses are also payable. 
Indirect losses such as compensation for the psychological stress of being illegally 
detained are not allowable claims. Where property claims are concerned, direct losses 
incurred when a business licence is wrongfully cancelled, such as staff salaries and 
equipment maintenance fees, may be compensated but indirect losses such as lost profits 
due to wrongful business closure cannot be compensated. 151 As noted above in the 
discussion on the Administrative Litigation law, it is permissible to use mediation to 
148 SCL, Article 4. 
149 SCL, Article 9. 
150 SCL, Article 26. 
151 Interview with an official from the State Council's Office of Legislative Affairs, Beijing, 1998. 
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settle the amount of an administrative compensation claim. This is based on the idea that 
a person may waive his/her rights to compensation. 
Conclusion 
In assessing the provisions of the new administrative law system in the PRC, I have 
attempted to emphasise the diverse angles of approach by those who implement the 
system, as this has a significant effect on the success of an individual case. The issues 
examined in this chapter have partly informed us about how the administrative law 
system is perceived in the PRC. An important point is that administrative litigation is 
meant to provide redress for a limited range of grievances, and that the PRC's 
administrative law system as a whole provides a number of mechanisms which a plaintiff 
may use to gain redress. This concept of "one option among many" must inform our 
assessment of the system. When a citizen has an administrative grievance and 
contemplates using the new system of administrative law to obtain redress, he or she 
faces a system that is designed mostly to bolster the authority of the state, but fails to 
provide the necessary corollary, which is an adequate control on state power. When the 
new system was in the planning stages, there was clearly hope in some quarters that it 
would provide an avenue of direct, legal redress for citizens and engender a stronger 
culture of accountability in administrative organs. The state's organs have yielded power 
to a very small extent, though, and the provisions of the legislation tend to favour their 
pre-eminent position. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
This chapter examines the procedure undertaken by applicants who wish to obtain 
reconsideration of a specific administrative decision, and the outcome of the process. In 
Chapter Two we examined some of the problems of the administrative review system as 
compared to other avenues of redress, and in Chapter Three we examined the provisions 
of the Administrative Review Regulations and the Administrative Review Law. In this 
chapter we will focus on how the system is implemented. 
The first part of the chapter is structured around the particular forms used by the PRC 
bureaucracy in the process of imposing an administrative penalty, and those used in an 
administrative review of such penalties. The forms provided in the body of the text are 
translations of model forms taken from two sources, with copies of the originals provided 
in the Appendix. 1 This material is based on a period covered by the provisions of the 
Administrative Review Regulations, and it is not known whether the promulgation of the 
new Administrative Review Law has resulted in the use of new forms. Given the slow 
pace at which administrative organs adopt the implications of legislative changes, this is 
unlikely for at least several years. Even when new forms that reflect the Administrative 
Review Law begin to be used, the provisions of the law, where they differ from those of 
the regulations, will probably have minimal impact on the operation of the administrative 
review system. 
Returning to the issues raised in Chapter One, the questions that the reader is asked to 
bear in mind at this point include: is the implementation of the administrative review 
system a ritualised form of political behaviour on the part of the state or the applicant, and 
1 Records of administrative review cases may be found in various sources, including a book heavily used in 
this chapter: Li Peizhuan (ed.), IT jE)I: ~ i..)< ~ ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative 
Review, 1991-1992) (Be!E_ng: China ~~al System Press,1993). See also collections of administrative cases 
such as: Lin Zhun (ed.), IT jE)/: ~ ~lj ~ #i (A Volume of Selected Administrative Cases) (Beijing: 
Legal Press, 1997). 
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if so what interests does it serve; is it a process that citizens undertake entirely using their 
own resources, leading to further atomisation of society, or are there resources available 
to assist an applicant; is the process of administrative review entirely institutionalised or 
do personal factors impinge on the outcome; if specific administrative disputes are not 
handled via administrative review, what happens to them and what does this reveal about 
the administrative review system; is administrative review used as an instrument by the 
state to further protect the state's power; what concepts are associated with administrative 
review in terms of the rule of law discourse; and, do individuals use the system to define 
or defend their rights, and under what conditions? 
The administrative penalty decision - process and forms 
The authority for administrative organs to impose an administrative penalty is contained 
in the Administrative Penalty Law (Xingzheng Chufa Fa) of 1996.2 The law sets out the 
types of penalties that may be imposed (warnings, fines, confiscation of property, 
administrative custody, and so on) and the principles that apply (legality, openness, 
fairness, and so on). It stipulates that if recipients disagree with the penalty they have the 
right to apply for administrative review or litigation. The law also states that 
administrative penalties cannot be given in the place of criminal punishment. The 
importance of this aspect of the law will become apparent in the discussions in Chapter 
Seven, which contains material that suggests that public security organs, especially during 
times of heightened anti-crime campaigns, have a tendency to blur the distinction 
between criminal and administrative offences. 
The law stipulates that written administrative penalty decisions shall be prepared with 
relevant details (see Form A below) and notification of the applicant's right to review 
and/or litigation. Receipts for confiscated property must be issued or the party has the 
right to refuse the penalty and report the case. This right is probably not well-known and 
the implications of it will be discussed in Chapter Six under the rubric "Administrative 
Organs". 
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With regard to collection of fines, this law deals for the first time with the problem of 
public security organs retaining monies for their own use rather than handing them over 
to the treasury. It is now stipulated that the organ which imposes a fine must not be same 
organ which collects the money, that receipts must be issued for fine money collected, 
and that offending officials may be subject to disciplinary sanctions or criminal liability. 
The process of administrative review begins after an administrative penalty has been 
imposed on a citizen, legal person, or other organisation, but there are several 
administrative procedures associated with imposing a penalty which impinge upon the 
recipient's ability to apply for administrative review. 
The intention behind the concept of the administrative penalty, in contrast to criminal 
punishment, is to simplify as much as possible - without losing fairness - the procedures 
for imposing a penalty. It does not require a fully detailed record of the conditions 
surrounding the events that gave rise to the penalty, nor does it require a lengthy delay 
between the event and the imposition of the penalty. It should be quick, simple, and easy, 
with the whole process of establishing a case and imposing a penalty taking no more than 
1-2 hours. Even though speed and simplicity are stressed, offenders are to be questioned 
and complaints and protests heard on the spot. But it is not necessary to give the offender 
an administrative penalty decision form (IT jE)t :Rt. .fiJ tk: ~ .=t1J xingzheng chufa 
jueding shu) with the penalty, a step that is often omitted when an oral penalty is given. 
Administrative penalties take one of two forms: oral penalties, which may include 
warnings, orders to cease the offending activity, or small on-the-spot fines; and written 
penalties, which are given according to specific legislation. Extremely minor penalties 
may be given orally, and most properly should include an administrative penalty decision 
2 
"Penalty" has been used as the translation for the term "chufa", rather than "punishment", so as to 
maintain a clear separation from criminal punishments. 
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form, but may not. Written penalties must include, by definition, a form recording all of 
the details. 3 
As is common to administrations around the world, the form on which administrative 
details are recorded is often regarded as a mere tool for the procedure and not as integral 
to the fairness of the decision-making. In the PRC, this has led to very lax standards being 
applied to the administrative penalty decision form which has adversely affected the 
fairness of administrative review. There is a general, standard form which may be used 
for any administrative penalty imposed by any organ, but individual organs may also 
issue their own forms for particular penalties that are regularly imposed. 
The standard administrative penalty decision form (see Form A below)4 contains three 
parts: the heading, which has the name of the organ imposing the penalty, the sequential 
number of the penalty, and details about the recipient of the penalty (name, gender, age, 
ethnicity, place of origin, occupation, work unit, address); the main body of the form, 
which contains the details of the offence, the legislation offended against, and what the 
penalty consists of; and a final part of the form which contains advice on how long the 
recipient has to appeal for review or to the courts if he or she is unhappy with the 
decision, the seal of the organ, and the day, month, and year that the penalty was imposed. 
The general time limit that applies to administrative review is 15 days from receipt of the 
penalty notice,5 but this may vary if other legislation so stipulates. Public order 
management decisions, for example, stipulate a five-day limit within which applicants 
may apply for administrative review.6 The standard form contains a blank 
3 He Jiangui (ed.), fr if){~ W Ji i:2:" (A General Survey of Administrative Punishments) (Beijing: 
The Legal Press, 1991), pp.71-86. 
4 The forms referred to in this chapter are taken from: Dong Jianguo (ed.), fr if){~ i.X ~ Jllf (A 
Handbook on Administrative Review) (Beijing: China Legal Press, 1991) with the exception of Forms C 
and P. These forms are taken from: Jiang Bo and Zhan Zhongle (eds.), .Jk 3( fr if){~ (Public Security 
Administrative Law) (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1994), pp.389, 403. Chinese language versions of the 
forms are in Appendix A. 
5 ARR, Article 29. 
6 i:f ~ A R .:Jt. :fa 00 ~tl 3f ~ JI ~ W -%-19~ (Public Order Management Regulations of the 
People's Republic of China) 1986, Article 39 in i:f ~ A R .:Jt. :fa 00 ~ 4$-1: .=PJ (Compendium 
of Laws of the People's Republic of China) (Changchun: Jilin People's Press, 1989), pp.1529-1534. 
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FORM A: Administrative penalty decision 
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Administrative Penalty Decision 
Administrative penalty ( ) no. ____ _ 
Person penalised: Name ______________ Gender _______ Age ___ _ 
Ethnicity________ Place of origin. ________ Occupation ______ _ 
Work unit. ________ Address _____________________ _ 
Facts of the violation, _____________________________ _ 
The above facts are offences against _______________________ _ 
Based on ____________________________ is given the 
following administrative penalties: 
1. ________________________________ _ 
2. ________________________________ _ 
3. ________________________________ _ 
If a party concerned does not accept this administrative penalty decision he or she may apply to a higher-
level organ for review within days ofreceiving this notice, or may apply directly to the 
people's court for administrative litigation. If the time limit for review and litigation have expired and the 
penalty has not been fulfilled an application will be made to the people's court to enforce the penalty. 
--------------work unit (official seal) 
___ year ___ month ___ day 
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space for the number of days within which the recipient may apply for administrative 
review or to the courts, which must be filled in by the organ imposing the penalty. The 
combined imperatives of speed and lack of attention to detail often mean that such details 
are omitted,7 which severely impinges upon the rights of the recipient. 
Even the title of a standard form may vary, and it is the responsibility of the organ to 
ensure that the title is clear and linked to the function of administrative penalties. For 
example, the form may also be called simply a penalty decision 
form c?li: w *:TE:~ chufajueding shu), or an administrative penalty notice 
(~ :d-r bk ~IJ .:: ~ .Jr:rt -h' 1 J .jl....J\. /IL .. J.!!. 7'1.l -,--;:i xingzheng chufa tongzhi shu). 
The forms that individual organs may issue pertain to a specific administrative penalty. 
For example, the public security organs may issue a public order management penalty 
decision notice (ft:f 3(- .g ft. ?li: .fiJ * 1f ii ~ ~ zhian guanli chufa jueding 
tongzhi shu ), and the land management organs may issue a land management 
administrative penalty notice form c± :!& .g JI. rr !)t ?li: W ii~~ tudi 
guanli xingzheng chufa tongzhi shu).The forms that pertain to a specific administrative 
penalty may vary in design and content to the standard form and characteristically come 
preprinted with as much detail as possible, including the time limits allowed for review or 
appeals to the court. 8 The public security organs in particular have an enormous variety 
of forms due to their diverse responsibilities. The form used by traffic police (Form B 
below) is succinct, and usually would come preprinted for each public security bureau 
and city. The official is required to fill in the particular details of the offender and the 
penalty, but as can be seen from this form, any details as to the cause of, and conditions 
surrounding, the accident are omitted from the record. This particular form is viewed by 
some legal practitioners in the PRC as particularly problematic from the point of view of 
providing adequate rights protection for recipients of such penalties. But attempts to 
7 More will be said about such omissions below. 
8 Interview with a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Law Institute, Beijing 1998. 
109 
change or improve the layout of the form are usually resisted by the public security organs 
on the grounds that the matter is an internal one for the organs cr*J -ms neibu). 
FORM B: Public order management penalty notice 
_____ City Public Security Bureau _____ District 
Public Order Management Penalty Decision Notice 
Administrative penalty (90) no.79 
Public order management offender Qiu _____ , male, aged 48, Han ethnicity, of ___ Province, 
____ County,, ___ Township, ____ Village, caused an accident because he violated the 
traffic rules. He is hereby given 8 days of administrative detention and a fine of 150 yuan according to 
Article 27 the People's Republic of China Public Order Management Penalty Regulations. 
If he does not accept this decision he may appeal to ______ City Public Security Bureau within 5 
days. 
_____ City Public Security Bureau _____ District (official seal) 
________ Bureau Director (signature and seal) 
____ .year _____ month ____ day 
The Administrative Review Regulations, by excluding abstract administrative acts from 
its scope, are powerless to combat the administrative power that pre-determines the 
framework in which an administrative penalty will be imposed. In the case of the traffic 
accident form, the administrative record begins from the point of presumption of fault, 
not from the point of the conditions that gave rise to the accident. This makes 
administrative review, which may occur several days after the event, of questionable 
value as great reliance would have to be placed upon the memory of either the official or 
the offender as to what actually occurred. These problems associated with use of the 
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correct forms are compounded by the fact that the correct forms are not necessarily used, 
especially in rural areas. Where incorrect forms are used, recipients of penalties are 
seldom confident or courageous enough to ask that the correct form be used so their rights 
can be better protected. 9 
An advantage of preprinted forms, however, is that the official is usually not required to 
fill in the number of days within which application for administrative review must be 
made. 10 There are different opinions as to the consequences if officials do sidestep the 
law by not filling in the number of days allowable for review applications. A researcher at 
the Supreme People's Court said that such circumstances would definitely impinge upon 
the applicant's lawful rights and the review organ or the court should cancel the decision. 
11 Alternatively, a judge of 10 years experience in the administrative division of the 
Supreme People's Court said that such circumstances, if the case made it beyond 
administrative review to administrative litigation, may be cause for a judicial 
recommendation to be made. The concept of the judicial recommendation will be dealt 
with more fully in Chapter Seven, but here it is helpful to note that it is a procedure 
employed by the court to handle irregularities in administrative conduct that are not 
deemed serious enough to warrant the court overturning the administrative decision. The 
court, if discovering such a problem in the course of handling a case, would write a 
recommendation to the administrative organ detailing the problem and suggesting a 
course of action to improve the decision-making process. It is a weak procedure 
predominantly because there is no legal requirement for the administrative organ to act on 
the judicial recommendation; it is simply a recommendation, not a legal directive. 
Another example of a public security bureau administrative penalty form is given at Form 
C below. This form is described as a decision or finding ~ fk:-=t5 caijue shu) because 
this is the term used in the Public Order Management Regulations 1986, Article 39, as 
9 Interview with a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Law Institute, Beijing 1998. 
10 Interview with two judges of the administrative di vision of the Supreme People's Court of the PRC, 
Beijing, 1998. 
11 Interview with a court official, Beijing, 1998. 
being the process by which the regulations are applied. Recipients of such penalties 
(caijue shu) are permitted to appeal ($ W ) to an upper level in the public 
FORM C: Public order management penalty decision 
_____ City Public Security Bureau ____ District ____ Station 
Public Order Management Penalty Decision 
No. __ _ 
19 __ year __ month __ day 
Because public order management offender __________ gender ___ age __ _ 
did _______________________________ _ 
it has been decided to give the penalty of. _______________ on the basis of 
Article ____ of the People's Republic of China Public Order Management Penalty Regulations. 
If the offender does not accept this decision he or she may appeal within five days. 
_______ office director 
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security organ and if no satisfaction is obtained there, they may file a litigation suit in 
court. This form also comes preprinted with the number of days allowable for review and 
allows about as much space for detail as the traffic accident form. 
As in many bureaucracies, when the correct form is not available, a substitute is used and 
modified where necessary by the official. This is one of the points at which administrative 
officials do not pay sufficient attention to detail. If, for example, a preprinted public order 
management penalty form is not available, then the official would use the standard form 
but would be required to fill in the five-day period allowable for administrative review 
applications. Such details were characteristically omitted, 
FORM D: Review application form 
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Review Application Form 
Applicant (who received the penalty): name 
' 
gender ,age , ethnicity 
' 
place of origin , occupation 
' 
address 
Defendant: name 
' 
Legal representative's name , address 
Because the applicant does not accept the defendant's decision of year month ___ day 
to apply the administrative penalty of , he or she 
herewith applies for review. 
Applicant's requests: 
Facts and grounds (for the demands): 
To: (administrative organ receiving the review application) 
applicant (signature or seal) 
year month day 
Attachments: l. ___ duplicate copy(ies) 
2. ___ copies of relevant materials 
FORM E: Review application form 
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Review Application Form 
Applicant (who received the penalty): Zhai ________ , male, aged 50, Han ethnicity, 
individual worker or trader, resident of _____ County, ______ Township ____ Town, 
place of origin Province, ______ County. 
Because the applicant does not accept the Refusal to Pay Tax Administrative Penalty Decision (90) no. 13 
of County Township Tax Office he hereby applies for review. 
Applicant's demands: that the Refusal to Pay Tax Administrative Penalty Decision (90) no.13 be cancelled 
and the fine of 370 yuan be refunded. 
Facts and grounds (for the demands): 
In 1986 I began an individually operated clothing business, the scope of which covered general 
merchandise and clothing. The local tax office collected taxes in fixed amounts at fixed intervals. On 24 
January 1989, Chen , an official from the tax office in charge of this, and I, had an argument 
when he or she came to collect my taxes. Chen ripped up two articles of clothing from my shop, imposed a 
penalty of 370 yuan for refusing to pay tax, and reduced the selling price on 100 items of clothing from my 
stock. The penalty was not imposed through proper procedures. I did not refuse to pay tax, Chen's decision 
to penalise me was mistaken, and the procedures he used were illegal. 
I hereby apply for review. 
Attachments: 
To: 
__________ County Tax Office 
Applicant: Zhai ______ _ 
____ year ___ month day 
1 duplicate copy of this application 
3 copies of relevant materials 
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especially in the early years of administrative review. The Administrative Review 
Regulations are phrased such that the time limits commence from the time when the 
recipient of the penalty becomes aware of the right to apply for administrative review. 12 
Thus, if the time limits are omitted from the penalty decision form and the recipient 
subsequently becomes aware of his or her right to apply for administrative review, then 
the time limit commences from that day. The provision is fair, but it is questionable as to 
how a recipient would become aware of his or her rights without being advised of them 
by the regulating organ (unless he or she was aware of them beforehand, in which case 
the recipient would have applied for review immediately if that were a viable option). 
The next step after becoming aware of one's right to apply for administrative review, and 
assuming one decides to apply, is to go to the relevant administrative review organ and 
obtain the review application form ~ i..)( $ 1i-=t5 fuyi shenqing shu). Several 
problems with the jurisdiction of administrative review emerge at this stage of the review 
process, but these will be dealt with below. For now we will concentrate on the forms and 
what information is required. 
The applicant must put his or her name, gender, date of birth, nationality, occupation, and 
address on the form (Form D above). The defending organ's details must also be recorded 
and the details of the case. Interestingly, the review forms are designed such that the 
applicant must state clearly what his or her demands are. For example, "demand to cancel 
the particular administrative decision and return the fine money" (Form E above). This 
suggests either that the applicant must be familiar with the range of demands that can be 
made, or that help and advice is provided by personnel from the review organ or some 
other appropriate person. It would be unusual for officials of the organ to assist the 
applicant because, as will be discussed further below, if the forms are not completed 
correctly administrative organs may use this as a reason to reject the application, and 
often do. And the organs certainly do not provide formal legal advice via use of a 
12 ARR, Article 29. 
115 
lawyer. 13 An applicant may engage his or her own lawyer or other designated 
representative, but this is not generally known to occur for administrative review. The 
majority of administrative review cases, especially from the early years of the system's 
operation, 14 are limited to the applicant and the defendant. Only one case cited in the 
sources records an applicant for administrative review as having a designated 
representative: that where a female applicant was represented by her elder brother. 15 This 
lack of assistance is noticeably different in administrative litigation cases, for which it is 
much more common to engage another person as one's legal representative. 16 Thus, 
applicants for administrative review are most likely to get help from their work unit or a 
personal acquaintance. This places the applicant in a weaker position than the defending 
organ. 
After an applicant has filed the review application form with the relevant organ he or she 
waits for notification or communication from the review organ. If the application form is 
incomplete the organ may send it back and allow extra time for it to be completed 
properly. If the application appears correct the review organ begins its bureaucratic 
paperwork trail by formally accepting the case. This process is recorded on the form for 
investigation and approval to accept a case ( \'1 * "'$' ::ftt * li 'an shenpi biao) - Forms 
F and G below. 
This is a very significant phase for the applicant as it is at this point in the administrative 
review process that he or she has the least amount of influence over the case. It is 
common for review organs not to accept all the applications for administrative review 
that they should at this phase. 17 
13 Interview with an academic from the China University of Politics and Law, Beijing, 1998. 
14 See sources in Note 3 above. 
15 Lin Zhun (ed.), .fi iE)I: ~ flj ~ m (A Volume of Selected Administrative Cases) (Beijing: Legal 
Press, 1997), pp.210-212. 
16 More will be said about this in Chapter Six. 
17 The proportion of cases rejected at this stage will be discussed in detail in the final section of this chapter. 
FORM F: Investigation and approval to accept a case 
Investigation and Approval to Accept a Case 
Grounds for the case 
Person or unit applying for review 
Defending work unit 
Date of receipt of application 
Requests for establishing 
a review case 
Recommendation about 
accepting the case 
Investigator: 
____ ,year ____ month ____ day 
Whether or not there are grounds to accept a case: 
Clerk: 
116 
Ratifier: _____ year ____ month ____ day 
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FORM G: Investigation and approval to accept a case 
Investigation and Approval to Accept a Case 
Grounds for the case 
Person or unit applying for review 
Defending work unit 
Date of receipt of application 
Requests for establishing 
a review case 
Recommendation about 
accepting the case 
Investigator: 
Ratifier: 
Does not accept Tax Office's decision to impose 
a 1300 yuan fine for refusal to pay tax. 
Zhang ___ _ 
____ County ____ Township Tax Office 
1990 --~month ___ day 
___ County Township Tax Office forcibly reduced the 
selling price on I 00 items of clothing from my stock and imposed a 
fine of 1300 yuan. I think the Tax Office has encroached upon my 
lawful rights. I hereby apply for review. 
It is in accordance with review application regulations; it is not a 
repeat application; it has not been filed at the people's court for 
litigation; the written application is in accordance with 
statutory demands; and the date of application is within the statutory 
time limit. Acceptance of the case is granted. 
Yao ______ _ Clerk: Sun ____ _ 
Liu ______ _ 
__ year __ month __ day 
The criteria for formally accepting an administrative review case are not explicit in the 
Administrative Review Regulations. Article 34, Clause 1, states that if the review 
application complies with the stipulations in these regulations then the case should be 
accepted. It can be seen from Form G that in practice this means examining several 
aspects to ensure that the legal requirements for establishing this particular administrative 
review case at this particular time are in place. These are: that this is the first and only 
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time this case has been brought to administrative review; that the case has not been taken 
to court as an administrative litigation case; that the application has specific statutory 
demands; and that the application has been made within the set time limits. These criteria 
are similar to those set out in the Administrative Litigation Law for the courts to examine 
when accepting an appeal for administrative litigation18 and can best be understood as a 
preliminary check to see if all the constituent parts of a legal administrative review case 
are present. These criteria are spread throughout the Administrative Review Regulations 
but not all are points that are drawn to the attention of a recipient of an administrative 
penalty. Only the time limit for review applications is communicated formally to the 
applicant (see Form A above), so the applicant is disadvantaged by the fact that the 
application is subjected to criteria that he or she was unaware of. 
If the review organ accepts the case it then forwards a notice to the applicant advising this 
fuyi anjian shouli tongzhi shu - Form H below). 
Significantly for the applicant's rights, there is no provision in this communication 
advising the applicant that, according to law, the review organ must complete its handling 
of the case within two months of receiving the application. 19 Significant numbers of 
review applications are not responded to within the designated time period and in such 
cases the applicant may then file a litigation suit in court or ask the court to enforce 
handling of the review application. But it is unlikely the applicant would know that the 
review organ must respond within two months unless he or she was familiar with the 
regulations. Two months is a considerable period for an applicant to wait for the outcome 
of an application, so speed in responding to complaints is clearly not a priority of the PRC 
administration. At this point the administrative review system fails to protect the rights of 
individuals and legal persons by allowing administrative organs too much time and 
requiring too little accountability. 
FORM H: Notice of acceptance of review case 
18 ALL, Article 41. 
19 ARR, Article 46. 
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Notice of Acceptance of Review Case 
Review acceptance ( ) no. __ _ 
____________ : (Applicant's name) 
Concerning----------------- application for review, this 
________ (review organ) has received and investigated the application. In accordance with 
Article 31 of the Administrative Review Regulations the application is accepted. 
You are hereby notified. 
_______ (review organ) 
___ year ___ .month ___ day 
At the same time as the applicant receives the notice of acceptance, the review organ 
initiates the process of gathering the necessary information. A notice by the same name is 
forwarded to the defending organ setting out the basic details of the case and containing 
several requests: the defending organ is asked to check the duplicate review application 
that has been enclosed, forward to the review organ materials and evidence relating to the 
case, and provide a defence of the disputed administrative decision (Forms I and K 
below). If appropriate, the review organ also arranges for third parties who are affected by 
the case to participate in the review by checking the enclosed review application, 
providing a response to it, filling in the forms that authorises their legal representative to 
represent them during the case, and forwarding all evidence and relevant materials to the 
review organ (Form J below). When the review organ communicates with other organs 
and work units on such matters, the communication includes a 10-day time limit by which 
the matters should be dealt with. This indicates an attempt to keep the handling of the 
case flowing along reasonably quickly, so it sits in contrast to the two month period 
allowed for review. 
FORM I: Notice of acceptance of review case 
Notice of Acceptance of Review Case 
Review acceptance ( ) no. ___ _ 
_____________ :(defending organ) 
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_________ (applicant's name) does not accept your ________ (name of defending 
organ) Administrative Penalty Decision( __ ) no. ___ of ___ year ___ month ___ day 
and has applied to this organ for review. This organ ________ (name of review organ) has 
accepted the case. Please check the duplicate review application forwarded to your organ _____ _ 
(name of organ), and within 10 days of receipt of it forward to this organ _______ (name of 
review organ) relevant materials and evidence relating to the administrative penalty decision, and also 
provide a reply to the accusation. 
You are hereby notified. 
___________ (review organ) 
____ ,year ___ month ____ day 
Attachments: . one duplicate copy of the review application 
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FORM J: Notice of acceptance of review case 
Notice of Acceptance of Review Case 
Review acceptance ( ) no. ____ _ 
This review organ has received an application for review of a case concerning _________ _ 
We have accepted the application and think that the case may concern the interests of your work unit, and as 
such you are hereby notified to participate in the review. Please check the duplicate review application 
forwarded to you, provide a timely reply, fill in the statutory representative's testimonial, and forward these 
documents together with relevant evidence and materials to this organ by ___ year ____ month 
___ day. 
___________ (review organ) 
____ year ___ month ___ day 
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FORM K: Notice of acceptance of review case 
Notice of Acceptance of Review Case 
Review acceptance ( ) no. ___ _ 
______ County Industry and Commerce Bureau: 
Wang does not accept your organ's Administrative Penalty Decision 1990 ___ month 
___ day, and has applied to this organ for review. Please check the duplicate review application 
forwarded to you, and within 10 days of receipt of it forward to this organ relevant materials and evidence, 
including a reply to the accusation. 
You are hereby notified. 
______ .District Industry and Commerce Bureau 
___ year ___ month ___ day 
Attachments: one duplicate copy of the review application 
If the review organ refuses to accept the case it forwards a form indicating it has 
disallowed review c:f -T ~fl~ 1.5< ~ tt!-=PJ buyu shoulifuyi caijue shu -
Forms Land M below). Such a form contains a space for reasons for the refusal and 
advises the applicant of his or her right to file an administrative litigation suit in court 
within 15 days of receipt of the notice. These two features demonstrate an intention to 
protect the rights of applicants from bureaucratic abuse, but the contents of Form M 
reveal some ways in which this phase of the administrative review process can be twisted 
to the state's advantage. The example given at Form Mis addressed to Li but the disputed 
administrative decision appears to have been directed at Zhao. There are at least two 
explanations for this form. First and least likely, Li is a friend or family member of 
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FORM L: Ruling on disallowing review 
Ruling on Disallowing Review 
Review disallowance ( ) no. ____ _ 
__________ : (applicant's name) 
Concerning review application, this organ ________ _ 
has received the application. After investigation,-------------------
On the basis of Article 34 of the Administrative Review Regulations, the application has not been accepted. 
If you do not accept this decision, you may apply to the people's court for administrative litigation within 15 
days of receipt of this notice. 
____________ (review organ) 
___ year ____ .month ____ day 
Zhao's and is trying to use the administrative review system to protest against an 
administrative penalty that may affect Li either financially or in some other personal way, 
as would personal detention of a spouse, for example. Such an application is beyond the 
scope of the ARR because Li would not have been the recipient of a specific 
administrative penalty nor would he or she have been directly involved in the case that 
gave rise to the specific administrative penalty. The explanation given for refusing to 
accept the case does not state that the case is beyond the scope of administrative review, 
so this explanation is not very likely. 
124 
FORM M: Ruling on disallowing review 
Ruling on Disallowing Review 
Li _____ _ 
Concerning your non-acceptance of an administrative penalty fine imposed by _____ City Public 
Security Bureau's ____ Station, this organ has received your application for review of the penalty. 
After investigation it has been established that _____ Station's Public Order Management Penalty 
Decision (90), no. 78 applies to Zhao , and as such the specific administrative act 
does not encroach upon your lawful rights. On the basis of Article 34 of the Administrative Review 
Regulations, your review application is disallowed. If you do not accept this ruling, you may apply to the 
local people's court for administrative litigation within 15 days of receipt of this notice. 
_____ City Public Security Bureau 
___ y,ear --~month ___ day 
The second and more likely explanation is that Li and Zhao were involved in a fight 
which resulted in Zhao receiving a public order management penalty, and possibly Li 
also. Li may have viewed the penalty imposed on Zhao as minor compared to the wounds 
he or she suffered and may have requested that the penalty be reviewed and increased. 
This type of scenario is quite common in public order administrative penalty cases.20 
Both cases cited in the sources are public order cases involving a physical dispute 
between two parties, at least one of whom is penalised, but it is the other party who 
applies for administrative review on the grounds that the penalty given to the other party 
is too light. It is legal for either or both parties to apply for administrative review as either 
the recipient of the disputed administrative penalty, or as a third party to the dispute who 
20 ~- tit lfi ~~' -bl:; ";;!;:; See for example: Fang Xin (ed.), 1T •A. ~ 1.A 1s l'f'J (A Guide to Administrative Review) (Beijing: 
Legal Press, 1991), pp.182-183 and pp.186-187. 
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has a direct interest in the case. 21 Such applications have been accepted so it would not be 
unusual for a review organ to be faced with this type of scenario. 
If the background to the example given at Form Mis as I have suggested, then the reasons 
given therein for rejecting Li's application raise some important issues. Li is advised that 
the public security organ's administrative decision to impose a fine under the Public Order 
Management Regulations does not encroach upon his or her lawful rights and thus 
according to the Administrative Review Regulations Article 34, the case is rejected. The 
review organ's reasons, in this example, are clearly not related to the criteria set out above 
in Form G, but rather represent a preemptory administrative review decision. The editor 
and commentator of the book in which these forms are found explains that valid reasons 
for rejecting a case include the criteria used on Form G above, but may also include a 
decision that the specific administrative behaviour did not encroach upon the applicant's 
lawful rights.22 As the Administrative Review Regulations clearly state that citizens and 
legal persons may apply for review where they believe their lawful rights and interests 
have been infringed,23 this appears to be faulty advice on the part of the book's editor. 
A possible explanation, however, may be found in the distinction between violations of 
statutory procedures by the defending organ which infringe on the applicant's lawful 
rights, and those that do not.24 If the defending organ has violated a procedure or failed to 
do something properly, a review organ will not automatically overturn the decision unless 
it directly infringes an applicant's lawful rights. This is in line with the Chinese legal 
system's tendency to place a higher value on substantive justice than to value equally both 
substantive and procedural justice. The case in Form M illustrates that, even if the 
administrative review went ahead, the review organ would not overturn the administrative 
decision because the decision and the manner of its making did not encroach upon the 
21 ARR, Articles 26, and 27. 
22 Dong Jianguo (ed.), .fi" !E,SI: ~ i.)< :f. Jllf (A Handbook on Administrative Review) (Beijing: China 
Legal Press, 1991), p.120. 
23 ARR, Article 2. 
24 This distinction will be dealt with fully below. See: Dong Jianguo (ed.), .fi" !E,SI: ~ i.)< :f. Jllf (A 
Handbook on Administrative Review) (Beijing: China Legal Press, 1991), p.56. 
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applicant's lawful rights. The decision may have been procedurally incorrect but even if 
the procedures were rectified the decision would still stand. This is in effect a pre-
emptory administrative review decision as it is made according to the Administrative 
Review Regulations, Article 42, Clause 4, Provision 3. 
Due to lack of specific criteria by which review organs are able to accept or refuse to 
review cases, it is not surprising that criteria which specifically apply to the formal review 
process creep into the phase of accepting or refusing a case for review. The implication of 
this is twofold. First, the initial phase of deciding whether to accept or refuse a case for 
review may turn into a quasi-review. This probably occurs most often when the case is 
one that is rejected for review and thus the application phases functions as a short-cut and 
means of avoiding the paperwork and responsibility associated with formal review. Such 
action substantially affects the rights of the applicant because at this stage no materials or 
information has been obtained from the defending organ. The decision is being made on 
the basis of only one side of the case. If a formal review were conducted it may be found 
that the defending organ was unable to give a credible answer to the accusations made 
against it, or that as well as incorrect procedures the defending organ employed other 
unlawful tactics during the course of making the disputed decision. 
The second implication is that all cases which are accepted for formal review are cases in 
which the substantive rights of the applicant may have been infringed, implying that a 
different outcome may have resulted if the defending organ had performed its tasks 
lawfully. This is a significant expectation to keep in mind when examining the numbers 
of cases that go through administrative review and what the outcome is. This will be 
observed in the final section of this chapter. 
127 
FORM N: Administrative review decision 
Administrative Review Decision 
Review decision () no. ____ _ 
Applicant (who originally received the penalty) : Name __________ , gender ____ _ 
age _____ , ethnicity ______ , place of origin. _________________ _ 
occupation , address ______________________ _ 
Defendant: __________________ , legal representative _______ _ 
entrusted representative. ______________ _ 
In the light of ---------------------------a case, the 
applicant does not accept the defendant's Administrative Penalty Decision 
) no. and according to law has applied to this organ for review. 
Findings of the hearing: _____________________________ _ 
On the basis of __________________________ rules, the following 
has been decided: 
!. __________________________________ _ 
2. __________________________________ _ 
3. __________________________________ _ 
If the applicant does not accept this decision he or she may apply to the local people's court for 
administrative litigation within days of receipt of this notice. If a suit is not filed 
within the specified time period or the review decision is not otherwise implemented, then according to law 
the review decision will be enforced or application will be made to the people's court to enforce the 
decision. 
___________ (review organ) 
___ year ____ month ____ day 
FORM 0: Administrative review decision 
Applicant: 
Legal Representative: 
Entrusted Representative: 
Defendant: 
Legal Representative: 
Administrative Review Decision 
Review decision (90) no.31 
______ County Tobacco Co. 
Chen __________ _ 
\Vang __________ _ 
_______ County Industry and Commerce Bureau 
Luo ____________ _ 
Entrusted Representative: Xu-------------
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The applicant does not accept the defendant's Industry and Commerce Penalty Decision (90) no. 11, and 
according to law has applied to this organ for review. 
Findings of the hearing: 
______ County Tobacco Co., knowing that Liu _______ had not received 
permission to trade and do business, still sold him cigarettes at the wholesale price and even increased their 
charge by 20%. 
Review organ's opinion: 
______ County Tobacco Co. should have strictly implemented the state Tobacco Sales Regulations, 
but instead of seeing the advantages in doing the right thing, the company engaged in illegal management, 
not only by providing Liu with a source of goods and thereby obtaining illegal income of 376,070,000 yuan, 
but also by assisting Liu to go elsewhere to resell cigarettes at a profit and on many such occasions 
personnel from the company provided Liu's group with an escort. 
On the basis of the regulations the following has been decided: 
To uphold Industry and Commerce Bureau's Administrative Penalty Decision (90) no. 11. 
If the applicant does not accept this review organ's decision he or she may apply to the people's court for 
administrative litigation within 15 days of receipt of this notice. If a suit is not filed within the specified 
time limit or the review decision is not otherwise implemented, then according to law the review decision 
will be enforced or application will be made to the people's court to enforce the decision. 
_____ City Industry and Commerce Bureau 
__ year ___ month day 
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FORM P: Decision on a public order management penalty appeal 
_____ Public Security Bureau 
Decision on a Public Order Management Penalty Appeal 
No. _____ _ 
19 __ year ___ month day 
Because public order management offender _____________ , gender ____ _ 
age ____ , did ___________________________ _ 
the _____________ Station (or County Public Security Bureau), imposed 
____________________ Public Order Management Penalty on the 
basis of Article _____ of The People's Republic of China Public Order Management Penalty 
Regulations. The offender does not accept the ruling and hereby appeals. The review decision is 
If the offender does not accept this review decision he or she may file a suit at the people's court within 5 
days of receipt of this notice. 
(Bureau Director) ________ _ 
This decision is announced on 19 ___ year ___ month ___ day at ____ o'clock. 
Once a case has been accepted and formally reviewed, the review organ issues an 
administrative review decision form (IT iE)?: jt 1-.)< ~ tf 45 xingzheng fuyi jueding 
shu) or, in the case of the public security organs, a decision on a public order management 
penalty appeal citf 3(-~ fl ~ W $ W ~ ~ 45 zhian guanli chufa shensu caijue 
shu) - Forms N, 0 and P. 
This is the most important document of the process as it contains the review organ's 
decision as to whether the demands of the application will be met. It contains room for all 
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the necessary details but notably not the applicant's side of the story nor the defending 
organ's reply to the accusations. The applicant's demands are recorded but the 
circumstances which gave rise to the demands, such as are recorded on the review 
application form (see Forms D and E above) are omitted. Whatever reply to the 
accusations that was forwarded to the review organ as a result of the requests made on 
Forms I and K above is also omitted. This means that the defending organ has been made 
aware of the applicant's grievances (because the review organ forwards a copy of the 
review application to the defending organ) but the applicant is not informed of the 
defendant's reply to these accusations, except in the guise of the "review organ's opinion" 
- Form 0- and therefore has minimal information by which to assess the review organ's 
decision. The review organ's responsibility to establish the facts of the case is clearly 
reflected in the review decision form. The focus of this form is on the findings of the 
review organ's investigations, which are recorded together with the review organ's 
decision(s). But the main problem is that the review is presented as afait accompli. On 
Form 0 there is no record of the evidence used to confirm the applicant's offence, no hint 
as to the reasoning process used to arrive at the review decision and no justification of the 
decision to uphold the penalty. The review is supposed to check the administrative 
penalty decision, but here it is used as an opportunity to further lecture the applicant. In 
the case of the public security organs' public order management penalty appeal decision 
forms, the results are very tersely presented. The form contains no evidence that the 
review organ made any attempt to obtain any information about the case or to establish 
any facts. This does not mean that the review organ did not do such things, just that there 
is no record of it on the appeal decision notice. Clearly the public security organs have a 
minimalist approach to administrative review and do not see the need to explain their 
actions or reasons to those affected by them. 
However, on both the standard form and the public security form there is provision for 
the applicant to be made aware of his or her right to subsequently file an administrative 
litigation suit in court within the specified time limit. 
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It can be seen from comparing Forms 0 and P above that considerable variation exists 
between the public security organs administrative review decisions' and those made by 
other review organs. Despite the problems of the standard administrative review decision 
form, it provides a better framework for responding to grievances than does the public 
security organ form. There is a push from some legal affairs offices within the PRC 
government structure to better standardise and regularise the administrative review 
decision form. A significant suggestion from the Shanghai City Government Legal 
Affairs Office 25 is to only use a form titled 'review decision form' (juyi jueding shu) at 
this final stage. Forms with a variety of titles have been used and even though the 
proponents of this view recognise that the core function of administrative review was 
carried out in all cases, they advocate that a standard form be used by all PRC 
administrative xitong. This suggestion is not just about the title at the top of the form, but 
more importantly is about the layout and contents of the forms, because as we have 
shown above, such matters significantly affect the rights of the applicant. One of the 
outstanding features of the new administrative law system, comprising administrative 
review, administrative litigation, and administrative liability, is that the standards set 
therein apply to all administrative organs when they make specific administrative 
decisions. If some organs, like the public security organs, are less bound than others to 
provide a decent standard of administrative redress, then not only does the ARR fail to 
protect the rights of all individuals equally, but there is no common, all encompassing 
standard of administrative review in the PRC; there is a variable standard according to 
which xitong the applicant is dealing with. It is this problem to which the Shanghai City 
Government Legal Affairs Office is proposing a solution. If a common, standard 
administrative review form was used, this would go some way towards lessening the 
distinctive hierarchy of the xitong structure and would help raise the concept of a 
professional administrative service characterised by norms of administration. 
25 Shanghai City Government Legal Affairs Office, "Certain Problems with the Handling of Review 
Decision Forms" in Li Peizhuan (ed.), IT :iE)( ~ i.)<. ,W: 1991-1992 (A General View of 
Administrative Review, 1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), pp.488-489. 
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Other recommendations by the Shanghai City Government Legal Affairs Office include 
paying more attention to recording the required details on the review decision form such 
as relevant dates, the applicant's name and address, and the specific demands made by the 
applicant. This latter recommendation reveals that applicants have largely been left to 
their own devices when filling in the application form. As they do not have knowledge of 
the Administrative Review Regulations, they have been unable to present their demands 
in the required legal language, thereby giving the organ grounds to refuse the 
application. 26 
Two of the biggest concerns with the review decision forms are the lack of detail they 
contain about the case, and the reasoning behind the review decision. These problems are 
both illustrated by the traffic accident form (Form B) referred to above. The review 
decision form is a legal document, and as such, proponents of the push for standardisation 
claim that it can be classified as legal only if it contains full and complete explanations 
and information. 
Even though lack of detail and information raises concerns, perhaps most worrying 
overall is that many administrative organs do not appear to have even a basic grasp of the 
legal administration principles involved in administrative review. On the administrative 
review decision form (Form N) where applicants are advised of the time limits within 
which they must apply for administrative litigation, if this part is filled in at all, it is often 
perfunctorily completed with the general 15 day27 time limit stipulated in the 
Administrative Review Regulations. But in many cases the substantive law used as the 
basis for the administrative penalty decision stipulates otherwise. For example, a tax 
office advised an applicant that there were 15 days within which to file a suit at court, 
26 Interview with an official from the State Council's Office of Legislative Affair, Beijing, 1998. The weak 
position of the applicant during administrative litigation is similar. This will be dealt with in Chapter Seven 
where I discuss an administrative litigation trial I attended. 
27 ARR, Article 36. 
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whereas the relevant tax law used to impose the penalty allows 30 days.28 This reveals a 
worrying lack of familiarity by administrative organs with even the basic contents of the 
laws they use in their daily work. Or, even more problematical, an administrative culture 
that places a low value on the procedural legalities of administration, or one in which 
officials knowingly disregard legal requirements. 
The report from the Shanghai City Government Legal Affairs Office does not concern 
itself at all with the substance of any of the administrative decisions that gave rise to the 
review applications whose problems are discussed. Either the substance of such decisions 
is presumed to be lawful or it is just not relevant to this particular report. Either way, the 
literature is silent on this aspect. What is significant for us is that the discourse 
surrounding the administrative review system, and the report cited is one element of it, 
links the issues of standardisation and regularisation of bureaucratic procedures with 
administrative review. 
Important and unimportant procedures and facts 
When a review organ receives an application for review it does so in a pre-existing 
cultural, political and legal milieu. Chinese law has traditionally placed a great deal more 
emphasis on getting the right result for a legal case rather than following proper 
procedures while obtaining the result. 29 This causes particular problems for 
administrative review applicants because a dearth of adequate procedures at the time of 
the imposition of the administrative penalty can make it even harder to obtain a just 
decision in administrative review. The example of the traffic violation penalty referred to 
above demonstrates this point for us. Due to a lack of other records, the review organ can 
only presume that the public security official made the correct interpretation of the events 
and the correct decision at the time when the penalty was imposed. As discussed in 
28 Shanghai City Government Legal Affairs Office, "Certain Problems with the Handling of Review 
Decision Forms" in Li Peizhuan (ed.), fJ iE)I: ~ i.)<. ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of 
Administrative Review, 1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), p.495. 
29 On the distinction between procedural and substantive justice in China's legal tradition see: Stanley 
Lubman, "Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities and Strategy" in American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 39, 1991, p. 325. 
134 
Chapter One, one of the characteristics of the reform era in the PRC is the trend towards 
legalising and codifying rights, powers and duties. The expression of this trend in the 
bureaucracy has resulted in the promulgation of numerous laws and regulations together 
with attempts to engender the concept of lawful administration in the bureaucracy. Not 
only are there more laws to follow now, but there is the expectation that such laws will be 
followed. This expectation now extends to the government's own machinery as well as to 
citizens and other legal persons. But in the new system of administrative law, comprising 
administrative review, administrative litigation and administrative compensation, the 
laws and regulations are interpreted by both bureaucratic organs and the courts in the light 
of pre-existing attitudes towards justice. This is not surprising, of course, but it serves as 
a caution against unjustifiable optimism about the new system. 
In contemporary Chinese administrative law there is an open expectation that all 
administrative organs will follow all statutory procedures when carrying out their tasks. 
The highest standard is set publicly and organs are continually encouraged to strive for 
the highest standards. But alongside this ideal is the recognition that conditions vary a 
great deal across the PRC and that not all organs achieve this goal. To cater for this 
expected shortfall, the Administrative Review Regulations are interpreted in a way that 
allows the review organs to be flexible about procedures and facts. 
A specific administrative decision in the PRC is measured by five main criteria: 
o are the important facts clear? 
o were the correct laws, regulations, decisions and orders used as the basis for the 
decision? 
o was there any violation of statutory procedures that affected the applicant's lawful 
rights? 
o were the legal limits of the organ's authority exceeded or abused? 
o and, is the decision suitable in general terms?30 
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Two terms used in these criteria signal the flexibility that review organs are able to 
employ: "important facts" and "statutory procedures that affect the applicant's lawful 
rights". A review organ is not obliged to cancel an administrative decision just because 
the defending organ did not follow all the proper procedures.31 The organ is encouraged 
to consider the extent to which the relevant procedures assisted or hindered the making of 
the specific administrative decision. This is guided by whether the facts of the case are 
clear, the application of law is correct and whether the procedures employed followed 
basic lawful demands (which are not spelled out in the ARR). 
There is open admission that administrative organs routinely fail to fulfil the following 
duties: to fill in the forms properly; to clearly notify the parties of their rights; and to 
record the date on the written review decision form. Any of these omissions may 
contribute to an applicant's rights being adversely affected, particularly if the party is not 
advised of their rights to review and litigation. But generally such omissions will not 
result in the review organ overturning the decision. The review organ may note the 
irregularities and recommend to the defending organ that it improve its procedures, but if 
the outcome for the applicant would have been the same in any case then the decision 
would stand.32 
The facts of a case are understood in a similarly flexible light. The ARR only permits 
confusion about "important facts" to be the basis for overturning an administrative 
decision. 33 Unimportant facts are not considered sufficient grounds. Important facts are 
described as those which relate to the situation or the evidence used as the basis for the 
administrative decision. For example, if a person illegally manufactures flick knives 
(~ W 7J tanhuang dao) and the public security organ imposes an administrative 
30 ARR, Article 42. See also Dong Jianguo (ed.), IT :iE)I: ~ i.).( ~Jiff (A Handbook on Administrative 
Review) (Beijing: China Legal Press, 1991), pp.53-54. 
31 On this concept see: Dong Jianguo (ed.), IT :iE)I: ~ i.).( ~Jiff (A Handbook on Administrative Review) 
(Beijing: China Legal Press, 1991), pp.53-54; Huang Shuhai, IT :iE)I: ~ i.).( ~ iH IBJ ~ (Questions 
and Answers about Administrative) (Beijing: People's Daily Press, 1991), pp.122-123; Hu Baolin and 
Zhan Zhongle (eds), ff J:l IT :iE)I: :}f (Environmental Administrative Law) (Beijing: China Personnel 
Press, 1993), pp.187-188. 
32 Interview with an official from the State Council's Office of Legislative Affairs, Beijing, 1998. 
33 ARR, Article 42, Clause 4, Provision 1. 
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penalty of 13 days detention, the organ only needs to produce as evidence the tools used 
to produce the knives. Unimportant facts in this case would constitute the types of 
materials used in the manufacture of the knives and how many knives were produced. 
The public security organ does not need to know such facts in order for its administrative 
penalty decision to be suitable and lawful.34 
"Correct application of law" refers to the use of one particular law when another should 
have been used, or the use of laws that no longer have effect, or the use of laws that have 
not yet gone into effect. This provision in the ARR points again to the main function of 
the regulations being to improve and regularise bureaucratic decision-making rather than 
to protect individual rights. In some cases the applicant will be affected adversely by the 
wrong application of law, but in many cases the penalty would still stand on the basis of 
another law. Incorrect application of law is always grounds on which to accept a case for 
administrative review but in practice is not sufficient grounds to overturn the decision. An 
administrative decision that had been made on the basis of a wrong application of law 
would merely be changed by the review organ to be made on the basis of the correct law, 
resulting in a substantively similar outcome for the applicant. This demonstrates that the 
main purpose of including this criterion in the ARR is to improve the standardization and 
regularisation of bureaucratic decision-making. 
The understandings attached to "excess of power" and "abuse of power" will be explained 
fully in Chapter Six in the context of administrative litigation because they are most 
applicable to that process. Here it will suffice to say that "excess of power" is associated 
with administrative actions that are performed outside the legal limits of the law. In 
English the concept is usually described as ultra vires, beyond power. "Abuse of power" 
is associated most specifically with an abuse of discretionary power, and in the context of 
the new administrative law system usually refers to a complaint that an administrative 
organ imposed one penalty when the recipient thinks another would have been more 
suitable. For example, a person may receive a 7-day personal detention from a public 
34 Dong Jianguo (ed.), fr :if)(~ i.).( ~ 1ffi (A Handbook on Administrative Review) (Beijing: China 
Legal Press, 1991), p.55. 
security organ for a public order offence, but may prefer a 200 yuan fine as it would 
enable him or her to continue to work and earn money. 
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The suitability of an administrative decision is measured in a negative way. That is, only 
if a decision is clearly unsuitable and out of proportion to the offence committed is a 
review organ required to overturn or change it. 
Costs 
Unlike in administrative litigation, there is no direct charge made to the applicant for the 
service of an administrative review,35 and this is now stipulated in the Administrative 
Review Law (Article 39), so a direct cost is not a barrier to using the service. There are, 
however, geographical barriers, which particularly in rural areas adversely affect an 
applicant's rights. 
Jurisdiction over administrative reviews of cases that arise from basic level (county) 
government decisions may be reviewed by either the government at the same level or by 
the relevant department at the next higher level. If an applicant wishes to go to the next 
higher level to seek review this usually involves long distance travel to the next largest 
town where the department is located, which requires considerable time and expense. 
Sometimes laws allow for this by specifically granting extra time for appeals to be made 
in mountainous districts or where communications are poor, such as in the Public Order 
Management Regulations of 1957 (Article 18, Clause 6). These regulations only allowed 
48 hours (normally) within which an appeal was to be lodged against the penalty 
decision, with the time limit extended (but for an unspecified time) for cases in remote 
areas. Such allowances have been removed from the 1986 Public Order Management 
Regulations, which simply state the five-day time limit for appeals to be lodged.36 Thus, 
the time allowed for appeal has been lengthened in return for the applicant taking more 
responsibility for registering the appeal on time. 
35 Wang Chengdong (ed.), IT jE){ ~ iS( (Administrative Review), Administrative Legal System Series, 
(Beijing: China University of Politics and Law, 1993), pp.74-89. 
36 Article 39. 
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A questionnaire survey conducted in Harbin City among 1000 people sought to find out 
how jurisdictional issues affected administrative review, in terms of time and resources.37 
People were asked whether they would prefer to apply for administrative review to the 
city government, to the district or county government, to an office subordinate to the city, 
or to an office subordinate to the province. Respondents indicated they would prefer to 
apply to the city, district or county government (75.7%), followed by the subordinate 
office (17 .5 % ), and the least popular option was the office subordinate to the province 
( 4% ). The results were interpreted by those who conducted the questionnaire to suggest 
that people prefer to apply for administrative review on familiar territory and that distance 
or unfamiliar surroundings were significant barriers to applying for a review. Similar 
problems with vertically organised jurisdiction have been observed in Beijing and 
surrounding districts. 38 
The cost to administrative organs of providing the administrative review service is 
considerably greater than the costs facing applicants. There are at least two issues 
involved. First, each organ was required to establish an administrative review office or to 
appoint a number of staff to the task. Most organs have established administrative review 
sections in their legal affairs offices. By way of a general guide, in 1991 the Beijing City 
government appointed four people to its administrative review section, the Jiangsu 
provincial government appointed five people to its section, and the Anhui provincial 
government appointed three people.39 Taking Beijing alone, as administrative organs 
across the entire city (not just the Beijing City government) received only 314 
applications for administrative review in 1991 (see Table 1 below) and the majority of 
these would have been cases in functional organs like the public security bureaus, the four 
37 Report from Liaoning Province, "Some Thoughts on the Administrative Review System" in Li Peizhuan 
(ed.), 1T ]'.){ ~ 1.5( ;jt!t .W: 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-1992) 
(Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), pp.524-525. 
38 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), q:t 001T ]'.){ ~ *tl j:t Jm lit~ iJJ :::§: :fg 1!f (An Investigative Report Into 
the Course of Development of China's Administrative Rule of Law) (Beijing: The Legal System Press, 
1998), p.260. Hereafter referred to as "Investigative Report". 
39 Li Peizhuan (ed.), 1T ]'.){ ~ 1.5( ;jt!t .W: 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-
1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), pp.4, 31, 33. 
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people in the Beijing City government's administrative review section were unlikely to 
have been overworked by administrative review applications. The staff may not be 
exclusively engaged in administrative review work, of course, but it appears that at least 
three people are required to staff an administrative review section. This may be partly 
explained by the personnel designations on the forms used to register acceptance of a case 
for administrative review (Forms F and G above). In forms F and G at least three people 
are involved in handling the acceptance of a case: the investigator($' =Elf A) , who is 
probably responsible for collecting all the relevant information and making a 
recommendation; the clerk(~ .1}} A) who probably hands out the forms to applicants; 
and the ratifier ($' ::ftt A ) who approves the recommendation. 
The second cost-related issue for administrative organs is that due to the varying nature of 
administrative work, some organs incur greater costs per review case than others. The 
environmental protection organs, for example, may be required to run tests on pollution 
levels to defend an administrative penalty that a lower-level organ has imposed.40 
Who you are determines how much and what kind of redress the system can offer. 
Among the areas in which problems arise in the implementation of the administrative 
review system are those which overlap with other forms of discipline or other patterns of 
decision making. Communist Party discipline, for example, which is conducted by the 
Party's discipline inspection commissions, is designed to deal with the ethics and conduct 
of Party members working in Party organisations. The Ministry of Supervision and the 
Ministry of Personnel, on the other hand, deal with the conduct of administrative 
personnel in state organs. There are also some institutions that remain subject to more 
personalised and traditional patterns of decision making, such as the defence forces, 
which remain excluded from the scope of administrative review.41 For all the individuals 
and organisations associated with these institutions, the new administrative review system 
cannot offer any form of redress. This means that there is no common form of 
40 Interview with the Director of the Policy and Regulation Department of China's National Environment 
Protection Agency, Beijing, 1998. 
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administrative redress available and that different segments of the population are subject 
to different sets of rules and standards. 
Let us take administrative personnel in state organs as an example. Decisions relating to 
their awards, penalties, appointments and dismissals are excluded from the scope of 
administrative review.42 (Readers should note that this material, and the example used 
below to illustrate the point, is only relevant to the period up to the promulgation of the 
Administrative Review Law, which permits applicants to request redress on these 
matters. But as such an applicant would be requesting their own organ to review the 
penalty, the new law probably still does not provide an adequately impartial review 
system). In the case of administrative personnel, problems arise due to the distinction 
made in the PRC bureaucracy between internal and external administrative power, a 
distinction that does not exist in many Western countries. 
Internal (r*J WS neibu) tasks relate to the manner and means by which the organ 
organises and manages its workload, tasks, and personnel. External (-:9~ WS waibu) tasks 
relate to the actual function of the organ in regulating society: for example, in supervising 
the market place, controlling public order, or managing health problems. External tasks 
typically bring the organ into direct contact with the public. 
If an administrative official violates the code of conduct for officials in his or her organ, 
there are several means available to the organ to discipline the official. Minor mistakes 
will often incur no more than criticism and education, a (Maoist) form of control which 
involves the supervisor giving the official "a talking to". One notch up from this is the 
allocation of work demerit points, then possible demotion, then dismissal. All of these 
actions are called administrative disciplinary sanctions (IT jE5( ~ -)J\. xingzheng 
chufen), and they are classified as internal acts of the organ. As such they are beyond the 
41 ARR, Article 10, Clause D. 
42 ARR, Article 10. 
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scope of administrative review. For redress on these issues one must appeal to either the 
Supervision organ or the Personnel organ. 
The administrative penalties that may be imposed on the general population for violations 
of administrative laws or regulations are called administrative 
penalties (.fr :iE)( ~ W xingzheng chufa). These penalties are classified as external acts 
of the organ and fall within the scope of administrative review. 
The problem for establishing a common system of redress is that the same behaviour 
receives different responses according to the offender's occupation. To illustrate this I 
have chosen a case from Anhui Province.43 
The case records that a certain Zhang, a worker in a basic-level collective, gave birth to 
two children, in 1975 and 1977 respectively. Then in 1989 a third child was born. Some 
time after this, in October 1991, the county government imposed an administrative 
disciplinary sanction (chufen) by dismissing her, and an administrative penalty (chufa) of 
1000 yuan fine for violating the planned childbirth regulations. Zhang refused to accept 
these decisions and went to the district administrative office to apply for administrative 
review, requesting that the review organ cancel the county government's decisions. 
There was disagreement about two matters of this case. First, which organ had 
jurisdiction to conduct an administrative review? The options were: the planned birth 
committee of the county administrative office; a body entrusted with power by the 
provincial government, such as the district or county government; or the provincial 
government itself. The end result was that the district government handled the review. 
The second problem was whether the case came within the scope of review. Here again 
the situation was not clear. According to the Administrative Review Regulations, 
43 The case is recorded in Li Peizhuan (ed.), fJ iE)1: J( i.).(. W: 1991-1992 (A General View of 
Administrative Review, 1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press, 1993), pp.289-291. 
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dismissals of administrative personnel do not fall within the scope of reviewable cases. 
The alternative view posed was that Ms Zhang was not, strictly speaking, a state 
administrative official but rather was a worker at a basic-level collective. As such she was 
not on the official list of state employees. The review organ decided that the dismissal 
part of the penalty did not come within the scope of administrative review because Zhang 
was an administrative official, but she could apply for review of the 1000 yuan fine. 
Zhang indicated that the main issue she had complaint with was the disciplinary dismissal 
sanction and that she did not intend to apply for review over the fine. 
The commentary accompanying this case record and the two issues raised above are 
concerned predominantly with organisational matters of the state. The jurisdictional 
problem is discussed by the commentators in terms of which organ, according to 
hierarchy and responsibility, had the authority to review this case. The PRC's local 
people's congress and local people's government organisation laws are quoted as 
references in support of the commentator's (and the case managers) reasoning. 
Discussions about whether the case falls within the scope of administrative review also 
revolve around organisational concepts such as the distinction between internal and 
external administrative power. 
We do not know if any personal reasons prompted the dismissal and fine imposed on 
Zhang, and nowhere in the case record or the commentary is the suitability of the penalty 
discussed. But we do know how the case was used publicly, and that was to make at least 
two points: that administrative review cannot be used for these types of cases; and that the 
reason for this is the way that state power is organised. Administrative review is 
organised to ensure that state power currently vested in various organs and governments 
is not lessened by the right that citizens now have to apply for administrative review. 
Administrative review can only be effective for sections of the population that do not 
come under any other form of authority. The implication of this for society is that it 
further divides the population into groups that have a chance of effectively using the legal 
system to obtain redress and those who do not. This lessens any possible progress for the 
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'rule of law' discourse (which argues that the government is just another party to a 
dispute and will be treated the same as a citizen). At the same time it indicates that the 
discourse of "administration according to law" is concerned primarily with following 
rules and less so with protecting the rights of citizens and other legal persons. In terms of 
the balance theory discussed in Chapter Three, this demonstrates a management 
imperative rather than a control of power imperative. 
Other organisational problems relating to jurisdiction arise out of the common problem of 
local protectionism. As alluded to in Chapter One, courts are funded by the government at 
the same level, which often leads to overt political manipulation of judicial decisions. In 
administrative litigation it is very common for an appeal to be denied at a local court only 
to be granted at the next higher-level city court. This pattern has been interpreted as an 
effect of protectionism by local courts on behalf of local government organs.44 In 
administrative review the applicant may choose to apply for review at either the local 
level, in which case the review organ is the government at the same level as the organ 
which made the offending decision, or at the next higher level functional organ. If the 
applicant goes for horizontal jurisdiction he or she runs the risk of being adversely 
affected by local protectionism.45 This consideration is probably usually overridden, 
however, by the barrier imposed by travel to the city organ. 
Up to this point in this chapter we have examined in detail how the administrative review 
system works. A study of the forms used in the process reveals that the applicant for 
administrative review is at a considerable disadvantage vis-a-vis the administrative organ, 
not only because of the initial difference in power between the two parties, but 
particularly because administrative organs take unfair advantage of their position in 
offering poor administrative standards, a disinclination to assist applicants, and a perverse 
tendency to further penalise applicants by refusing to accept incorrectly framed 
applications for review. Added to this is the pre-existing legal framework that allows 
administrative organs to choose which facts and which procedures are relevant to a case, 
44 Interviewees unreservedly supported this interpretation, especially as it applies in rural areas. 
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and which are not, thereby further limiting the ability of applicants to defend their rights 
to lawful administration. But it is the organisation of power and authority in the PRC that 
is probably the most powerful way in which the state circumscribes the power of 
administrative review. Administrative review may only be considered as an option for 
redress if no other state institution has authority in that area. The only way in which the 
state appears to be generous and considerate of applicants is by not directly charging a fee 
for the service, but this benefit is dissipated by the problems of distance and the low 
likelihood of success. What is the result of all this on applicants? How many applications 
are made and what is the outcome of them? Is it worth the hassle? 
How many cases are there? 
In contrast to the systematically published figures for administrative litigation cases,46 the 
figures for administrative review are much less systematically collated. We can only 
speculate as to the reasons for this, and piece together a picture from the patchy sources 
that are available. 
The officials from administrative organs whom I interviewed, in reply to questions about 
how many applications for administrative review their organ receives each year, said that 
they did not know or did not collect such figures. The Director of the Policy and 
Regulation Department in the National Environment Protection Agency, for example, 
said that his organ collates the number of administrative penalties imposed on individuals 
and enterprises but these figures are not published. He then added that his organ does not 
collect the figures about other issues, such as how many applications are made for 
review.47 
I subsequently interviewed the director of the General Office in the Office of Legislative 
Affairs of the State Council. The director stressed that the statistics on administrative 
review that his office has are patchy and unreliable, but he did admit that there are about 
45 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.260. 
46 More will be said about this in Chapter Seven. 
47 Interview, Beijing, 1998. 
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30,000 applications for administrative review each year lodged with all organs across all 
of the PRC. In about 60% of the cases, the original administrative decisions are 
confirmed by the reviewing organ, and applicants then take their cases to court in about 
30% to 40% of such cases.48 
The number of applications for administrative review in 1991 made to 17 of China's 
provinces and province-equivalents can be obtained by adding the number of cases 
represented in Table 1 below. A figure of approximately 25,000 cases per year is obtained 
by this method. Although this table only accounts for 56.6% of China's provinces and 
province-equivalents, it covers about 70% of the population.49 If we increase the figure of 
25,034 by a third to account for the other 30% of the population, we obtain an 
approximate number of review applications for the whole country in 1991of33,000, 
which is close to the director's estimate of 30,000. 
Unfortunately I have only been able to obtain consistent figures for 1991and1992, with 
patchy figures for some organs and provinces available for later years. So we cannot 
obtain a thorough picture of the trends in administrative review applications. 
Table 1: Numbers of applications for administrative review received in 17 provinces 
and province-equivalents of the P.R.C. in 1991 
Province or equivalent 
Beijing 
Shanghai 
Sichuan 
Ningxia 
Shaanxi 
Hubei 
Number of applications 
314 
1142 
*5000 
*200 
*700 
1637 
48 Interview, Beijing, 1998. 
49 This figure is based on population data taken from cp 00 A 0 #f. it $ ~ (Yearbook of China's 
Population Statistics) (Beijing: China Statistical Press), Volume 1992, p.4 and Volume 1993, p.4. 
Hunan 
Jiangxi 
Guangxi 
Guangdong 
He nan 
Tianjin 
Shandong 
Jiangsu 
Anhui 
Zhejiang 
Fujian 
Total 
2163 
947 
1333 
1498 
*2000 
*500 
*1000 
*1000 
*2000 
*3000 
*600 
25,034 
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,,- :i:ft .li5 '~I -lit! 11">:" Source: Li Peizhuan (ed.), 1T ~;c.. ~ 1-A w:; ..!A!. 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 
1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), Section 1, pp.3-100. Li's figures are sourced from 
reports by the various city and provincial governments legal affairs' offices or administrative review offices. 
An average of95% of applications for administrative review are handled to completion by the process. The 
remaining cases are either transferred to another organ or are cases that failed to be established as proper 
administrative review cases. 
*Figure is approximate and is obtained by apportioning an appropriate number of cases from the number of 
applications reported for a longer period. For example, the only figures available for Sichuan Province 
report that from when administrative review formally commenced at the start of 1991 until September 1992 
the province received 9392 applications for review. Thus, if cases were received at a constant rate, and 
other figures indicate this is the case, then approximately 5,000 were received in 1991. 
The public security organs, which have the largest number of complaints made against 
them, are reported to have accepted 22,513 applications for administrative review in 1991 
and 27,196 applications in 1992.50 In 1991 tax organs received 1,400, and commodity 
price organs received approximately 500. In short, the evidence is that the public security 
organs receive the lion's share of complaints. 
50 The Administrative Rules Office of the Legal System Department of the Public Security Bureau, "A 
General Survey of Public Security Administrative Review Work" in Li Peizhuan (ed.), 
(A General View of Administrative Review 1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal 
System Press, 1993), Section 1, pp.IOI, 105, 107. Li's figures are sourced from the organs' general offices 
or administrative review offices. 
147 
The variation among types of organs is due to several factors: public order management 
disputes constitute the bulk of public security organs' cases, and the right to appeal such 
cases (established by the new regulations in 1986) precipitated the establishment of 
dedicated administrative divisions in the courts, a development which was widely 
publicised.51 With the passage of the Administrative Review Regulations in 1991, all 
public order management penalty cases had to go through administrative review first 
before going to court. This contributed to the high number of public-security review 
applications. It should also be noted that land management disputes at this stage were not 
able to be handled under administrative review, but after the 1994 amendments to the 
ARR such disputes began to come before administrative organs and may have contributed 
to an increase in the number of overall review applications after that time. More will be 
said about this below. 
The geographical variations are startling. To demonstrate several points here I have 
chosen to compare three jurisdictions: Beijing, Shanghai, and Sichuan. The choice of 
jurisdictions and the comparisons made should not be taken as methodologically 
problem-proof, but rather should be taken as an attempt to illuminate some of the issues, 
such as wealth and political-legal environment, that may affect the number and outcome 
of administrative review applications. I have chosen two wealthy areas with similar 
population levels (Beijing and Shanghai) and one poor area (Sichuan). 
51 FBIS - China Daily Reports: 11 February 1987, K. l; 29 January 1988, pp.6-7; 25 August 1988, p.28. 
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Table 2: Frequency of administrative review cases compared to population in 17 of 
China's provinces and province-equivalents in 1991 
Province or equivalent No. of people per case Wealth rank 
Shanghai 11,734 1 
Zhejiang 14,006 6 
Tianjin 18,180 3 
Sichuan 21,794 26 
Ningxia 24,000 20 
Hunan 28,705 21 
Anhui 28,805 28 
Guangxi 32,438 29 
Hubei 33,671 14 
Beijing 34,841 2 
Jiangxi 40,813 23 
Guangdong 42,984 5 
He nan 43,815 27 
Shaanxi 48,083 22 
Fujian 51,317 11 
Jiangsu 68,440 7 
Shangdong 85,700 10 
Rates and rankings are calculated using case statistics from Table 1, population statistics from 
9=f 00 A 0 #f. it ip. ~ (Yearbook of China's Population Statistics) (Beijing: China Statistical 
Press), Volume 1992, p.4 and income statistics from 9=f 00 #f. it .:::P. ~ (China Statistical Yearbook) 
(Beijing: China Statistical Press), Volume 1993, p.40. 
Beijing and Shanghai are the wealthiest province-level areas in the PRC (Table 2). In 
1991 Shanghai ranked first out of 30 provinces with an income level of 5,423 yuan per 
capita. Beijing ranked second with a level of 3,925 yuan per head of population. Sichuan 
ranked 26th with a per capita income of 980 yuan.52 In 1991, Shanghai also had the 
highest rate of administrative review applications (Table 2) at the rate of one case per 
11,734 people. Beijing, with a similar income level, had one administrative review case 
per 34,841 people, constituting about a third the rate of Shanghai. Sichuan's rate, with a 
significantly lower per capita income than either Shanghai or Beijing, was one case for 
every 21,794 people, making it about half way between the rates of Shanghai and Beijing. 
Clearly the people of Shanghai were more active in using the administrative review 
system to defend their rights than the people of Beijing in 1991, but there is no clear 
indication that this is because of the wealth factor. 
52 Income statistics are taken from 9=f 00 #t, it ip. ~ (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: China 
Statistical Press), Volume 1993, p.40. 
Table 3: Number and rate of applications for administrative review in three of 
China's province-equivalents in 1992. 
City or province 
Shanghai 
Sichuan 
Beijing 
Number of applications 
912 
4392 
310 
No. of people per case 
14,748 
25,041 
35,548 
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Source: Li Peizhuan (ed.), D ]:)I:~ 1.5(. ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 
1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), Section 1, pp.3, 9, 80 and 
t=P 00 A 0 #f. it~~ (Yearbook of China's Population Statistics) (Beijing: China Statistical 
Press), 1993, p.4. 
The figures available for 1992 demonstrate a similar pattern (Table 3). Although the 
number of applications for administrative review in Beijing fell by only 1 % to 310 cases, 
in Shanghai the number of applications fell 20% to 912 cases.53 Even so, the people of 
Shanghai were still nearly three times more likely to use the legal system to defend their 
rights than the people of Beijing. It must be said, though, that even though there are stark 
variations, the figures overall are extremely low compared to the scale of administrative 
activity undertaken by the Chinese state. 
The literature tends to portray the low number of review applications as a problem rather 
than as a positive indicator.54 If the standard of administrative decision-making had 
improved significantly, administrative review applications would not only decline, but so 
would administrative litigation appeals. As the latter has not occurred (see Chapter 
Seven), we can safely assume there are still significant levels of dissatisfaction with 
administrative decisions. 
Further support for this interpretation is provided by evidence from questionnaires 
conducted by administrative review system personnel in the PRC. In a report on the 
administrative review situation in Liaoning, a questionnaire survey was conducted in an 
53 Li Peizhuan (ed.), D ]:)I:~ 1.5(. ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-
1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), pp.3, 9. 
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unnamed city involving 582 people. They were asked about their encounters with 
administrative organs in that city and whether or not they were happy with an organ's 
handling of their case, regardless of whether this resulted in an administrative penalty 
being imposed or not. The answers revealed that 134 people (23%) were happy with how 
their cases had been handled, while 448 people (77%) were not.ss The administrators of 
the questionnaire state that the figure of 77% who were unhappy with the handling of 
their case did not translate into numbers of applications for administrative review and that 
this significantly affected the ability of the administrative review system to play a positive 
part in redressing administrative grievances. 
It is commonly said about administrative litigation in the PRC that there is a link between 
wealth and the likelihood of a person using the new administrative law system to defend 
his or her rights. The characteristics of the relationship are described, in a saying, as a 
bean pod: bulging in the middle and tapering at the ends. The ends of the pod, where the 
smallest number of cases occur, are said to be the very poor areas of the PRC where 
people fear to take action against the government more than elsewhere, and the very rich 
areas where money can buy a desired outcome outside the legal system.s6 
The figures quoted here demonstrate this bean pod saying to be false for administrative 
review in 1991 and 1992. Beijing and Shanghai are the two wealthiest province-
equivalents in the PRC in terms of per capita income, yet the rate at which their citizens 
used the administrative review system to defend their rights varied enormously. The case 
of Sichuan Province further demonstrates the lack of clear links between wealth and the 
likelihood of a person using the formal legal system to gain redress for administrative 
grievances. 
54 See for example, "From the point of view of the implementation of the review system, the most important 
problem currently is the low number of review cases, even to the point where the number is declining" in 
Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.258. 
55 Report from Liaoning Province, "Some Thoughts on the Administrative Review System" in Li Peizhuan 
(ed.), fr ]:)I:~ i.5<. ~ ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-1992) 
(Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), p.523. 
56 Interview with a judge of 10 years experience in the administrative division of the Supreme People's 
Court, Beijing, 1998. 
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Geographical variations may be explained, however, by a combination of wealth and the 
political-legal environment. This suggestion is built upon an explanation put forward to 
explain the regional variation observed in administrative litigation appeals.57 The 
argument is that administrative organs in province-equivalents which have a high rate of 
administrative review applications are fairer in their handling of the applications, which 
thus contributes to even more applications. 
Table 4: Numbers of administrative review cases which may have been decided 
favourably for applicants in three province-equivalents of the P.R.C. in 1991 
*Overturned cases: decided favourably for the applicant. 
*Changed cases: the review organ changed the administrative decision, usually in favour of the applicant. 
*Withdrawn cases: the applicant decides to withdraw the case during the course of review, either because he 
or she can see the case will not succeed, or because he or she has obtained some concession from the review 
organ during the review. 
*Rejected cases: the review organ refused to accept the case for review. 
NB. Confirmed cases, which are not represented here, are cases in which the review organ decides in 
favour of the defending organ. 
City or No. and percentage of No. and percentage of A+B 
province administrative decisions administrative cases 
overturned or changed (A) withdrawn or rejected (B) 
Beijing 112 (35.6%) 72 (22.9%) 58.5% 
Shanghai 364 (32.5%) 184 (16.11%) 48.6% 
Sichuan 1955 (39.1%) 760 (15.2%) 54.3% 
Source: Li Peizhuan (ed.), .fi :iE5t ~ 1.5< ~ 1ff 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 
1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), Section 1, pp.3, 9, 80. 
As it is not known conclusively why applicants withdraw a case from the administrative 
review process, it is worth separating this figure from the number of cases which it is 
known are decided favourably for the applicant. In the case of administrative litigation 
cases, there are at least two explanations given to explain why applicants withdraw a case 
57 This idea is taken from Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, pp.238-239, who suggests that 
regional variation in the number and handling of administrative litigation cases may be accounted for by 
differing degrees of judicial fairness across regions. 
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from the litigation process. The explanation by some PRC scholars is that plaintiffs for 
administrative litigation realise during the course of proceedings that they will not win 
and as they fear to antagonise a powerful administrative organ they withdraw their suits 
without achieving a favourable ruling. A foreign-based scholar disputes this reasoning 
and claims that in 38%-45% of withdrawn litigation cases, the plaintiffs withdraw the 
case after the defending organ rectifies the administrative decision.58 
In the case of administrative review, we do not have sufficient data to determine why a 
portion of cases are prematurely withdrawn, but depending on whether we include 
withdrawn and rejected cases among the favourable rulings or not significantly affects our 
analysis. If these cases are omitted from the analysis, then we can see from Table 4 that a 
citizen is slightly more likely to get a favourable administrative review decision 
Table 5: Results of administrative review cases across the P.R.C in 1991. 
*Confirmed cases are decided in favour of defending organs. 
A: cases that were either overturned or changed by the review organ, usually in the applicant's favour. 
B: cases that were either withdrawn by the applicant or rejected by the review organ. 
City or province Confirmed Overturned(A) With.(B) A+B 
Beijing 111(35.3%) 112(35.6%) 72 (22.9%) 58.5% 
Shanghai 470 (41.l %) 364 (32.5%) 184 (16.11 %) 48.6% 
Hubei - (50.3%) - (31.8%) - (15.5%) 47.3% 
Hunan 593 (27.4%) 
Guangdong 885 (59%) 494 (33%) 55 (3.7%) 36.7% 
He nan 1019 (50.9%) 711 (35.5%) 233 (11.6%) 47.1% 
Shandong 403 (40.3%) 315 (31.5%) 200 (20%) 51.5% 
Jiangsu 492 (49.2%) 226 (22.6%) 208 (20.8%) 43.4% 
Anhui 909 (45.45%) 647 (32.3%) 157 (7.9%) 40.2% 
Zhejiang 1654 (55.1 %) 774 (25.8%) 280 (9.33%) 35.1% 
Fujian 290 (48.3%) 190 (31.6%) 64 (10.6%) 44.2% 
Sichuan 2250 (45%) 1955 (39.1%) 760 (15.2%) 54.3% 
Ningxia 60 (30%) 112(56%) 22 (11 %) 67% 
Shaanxi 400 (57.1%) 204 (29%) 84 (12%) 41% 
,,_ jE)( Is" -~ • 1/ff 
*Figures are based on totals as per Table 1. Source: Li Peizhuan (ed.), IT ~ "k J..I..!.. 1991-
1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), 
Section 1, pp.3-100. 
58 For both views see Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins," 1997, p.843. 
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from an administrative organ in Sichuan as opposed to Beijing or Shanghai. Indeed, just 
working on cases that are definitely known to have been decided favourably for 
applicants, Sichuan has a higher rate of favourable administrative review decisions than 
every province or city except Ningxia (Column A, Table 5). 
If, however, withdrawn cases are included in the analysis, then applicants in Beijing are 
more likely to get a favourable response from an administrative organ as opposed to 
applicants in Shanghai or Sichuan. Even compared to listed provinces and province-
equi valents (Table 5), Beijing has the highest rate of administrative review responses 
favourable to applicants when withdrawn cases are included, again with the exception of 
Ningxia. But should withdrawn and rejected cases be included in the rulings favourable to 
applicants? 
If, in fact, applicants in Beijing were more likely in 1991 to get a favourable ruling on an 
administrative review case then we would expect the number of applications for 
administrative review to increase in subsequent years. In fact, the number decreased 
marginally (Tables 1 and 3). When data from 1991-1996 are taken as a whole the rate of 
favourable rulings declined even further: of 1512 cases that were handled to completion 
under administrative review in Beijing during this period, 1038 (68.7%) were confirmed 
in the defending organ's favour by the review organ and 448 (29.6%) were overturned or 
changed in favour of applicants.59 This latter figure is significantly lower than the 35.6% 
recorded for Beijing in 1991 (Table 4). 
Another factor supporting the argument that withdrawn cases should not be included with 
those overturned or changed in favour of the applicant is the relationship between 
administrative review figures and administrative litigation figures. The trend throughout 
the 1990s in Beijing was that as the number of administrative review applications 
declined, there was a corresponding increase in the number of administrative litigation 
59 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.253. 
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appeals.60 This suggests that potential applicants quickly became aware of the difficulty 
in obtaining a favourable ruling from an administrative organ in Beijing and so switched 
their tactics to filing a suit in court in the hope of gaining a better outcome. This 
connection between the handling of administrative review cases and the subsequent effect 
on administrative litigation figures has also been reported from other regions of the 
PRC.61 
On a related matter, the letters/visits system has also been affected by administrative 
review. In the first six months of 1991, for example, the letters/visits offices in public 
security organs across all of the PRC received 20,749 cases, representing a 17% decrease 
from the same period in 1990.62 This reduction could be interpreted as an indicator of 
better administration in the public security organs, but in light of the discussion above 
such an interpretation cannot stand. It is most likely that the reduced number of cases is 
partly the result of alternative avenues of redress becoming available. 
A report which discusses figures from the whole country states that for the initial two 
years of administrative review (1991and1992), 25% of reviewed cases were 
subsequently filed as suits in court.63 Administrative litigation was increasingly regarded 
as able to deliver justice far better than administrative review, and thus the number of 
applicants who decided to try their luck with the courts after obtaining no redress from 
the administrative organ increased. 
60 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.253. 
61 Administrative Division of an Intermediate Court of Yunnan Province, "Strengthen the Administrative 
Review System and Further the Establishment of Administrative Rule of Law - An Investigation Into the 
Administrative Review System of Yunnan Province" in Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report'', 1998, 
p.270. 
62 
"The Experiences and Practices of Those Handling Administrative Review in Public Security Organs 
Across the PRC" in Li Peizhuan (ed.), IT jE)I: ~ i.)< ;jttt ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of 
Administrative Review, 1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press, 1993), p.585. 
63 Report from Liaoning Province, "Some Thoughts on the Administrative Review System" in Li Peizhuan 
(ed.), IT jE)I: ~ i.)< ;jttt ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-1992) 
(Beijing: China Legal System Press, 1993 ), p.522. Heads of Administrative Di visions of Three District 
Courts in Beijing, "Strengthen the Internal Remedial Mechanisms of Administrative Systems and Advance 
Administrative Rule of Law - An Investigation Into the Administrative Review System in Beijing" in Jiang 
Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", p.253. 
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Administrative litigation figures available for the rest of the country support the 
significance of the relationship between review and litigation. Pei Minxin has shown that 
in 1994 the people of Sichuan were the least likely to use administrative litigation as a 
means of redress: in 1994 Sichuan courts received 6% of the country's administrative 
litigation appeals while having 9.3% of the population. The people of Henan and Hunan, 
on the other hand, were most likely to use administrative litigation as a means of redress. 
Henan courts received nearly 15% of China's administrative litigation appeals while the 
province contained about 7 .5% of the population. Similarly, Hunan courts received nearly 
14% of administrative litigation appeals with 5.3% of the population. Pei uses these and 
other figures to argue that the courts in Henan and Hunan are more likely than elsewhere 
in the PRC to give a favourable ruling to a plaintiff, suggesting a higher degree of judicial 
fairness than the national average. 64 This view is also expounded by the head of Law 
Department of the PRC's National School of Administration.65 
The evidence from the analysis of administrative review applications presented above 
suggests that the number and outcome of administrative litigation appeals is also related 
to the outcome of administrative review applications. The people of Sichuan were slightly 
more likely to obtain a favourable ruling from administrative review and thus would have 
been less likely to then make an administrative litigation appeal in court. The people of 
Henan had about the same rate of success in administrative reviews as the people of 
Beijing (Table 5) and yet a disproportionately higher number of them subsequently made 
administrative litigation appeals. Of those litigation appeals, Pei Minxin claims that 
plaintiffs in Henan had a two-to-one advantage over the government when the outcome of 
the litigation is examined. These plaintiffs did not enjoy such advantages during 
administrative reviews in Henan, suggesting that the administrative organs in Henan were 
more likely to alter an administrative decision in the face of litigation than were 
administrative organs in Beijing. These results tell us something of the varying degree to 
which administrative organs in different regions of the PRC are likely to alter an 
64 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins," 1997, pp.839-40. 
65 Interview, Beijing, 1998. 
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administrative decision during litigation, as well as something of the regional variation in 
the strength of the courts. 
The rate of administrative review applications is extremely low 
Despite any observations that can be made about the distribution and handling of 
administrative review applications, there is an extremely low rate of applications 
compared to the scale of administrative activity of government organs in the PRC. In 
1995, by way of example, all functional organs of the Beijing City government handled 
10.5 million violations of administrative behaviour and consequently imposed nearly 8.3 
million administrative penalties, a staggering rate of one penalty per 1.5 people! 66 But 
only 209 applications for administrative review were made,67 representing an appeal rate 
of .0025%. 
Similar conditions are reported from Xinjiang's capital, Urumqi. In 1996 the Urumqi re-
education-through-labour committee (Jf ~ ~ ~ laodong jiaoyang) imposed 
1601 re-education through labour penalties, but received only 35 applications for 
administrative review, a rate of 2.19%. The Urumqi detention and investigation 
committee ct&~'$' :gr shourong shencha) imposed 1275 administrative penalties 
and received only 40 applications for administrative review, a rate of 3.1 %. The city's 
labour bureau imposed 708 labour supervision penalties and received only one 
application for administrative review. 68 
There are both positive and negative reasons put forward to explain the very low rate of 
administrative review applications compared to administrative penalties imposed.69 The 
positive reasons are: first, administrative organs act more within the law now than they 
used to, and the professional conduct of cadres has improved such that people have no 
66 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.258. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid, p.280. 
69 Ibid. Also see: Report from Liaoning Province, "Some Thoughts on the Administrative Review System" 
in Li Peizhuan (ed.), IT :if5I: ~ 15<. ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 
1991-1992) (Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), pp.522, 524, 525. 
real cause to complain; and second, administrative organ,s have strengthened and 
improved their procedures for authorising enforcement of an administrative decision 
which has resulted in a reduced rate of applications for administrative review of 
enforcement decisions. 
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The negative reasons are: first, many administrative organs regard administrative review 
work as troublesome and do not accept all of the cases they should; second, a review 
organ's decision on cases is often driven by criteria that are irrelevant or harmful to the 
applicant's rights, especially the economic situation of the organ; third, citizens are often 
afraid to accuse an administrative organ; and fourth, administrative review generally 
provides a claimant with less than it costs in time, energy and resources, especially in 
rural areas.70 
Table 6: Numbers of administrative review and administrative litigation cases filed 
in Beijing, 1991-1996 
Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Administrative review 
applications 
314 
308 
254 
219 
209 
246 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report," 1998, p.253. 
Administrative litigation 
appeals 
142 
231 
243 
290 
283 
430 
Another factor which it is claimed contributed to the low level of review applications in 
the early years of administrative review, and one which no longer applies, was the 
exclusion of land management disputes from the scope of administrative review.71 When 
the Administrative Review Regulations were promulgated in 1991, land management 
disputes that had been adjudicated as civil disputes by administrative organs were 
70 See the discussion above about "costs". 
71 Report from Liaoning Province, "Some Thoughts on the Administrative Review System" in Li Peizhuan 
(ed.), fr i){ ~ i.5(. ~ 1991-1992 (A General View of Administrative Review, 1991-1992) 
(Beijing: China Legal System Press,1993), p.525. 
158 
excluded from the scope of administrative review. This was because these cases was 
deemed to be civil in nature and the administrative organ was merely providing the 
adjudicatory service. In as much as administrative review deals with administrative 
disputes which involve a citizen and an administrative organ as opposing parties, these 
civil case decisions were unsuitable for administrative review. This provision was 
modified in 1994 to allow adjudicatory rulings by administrative organs on land 
management disputes to be appealed against in administrative review. The courts were 
being swamped with land management administrative litigation appeals and it was 
thought that this may dissipate some of the pressure. Shortly after this change in 
regulations the number of administrative review applications began to increase (Table 6 
above), and land management disputes are now the second most frequently disputed 
category of administrative decisions in both administrative review and administrative 
litigation. The relatively low numbers of administrative review applications in the early 
years may have been partly caused by this. It is doubtful, though, whether even allowing 
land disputes to be reviewed right from the start would have given a significantly 
different picture. The trend during the 1990s was for review applications to decline, 
regardless of changes to the categories of disputes which could be taken to review. This 
decline was turned around in Beijing in 1996 (Table 6 above) but not so as to give the 
view thauhere was suddenly a significant proportion of review applications compared to 
the scale of administrative decision-making. 
In this chapter we have followed the process by which a Chinese today goes about 
making an application for administrative review, and the outcome of such applications. 
The state's superior position at the outset is further strengthened by the way applications 
are handled and regulations are interpreted. Who the applicant is and how much 
knowledge he or she has of both the Administrative Review Regulations and the legal 
system are significant factors affecting the outcome of the application. The administrative 
review system is organised in a way that should provide professional checking and 
supervision of administrative decisions. This is achieved partly in procedural matters, but 
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very little attempt is made in regard to the substantive justice of the decision. Even on the 
issue of proper procedure, much of this is more attuned to the review organ's relationships 
with other organs rather than with the applicant. 
The result is that there is a slim chance of success for the applicant of administrative 
review, and this is reflected in the very low numbers of applications. Overall, 
administrative review has been a failure as an attempt to protect the rights of citizens and 
other legal persons from state encroachment. The impetus of the system is towards 
bureaucratic reform and improved regularity of administration, but even in these aspects 
the results are disappointing. In terms of the balance theory expounded in Chapter Three, 
the theoretical discourse of the administrative review system is oriented more towards 
management rather than controlling administrative power, but there has been very little 
impact in practice. 
The situation for the applicant is not entirely dismal, though. The applicant's position in 
relation to the government has strengthened compared to the period before the 
Administrative Review Regulations were passed. He or she now knows that a review 
must be conducted according to a standard legal procedure and that it must examine set 
criteria. This reduces the chances of personal interference in the review procedure. 
What the administrative review process does not provide, because it is mostly conducted 
on paper, is a hearing involving all of the parties to a dispute. The applicant has no 
opportunity, other than on the application form, to influence the outcome of the review. 
Because the review is conducted entirely within the administrative xitong and the 
applicant has only formal written access to this system, the chances of being able to 
negotiate a mutually acceptable solution are diminished. The administrative review 
process is based on the premise that negotiation with the individual applicant is not 
necessary. We will now tum to the phase beyond administrative review, and examine the 
procedure undertaken by an applicant after he or she receives a notice advising that the 
administrative decision has been confirmed by the review organ in favour of the 
defending organ. What options are open within the bounds of the administrative law 
system? Are these options the only or most effective ones? 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PRE-TRIAL NEGOTIATION AND COMPENSATION 
The interstitial period between administrative review and administrative litigation may at 
first appear to be a yawning chasm of filling in yet more forms and more waiting, but a 
closer look reveals that it is potentially a significant phase for the plaintiff. This is partly 
an unintended consequence of the new administrative law system, and partly a result of 
the pre-existing political-legal culture. Applicants for administrative review and plaintiffs 
in administrative litigation have different amounts of power at different stages in pursuit 
of redress for a complaint, so we need to examine not just the formal systems and their 
operation, but also the informal, in-between stages. 
When a person is dissatisfied with an administrative decision, he or she has several 
options: apply for administrative review if laws permit; or, choose to apply for review or 
litigation as he or she sees fit, or a variation is to apply for litigation after an 
unsatisfactory review; or, apply directly for litigation if laws permit. The time period 
between review and litigation, or prior to a litigation case being formally accepted by a 
court, is not a legally defined phase, but the discussion below will show that it can be a 
crucial time for the applicant, especially if a claim for compensation is made at the same 
time as application for administrative litigation. The material in this chapter focuses on 
the issues surrounding compensation that are associated with the interstitial or early 
litigation phases. The discussion below will show that when demands for compensation 
and litigation are linked the two processes tend to be melded into one. 
Applicants for administrative review may also request compensation at the same time as 
applying for administrative review, and indeed, any compensation claims must first be 
taken to the relevant administrative organ and only if the applicant is unhappy with the 
outcome may he or she then file the case at court. 1 I have no information available as to 
1 ALL, Article 67. 
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characteristics associated with such a course of action. But as the rate of administrative 
review applications is extremely low, and the rate of reversal of decisions is also low, it 
seems probable that administrative organs rarely pay compensation at that stage. It is 
more likely that an applicant who deems mistreatment serious enough for compensation 
to be demanded would also file an application for litigation, thus linking the two 
processes. 
Philip Huang has explored the theme of informal phases in legal process as it applies to 
civil justice in the Qing Dynasty, and claims that a Qing lawsuit had three stages. The 
first stage began when a complaint was filed and extended until the magistrate made an 
initial response. The second stage was the interstitial phase before the formal court 
session which was often characterised by interaction and mediation between the court and 
the litigants. The third stage was the formal court hearing. Huang concludes that there 
were features of the interstitial phase that contributed to abuse of formal law, but that it 
was advantageous to plaintiffs by equally considering both peacemaking and law.2 
It should be noted that Huang's study is of civil suits, which are fundamentally different in 
nature from administrative suits. Negotiation and mediation between two civil litigants 
may be appropriate, but if this approach is extended to disputes between citizens and the 
government, the citizen is often disadvantaged because of the superior power of the 
government. It is for this reason that mediation is prohibited as a method of dispute 
resolution for administrative disputes.3 But as is often the case in China, practice varies 
from policy so we cannot ignore the possibility that the interstitial phase plays a 
significant part in understanding the whole. 
The interstitial phase is significant predominantly if a claim for compensation is involved, 
because the Administrative Litigation Law allows the use of mediation to settle 
compensation claims. Where mediation is used (legally) to agree upon compensation it 
2 Philip Huang, Civil Justice in China - Representation and Practice in the Qing (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996), Chapter Five. 
3 ALL, Article 50. 
tends to be extended (illegally) to settle related claims for reversal of a specific 
administrative decision. The mediatory process may occur at any time during 
administrative review, or prior to, or during, administrative litigation. 
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The authorised use of mediation to settle compensation claims is the weakest point of the 
administrative compensation system because it places applicants in a vulnerable position 
in relation to the state. Mediation is not permissible in administrative review or 
administrative litigation because the issues are understood as being questions of right or 
wrong: that is, "did this administrative organ act lawfully when it made this particular 
administrative decision?" Permission to mediate in relation to any damages stemming 
from a specific administrative decision undermines the administrative review or litigation 
process. The reasons given by scholars in China as to why mediation is permitted in 
compensation claims do not engender confidence. Some see the system as based on a 
principle that separates the exercise of administrative power from state responsibility to 
pay for the consequences of an unlawful exercise of that power: 
Mediation is permitted in administrative compensation litigation because the essence of 
administrative compensation litigation is to resolve the question of 
administrative compensation; it is not related to the exercise of administrative power.4 
And further: 
Administrative compensation litigation is not a question of the lawfulness of the specific 
administrative act, but stems from the question of whether the lawful rights of the parties 
were harmed and whether the administrative organ should assume responsibility for damages.5 
To claim that administrative compensation is not related to the exercise of administrative 
power is a weak attempt to excuse the state for not designing an administrative law 
system that financially supports the declared aim of lawful administration. Linking 
compensation to the question of harm caused to the applicant rather than the legality of 
the administrative act weakens the responsibility of administrative organs to carry out 
their duties lawfully, regardless of the consequences. This may raise questions as to the 
4 Fang Shaokun, Ding Yuechao and Miao Shengrning, 00 ~ Ji!a ~~~JI ~ ~-%­
and Facts of State Compensation Law) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1998), p.166. 
(Principles 
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intentions of the new administrative law system. Without legislative and financial support 
to deliberately compensate victims of maladministration, the process of administrative 
review and litigation may be hollow. 
This chapter will continue the storyline of what it is like for a plaintiff during this period. 
What events are supposed to happen? What events may, in fact, happen? How does this 
affect the plaintiff? What are the relative positions of power of both the state and the 
plaintiff? What factors impinge upon this power? And whose interests are served? 
What should happen? 
When a plaintiff wishes both to complain about a specific administrative penalty decision 
and to claim compensation, what is the administrative organ and the court supposed to 
do? 
Early in the life of the Administrative Litigation Law, administrative compensation 
claims were often handled (incorrectly) as civil suits by the court.6 The situation was 
often complicated by the fact that certain types of administrative litigation suits tended to 
engender civil compensation suits. Public order and environmental disputes, for example, 
often involve at least three parties: the administrative organ, the plaintiff who is 
penalised, and one or more third parties who have been adversely affected by the 
plaintiff's behaviour. The administrative organ, as part of its administrative penalty, may 
order the offender to pay compensation to another party who was harmed as a result of 
the offender's actions. If the offender wishes to complain about this decision, the case 
should most properly be handled as a civil suit. Or the third party(ies) themselves may 
wish to lodge a compensation suit against the person who was penalised, for example, as 
a result of behaviour that polluted the environment and that subsequently affected the 
5 Ibid, p.167. 
6 Yang Haikun, t:f 00 ff :iE)t ~ ~ .::¢: ~ l.Q- (Elementary Theory of Chinese Administrative Law) 
(Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1992), p.622. 
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third party(ies)' ability to do business.7 This latter situation also involves a civil dispute 
that should be handled differently to an administrative dispute, but often they were 
lumped together. 
Where a plaintiff requests compensation from an administrative organ for damages 
caused by the administrative decision, this is the proper context for an administrative 
compensation suit. The correct handling of such disputes when the plaintiff wishes to 
pursue both cases in court is to establish two administrative suits. There are at least three 
scenarios that may lead to this. The first occurs when investigation of the legality of a 
specific administrative decision directly relates to the compensation claim, causing the 
plaintiff to request that the court both overturn a specific administrative decision and 
award compensation. The second scenario occurs when an administrative organ, on its 
own volition, cancels its specific administrative decision but no recompense is offered to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff may have requested compensation from the administrative 
organ, which was refused, so he or she requests the court to award compensation. The 
third scenario occurs when the plaintiff actually receives a penalty for the action that had 
caused harm to a third party. This may arise, for example, if a public order management 
offender is given an administrative penalty for beating up a third party, and the third party 
challenges the penalty on the grounds that it is too lenient. The third party then brings an 
administrative compensation suit. This latter scenario is similar to the first scenario 
outlined above in that the court should, at the time of considering the legality of the 
specific administrative act, also consider the question of compensation.8 
The practicalities of handling two suits which have the same plaintiffs and defendants 
almost inevitably means that there is a tendency to consider all of the issues associated 
with the cases together, and indeed some Chinese legal scholars raise this as a sensible 
7 On these concepts see: Hu Baolin and Zhan Zhongle (eds), ff ±l IT iE)t ~ (Environmental 
Administrative Law) (Beijing: China Personnel Press, 1993), pp.222-226; Jiang Ming'an, 
IT iE)t W 10 ~ :¥ (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 
1993), pp.229-232. 
8 Yang Haikun, 9:t 00 IT iE)t ~ ~ -* J!. 1:2:" (Elementary Theory of Chinese Administrative Law) 
(Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1992), p.623. 
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course of action.9 But it is made clear that the primary factor to consider is the legality of 
the specific administrative decision, and from this should flow any compensation award. 
What is the likely sequence of events if a plaintiff files both an administrative litigation 
appeal and an administrative compensation claim as a joint suit? If a diversion away from 
proper procedures occurs, at what point does this occur, and what are the consequences? 
Which party initiates the diversion and exactly how does it happen? A specific 
administrative compensation case will help clarify a possible sequence of events. 
How mediation in the interstitial phase works 
The location of the events in this case will be familiar to any reader who has stayed at the 
Beijing University campus. 10 We do not know if this is a genuine case record, and it is 
possible the events may have been re-written to demonstrate the state's fair handling of 
the matter. The importance of the record, however, is that it shows how mediatory 
activity undertaken during the pre-trial phase may, in some cases, significantly alter the 
outcome for the plaintiff. 
The case records that a certain Yan Zhengxue, originally from Jiaojiang City in Zhejiang 
Province, deputy chairman of a fine arts cooperative and a representative in the Jiaoyang 
City congress, at 10 o'clock in the evening on 2 July 1993 was travelling on the 332 bus 
via the southern and western walls of the Beijing University campus as it travelled 
towards the Summer Palace. Yan was not paying enough attention to his upcoming stop, 
and consequently found the bus doors had already closed before he got himself organised 
to get off. He then started demanding loudly that the doors be opened so he could get off. 
An altercation with the ticket seller ensued which resulted in the ticket seller's kit being 
strewn across the floor and she herself being thrown to the floor of the bus. 
Upon the bus' arrival at the Summer Palace, the ticket seller went to report the case, 
whereupon two police from the Donggongmen Station boarded the bus, handcuffed Yan 
9 Ibid. 
10 Haidian District Court (eds),'$' -1:~ ~ -(9~ ~ ~Jf (Analysis of Selected Trial Cases) (Beijing: China 
University of Politics and Law, 1997), pp.323-328. 
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and forced him to go with them to the police station. At the police station the two police 
officials beat him up using their hands, feet and truncheons. After about 40 minutes, Yan 
admitted that he had a bad attitude and that he had not behaved himself after boarding the 
bus. At this admission, the public security officials did not impose a formal 
administrative penalty on Yan, but conducted mediation to settle the complaint. They 
allowed Yan to pay 25 yuan in compensation to the ticket seller and he was allowed to 
leave at l.OOam. 
Yan went to hospital to get patched up. He subsequently filed an administrative 
compensation claim at the court on 12 July demanding compensation for his medical 
expenses, loss of income, and psychological stress, claiming a total of 46,956 yuan. After 
the court received Yan's appeal application, but before it had formally accepted the case, 
the political commissar and deputy head of Party affairs for the Haidian District Public 
Security Bureau contacted Yan and offered an apology and 2,000 yuan compensation. 
Yan refused and insisted on going forward with the suit. During the suit Yan reiterated 
his claim for 46,956 yuan, being 30,000 yuan for psychological stress, 6,300 yuan for loss 
of working time, 5,656 yuan for property losses, and 5,000 yuan for continuing medical 
expenses. He also demanded an apology. On 4 March 1994 the Haidian District 
Procuratorate began a public prosecution suit against the public security official who was 
most responsible for the beating Yan received. As a result of this suit, the official was 
given a criminal sentence of one year's detention and Yan was awarded 8,000 yuan 
compensation, which he accepted. Subsequently, however, Yan was sent off to 
Heilongjiang Province on a re-education through labour punishment for the 
administrative offence he had committed. 
What is the significance of this process? 
There are several significant points to observe in this case: the intermediate position 
created by the compensation claim, the timing of the mediatory offer, and the Party's role 
in initiating the mediation and compensation. In this case record, a mediatory offer of 
compensation was made prior to the court's acceptance of the case for consideration. Is 
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this the proper sequence of events, or should the court first accept the case and then 
permit mediation to begin? None of the three laws that regulate the new administrative 
law system - The Administrative Litigation Law, The State Compensation Law or the 
Administrative Review Regulations - state that mediation for compensation claims can 
be conducted prior to the formal acceptance of a case, and yet both the explanatory 
literature 11 and interviewees 12 claim that this is quite legal. Mediation for compensation 
claims can be conducted before a case is accepted, at the time when it is accepted, or 
during the actual hearing. 
There are several implications of mediating a compensation claim prior to a formal court 
hearing. First, as in the example above, the amount of compensation offered is likely to 
be lower than what would otherwise be obtained from a court ruling, and this functions as 
a form of "silence money" on the understanding that the plaintiff would then withdraw the 
suit. 
Second, officials who should be held accountable for illegal acts may go unpunished or 
lightly punished. In the case discussed above, the public security organ claimed it had 
offered 2,000 yuan compensation to Yan, suspended one police official from duties, and 
had imposed an administrative disciplinary sanction on the other. All these responses are 
considerably lighter than those imposed after the public prosecution suit. If a plaintiff is 
interested in securing the accountability of public officials as well as monetary 
compensation, then he or she must use the formal legal system to pursue the case as far as 
possible. The downside of this is that in cases like Yan 's, the plaintiff may end up with an 
administrative penalty that he or she did not previously face. 
Third, if Yan had initially been given an administrative penalty and wished to appeal 
against it, this is likely to be dealt with at the same time as an intermediatory offer for 
compensation. Legally, the courts should establish two separate cases, one to deal with 
11 Huang Shuhai (ed.), fT :iE)( ;trl. ~ fT :iE)( W i:'C JN if~ Jllf (A Handbook for Administrative 
Organs when Responding to Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: China's Outstanding Press, 1990), p.356. 
12 Interviews with judges and senior officials of the Supreme People's Court of the PRC, Beijing, 1998. 
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the administrative penalty appeal, for which mediation is prohibited, and one to deal with 
the compensation claim, for which mediation is permitted. But because both cases would 
have the same plaintiff and defendant they are commonly handled as one case, and 
mediation is used to settle both matters. This considerably reduces the chances of the 
plaintiff receiving a fair response because the administrative organ, by far the more 
powerful of the two parties, is in a position to pressure and cajole the plaintiff. 
Fourth, intervention by the Party or some other institution (such as an administrative 
organ) is more likely during the intermediate phase. In the case above, it is highly likely 
that the Party was involved with the public security organ in determining the initial 
(lighter) punishment to be imposed on the police officials. This demonstrates the 
continued protection of state officials from the full legal consequences of their actions, a 
disappointing observation when examining official accountability. 
The nature of specific, official accountability is dealt with in the Administrative 
Litigation Law, which makes it clear that where a compensation claim is awarded, the 
administrative organ must first pay the claim. After this, the organ should(@ 3° ) order 
the offending official to pay a part, or all, of the claim to the organ, but there is no 
imperative that it do so. Whether or this occurs depends on two main factors: intentions 
and significant mistakes. If the official clearly knew that the decision would encroach 
upon a person's lawful rights then he or she should be asked to pay some of the 
compensation claim. If, on the other hand, the action was a "significant mistake", more 
flexibility is permitted as to whether the official should make a personal financial 
contribution to the claim. "Significant mistakes" are indicated when there are laws that 
the official should have paid attention to, had the ability to do so, but did not, thereby 
causing harm to a citizen. 13 
13 Yang Haikun, i:p 00 fr iE)I: ~ ¥ -* ff i:2: 
(Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1992), p.625. 
(Elementary Theory of Chinese Administrative Law) 
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Administrative organs may make their own rules in the handling of such matters. The 
State Administration for Industry and Commerce, for example, has issued implementing 
measures that cover the handling of administrative compensation claims in its organs. On 
the subject of officials being requested to pay part or all of a compensation claim, the 
measures state that such decisions lie with the director of the organ concerned. They also 
state that if an official is requested to contribute to the compensation claim, then not more 
than 10% of the official's salary may be deducted each month, depending on the 
responsibility involved. 14 If a director does take a decision to pursue the official for a 
contribution, the matter is then passed to the supervision department of the offending 
official's work unit, or to the judicial organs if it constitutes a crime. 
None of my interviewees had ever heard of any administrative organ ordering an 
employee to pay up for a compensation claim, indicating that this is not carried out in 
practice, or is certainly not routine. Some said that it is more likely that the organ would 
give a warning or an administrative disciplinary sanction (chufen) to the official, given 
that official salaries are low and there is concern for the official's welfare. 15 This concurs 
with the case above, where the public security organ initially imposed internal 
disciplinary sanctions on the officials. 
The courts have no formal legal control over the way an offending official is dealt with, 
as this is strictly an internal (neibu) matter of the administrative organ. However, once a 
decision is taken to publicly prosecute the official, as above, the courts might play a role 
in securing a more appropriate punishment. The effect of this type of system is that 
administrative organs may find themselves litigated against because of unlawful 
behaviour and there may, if all goes well for the plaintiff, be some redress for the effects 
of that unlawful decision, but the unlawful behaviour itself is beyond the reach of the 
14 Articles 28 and 29, Industry & Commerce Administrative Organs' Implementing Measures for 
Administrative Compensation, 1 August 1995. Issued as Order No.34 by the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce. See Fang Shaokun, Ding Yuechao and Miao Shengming, 
00 $: ~ 1* ~ ~ J!. ~ ~ -%- (Principles and Facts of State Compensation Law) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1998), p.347. 
15 Interview with a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Law Institute, Beijing, 1998. 
legal system unless the organ decides to hand the case to the procuracy. Unlawful 
administrative behaviour most often remains subject only to internal departmental 
handling by supervision departments. 
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What is the effect of this type of internal handling on the numbers and patterns of 
administrative compensation claims? There is very little information available about 
administrative compensation in comparison to administrative review and administrative 
litigation. This is partly because the State Compensation Law, which regulates 
administrative compensation, was only passed in 1994, so the effects of it have not yet 
been systematically studied. There is, however, some information available about how 
administrative compensation has worked in certain areas of China, and this will be relied 
upon heavily in the next section. The reader should be cautioned against assuming that 
the characteristics of administrative compensation claims presented below for Tianjin, 
Hebei, and Hubei are indicative of what occurs across China generally. The features vary 
a great deal even within the three areas studied below, and it will become clear why 
generalities cannot be presumed. 
Administrative compensation 
The number of claims for administrative compensation in China has varied according to 
the law that regulated such claims. During the early 1980s, the State Constitution and the 
Law of Civil Procedure permitted administrative compensation claims. Doubtless the 
relative newness of the idea that the state should bear responsibility for its actions, 
combined with regulation by laws which did not specifically cater for administrative 
cases, contributed to the very low number of administrative claims. In Tianjin, for 
example, only four applications for administrative compensation were made to courts at 
all levels during the 1980s. Similarly in Hebei Province, there were only six applications 
for administrative compensation made to four middle-level courts in the province. After 
the passage of the Administrative Litigation Law (1989) and the State Compensation Law 
(1994), however, the same courts in Tianjin received 61 applications for administrative 
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compensation and those in Hebei Province received 93. 16 In Hubei Province, among 
administrative litigation cases that were handled to completion in 1996, 529 cases related 
to administrative compensation. 17 
The effects of the passage of the State Compensation Law in comparison to the 
Administrative Litigation Law have not been as dramatic. That is, the passage of the 
Administrative Litigation Law in 1989 had a greater effect in increasing the number of 
administrative compensation claims than did the subsequent passage of the State 
Compensation Law. In Tianjin, up until 1997 the courts received 29 applications for 
administrative compensation under the Administrative Litigation Law (a dramatic 
increase from four cases during the 1980s), while 32 were received under the State 
Compensation Law. If the SCL had not been introduced, the 32 cases would most likely 
have been appealed under the ALL. Furthermore, the number of compensation cases 
appealed under the ALL probably declined after the passage of the SCL (the breakdown 
of available figures does not allow precise analysis) as applicants began to use the new 
law, but there was not as dramatic a shift to the SCL as there was to the ALL in the early 
1990s. Similar proportions applied to Hebei, with 42 applications and then 51 
applications. 18 
16 Gao Ruomin and Lu Jianguo (Tianjin City High Court judge and Hebei Province High Court judge), 
"Where there is power there should be redress - Where government organs encroach upon people's rights 
they should also assume responsibility" (an investigative report into the factual situation of the 
administrative compensation system in Tianjin and Hebei) in Jiang Ming'an (ed), "Investigative Report", 
1998, p.286. 
17 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.308. 
18 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.287. 
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The situation in Tianjin and Hebei 
Are claims independent or part of a litigation appeal? 
Are administrative compensation claims related predominantly to an administrative 
litigation appeal against a specific administrative organ, or do they arise as independent 
disputes? There is some evidence to suggest that the majority of administrative 
compensation claims relate to specific administrative decisions, and that there is a 
correlation between the high number of administrative review and administrative 
litigation appeals made against public security organs and the pattern of compensation 
claims. 
Table 7: Numbers of administrative compensation claims made against organs in 
Tianjin and Hebei from 1989 to 1997 
Administrative organ Tianjin - 3 levels of courts Hebei - 4 middle 
level courts 
Industry & Commerce 4 3 
Tax 1 
Public Security 24 24 
Planned Childbirth 1 2 
Land Management 7 5 
Government 7 48 
Culture 1 
Public Management 2 
Health 3 
Other 14 8 
Total 61 93 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.288. 
Table 7 demonstrates clearly that in Tianjin the public security organs, as well as 
attracting the lion's share of administrative review and litigation complaints, also attract 
the largest number of compensation claims. A similarly large portion applies to Hebei but 
was eclipsed there by claims made against local governments. This has significant 
repercussions for the argument presented in this chapter about the interstitial phase of this 
system of redress. If most compensation claims are related to an administrative litigation 
appeal against a specific administrative decision then this heightens the probability of 
mediation being applied to both claims, which adversely affects the plaintiff's rights. 
174 
The other interesting observation to be noted from Table 7 is a stark difference between 
urban and rural areas when it comes to requesting administrative compensation from the 
local government itself. Three levels of courts in Tianjin received only seven claims 
compared to 48 among four rural-based courts in Hebei Province, but we do not have 
sufficient information about the populations covered by the courts to make any firm 
interpretations from this data. 
Table 8 below provides further evidence for the argument that compensation claims are, 
by and large, related to an appeal against a specific administrative decision. 
Table 8: Administrative compensation claims and administrative litigation appeals 
in Tianjin and Hebei from 1989 to 1997 
No. of cases received as No. of cases received Total 
part of a joint suit. as independent claims. 
Tianjin 54 (88.5%) 7(11.4%) 61 
Hebei 70 (75%) 23 (24.7%) 93 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, pp.290-291. 
The great majority of compensation claims relate to a specific administrative decision that 
the plaintiff also wishes to appeal against. The reasons for this are threefold. First, 
administrative organs refuse to recognise and take responsibility for their own unlawful 
behaviour. Second, in the few cases where administrative organs admit they have 
performed an unlawful act and cancel the decision, they often give compensation to the 
victim and thus the victim usually does not then file a suit at court. The implication of 
this is that all cases which are filed as joint suits (both as a litigation appeal and 
compensation claim) had been previously rejected by the administrative review organ for 
both the specific administrative decision appeal and the compensation claim. Third, 
compensation claims must first be taken to the administrative organ, and the organs hope 
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in vain that even though they disallow the compensation claim, the applicant will not take 
the suit to court. 19 
What proportion of applications for compensation does the court accept? 
Table 9 below indicates a varied pattern of acceptance, with courts in Hebei more likely 
to accept applications than courts in Tianjin, but overall the plaintiff's chances of getting a 
court to examine a case is about 50%. 
Table 9: Numbers and percentage of administrative compensation claims accepted 
and rejected by courts in Tianjin and Hebei from 1989 to 1997 
Cases accepted Cases rejected Total 
Tianjin 25 (41%) 34 (55.7%) 61* 
Hebei 52 (55.9%) 41 (44%) 93 
*Two applications were not completed. 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.289. 
What sort of compensation demands are made? 
In line with what we already know about administrative compensation, we can expect that 
most claims will be related to violations of law by public security organs and will 
therefore involve claims for personal and property damages. But the evidence available 
suggests even more than this. 
Table 10: The nature of compensation demands in Tianjin and Hebei from 1989 to 
1997 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Return of property 
13 
26 
Property damage 
2 
3 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, pp.291-292. 
19 Jiang Ming'an ~ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.291. 
Personal harm 
10 
23 
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The pattern of specific demands for compensation relates, as expected, to personal harm 
and property damage caused by organs such as the public security, and industry and 
commerce bureaus. The claims for return of property relate to public security organs' 
decisions to confiscate property as part of an investigation into an offence, such as the 
example used in Chapter Four of the offender who manufactured flick knives. Plaintiffs 
are not only complaining against the specific administrative decision which imposed a 
penalty, but also are claiming their property back. There are also a significant proportion 
of claims against personal harm, further evidence that abuses of power are common in 
Chinese public security organs. 
Table 11: Results of compensation claims made to courts in Tianjin and Hebei 
"yes": compensation claim was deemed payable by either: the court or the defending organ. 
"no": compensation claim deemed disallowed by the court and possibly the defending organ. 
Court decision Plaintiff cancels suit Unable to be 
completed 
"yes" "no" "yes" "no" 
Tianjin 7 30 18 4 2 
Hebei 51 23 1 18 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, pp.293-294. 
The results in Table 11 can be discussed in three groups: cases where the plaintiff and the 
defending organ came to a mutual agreement before the formal court hearing took place; 
cases where this was attempted but failed; and cases where either the plaintiff or the 
defending organ did not appear at all interested in negotiating an agreement, thereby 
necessitating a formal court hearing. 
In Tianjin, there appears to be a positive correlation between a pre-court negotiated 
agreement and the likelihood of plaintiffs subsequently withdrawing a suit. In 18 cases 
plaintiffs withdrew their suits after compensation was deemed payable, and in 4 cases 
plaintiffs withdrew their suits without receiving any compensation. But there is also 
clearly another group of cases for which negotiation may have been tried and failed, or 
where either or both parties were unwilling to even try to negotiate a pre-court settlement. 
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In a majority of these cases (30) the court disallowed the compensation claim. The 
implications of this are twofold. First, in Tianjin most cases were withdrawn from the 
process by applicants presumably because they had already achieved a satisfactory 
outcome. Second, where defending organs refuse to make an offer of compensation in the 
pre-court stage, most plaintiffs will still take their case to court but the court will disallow 
the claim, thereby supporting the government's position. 
In Hebei, however, the situation is different. In only one case did a plaintiff withdraw a 
suit after receiving compensation. Most suits withdrawn by the plaintiff were done so 
even though he or she had failed to obtain compensation. But if plaintiffs persisted in 
taking their cases to court they had a much better chance of achieving their claims than 
did plaintiffs in Tianjin. 
The implications of this finding are twofold. First, it is not clear-cut that plaintiffs 
withdraw their suits from the process only because they have achieved a favourable 
concession from the defending organ.20 The situation varies from place to place, and 
without full statistical data it is difficult to make a conclusive assessment. Second, 
administrative organs in Hebei Province are more likely to change a previously 
unfavourable administrative review or compensation claim decision in the face of an 
administrative litigation case in court. This tells us both that the courts in Hebei are more 
confident in facing administrative organs than those in Tianjin, and that administrative 
organs see themselves as slightly more subject to the law there than in Tianjin. 
Do administrative organs pay up? 
The execution of court judgements in China has been plagued by several factors: the low 
position of the courts, the superior power of administrative organs compared to judicial 
organs, and the structure of the government that links courts to their local governments, 
20 This counters the assertion of some Chinese legal scholars that administrative suits that are withdrawn 
during the process indicate the failure of the ALL to provide legal redress. It also counters Minxin Pei's 
assertion that plaintiffs withdraw suits on the basis of rational reasoning and not fear or distrust. See Minxin 
Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, pp.843-844 for both views. 
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thereby creating local strongholds. In the past it was extremely difficult to get a court 
ruling from one district executed against an administrative organ from another district. 
The new system of administrative law has also foundered on these structural problems 
and has failed to deliver due compensation payments by organs outside the ruling court's 
area. But again, the patterns are different for each area. 
Table 12: The execution of administrative compensation rulings in Tianjin and 
Hebei 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
No. of cases where court 
ruled compensation is 
payable 
7 
52 
Source: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.294. 
Executed Not Executed 
6 1 
37 15 
It can be seen from Table 12 that 14% of court rulings in Tianjin were unable to be 
executed compared to nearly 30% in Hebei. In cases where execution was not achieved it 
is claimed that the reason is local protectionism. Although the variation between the two 
cities is considerable, it is clear that the judicial system does reliably deliver due 
compensation. If the compensation ruling involves return of property or a small amount 
of money then the chances of execution are very good. Conversely, if the amount of 
compensation involved is large, or the ruling requires a considerable amount of money to 
be returned, it is often the case that the defending organ has diverted the money for 
another use. 21 In such circumstances the likelihood of the plaintiff being awarded what is 
due is very small. This demonstrates that the new administrative law system has not been 
able to overcome some significant operating problems in the Chinese bureaucracy. 
Some Chinese scholars claim that even though there are problems in the administrative 
compensation system, it still does protect the rights of some people from state 
21 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report'', 1998, p.295. This was also confirmed in interview with a 
Chinese lawyer, Beijing, 1998. 
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encroachment.22 But for this to be possible the plaintiff must be prepared to take the case 
to court (after first going through the required procedures within the administrative 
organ). Within administrative organs there is very little appearance of self-regulation and 
effective supervision. 
Furthermore, merely protecting the rights of a few people from state encroachment, while 
important to the individuals involved, is the lowest possible standard to be expected of a 
system which claims to protect the rights of citizens from powerful state 
maladministration. These few successes should be the bare minimum standard by which 
the success of the system is measured. The fact that so few successful compensation 
claims are made demonstrates that the system has failed to deliver an effective avenue of 
redress against state encroachment. 
The situation in Hubei 
It is worth noting that the majority of the published information about the new 
administrative law system has been collected by judicial officials and not administrative 
officials, especially information about administrative compensation. An investigation 
about administrative compensation in Hubei Province, conducted by judicial officials, 
reputedly failed to obtain much information from administrative organs as to the numbers 
and characteristics of administrative compensation claims made to them. This may reveal 
anything from complete lack of interest on the part of administrative organs in 
systematically monitoring statistics related to lawful administration, to a reluctance to 
reveal statistics that may paint an unflattering picture of administrative organs. Whatever 
the reasons, information is patchy.23 
In 1996, Hubei courts at all levels received 6,657 administrative litigation appeals. Of 
these, 529 had a related administrative compensation claim. The great majority of these 
administrative compensation claims (408) were filed at the same time as an 
administrative litigation appeal against a specific administrative decision, while only 121 
22 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.301. 
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compensation claims were filed as independent suits. This echoes the situation in Tianjin 
and Hebei. Claims against encroachment on personal rights numbered 314, and claims 
against encroachment on property rights came to 215. In a little over half of the cases, 
(297 cases, or 56%) courts decided that compensation was payable, and in most cases 
where compensation was deemed payable mediation was used to agree on the amount 
(232 cases, or 78%). 
As in Tianjin and Hebei, the majority of administrative compensation claims are 
associated with an administrative litigation appeal, and most of these are resolved by 
mediation. And like Tianjin but unlike Hebei, plaintiffs are likely to withdraw a suit 
during the procedure if the defending organ initiates an offer to pay compensation. The 
overall picture is not greatly dissimilar from that in Tianjin or Hebei. There are some 
successes, but then we should expect this. 
What conditions constitute harm? 
The State Compensation Law lacks any details as to the conditions under which 
administrative compensation is payable. There are general guidelines provided, such as if 
citizens are illegally detained or torture is used, but just how these violations are 
measured is left undefined. Compensation is only payable if an administrative organ 
encroached upon the rights of a person so as to constitute harm to them or to their 
property. But why is it that the majority of compensation claims are filed as joint suits 
with an administrative litigation appeal? Is it the administrative decision itself which is in 
question, or is it the way in which the decision was made, or is it illegal behaviour by the 
organ, carried out while the person was dealing with the organ? In the case of Mr Yan and 
the bus, it was illegal behaviour by the organ's officials that occurred while the plaintiff 
was dealing with the organ that was in question. Most claims relate to a specific 
administrative decision and involve personal harm or property damage, so how do these 
types of violations relate to specific administrative decisions? 
23 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.307. 
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When an administrative detention penalty is imposed, there are four types of 
circumstances which commonly give rise to personal harm or damage to property. First, 
the organ enforcing the detention penalty does not have legal authority to do so. Only 
public security organs at county level or above have authority to enforce administrative 
detention, so where a lower level organ does so it is in violation of the law. Second, 
where a person is detained in absence of any facts or evidence of wrongdoing. Third, 
where detention is imposed on the wrong party. Fourth, where the legal time period for 
the detention has been exceeded.24 From this list it is clear that for compensation to be 
payable there does not necessarily have to have been physical harm caused to the person. 
If a person is detained mistakenly or because of poor procedural protection, but no 
physical harm has been caused while in custody, then compensation should be payable. A 
similar reasoning applies to property violations: if a person's property has been 
mistakenly or carelessly confiscated, but is subsequently returned unharmed, then 
compensation should still be payable. 
In the cases discussed above from Tianjin, Hebei and Hubei, it is clear that the 
compensation claims relate to incidents of physical harm caused to a person, or property 
damage caused by failure of the organ to return property and make restoration. These 
compensation claims did not arise out of circumstances of mistaken or poorly 
implemented detention that, when discovered, were immediately put right. A plaintiff 
would be unlikely to go to the trouble of filing a compensation claim in such 
circumstances. Chapter Four showed how difficult it is for an applicant of administrative 
review to get an application as far as being considered by the review organ, and this 
chapter discussed the similarly poor response by administrative organs to compensation 
claims. Plaintiffs will most likely only file a compensation claim if the circumstances are 
extreme, as in the case of Mr Yan and the bus. 
The claims filed in Tianjin, Hebei and Hubei involve incidents where the plaintiff was 
physically harmed or property was confiscated and not returned. There is no lawful reason 
24 Fang Shaokun, Ding Yuechao and Miao Shengming, 00%9!l'f1~@)J:!l..!:§~!fm (Principles 
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why a person should be physically harmed as a result of the imposition of an 
administrative penalty, so in all such compensation claims we can assume the person has 
been harmed as a result of unlawful behaviour carried out during the handling of the 
dispute. In short, for these cases, it is not the administrative decision itself which is 
primarily in question, nor the decision-making process, but rather the illegal behaviour of 
the administrative officials handling the dispute. Claims relating to return of property are 
more complicated in that property may, in some circumstances, be lawfully confiscated as 
a result of a specific administrative decision, and we have no way of determining which 
of the claims above involve lawful, specific administrative decisim1s and which do not. 
The implications of this are problematic for the new system of administrative law. The 
Administrative Litigation Law clearly links administrative compensation to the carrying 
out of specific administrative decisions by organs or their personnel.25 But if a significant 
proportion of compensation claims arise not because of a specific administrative decision 
but because of unlawful behaviour by administrative officials during the handling of a 
case, then the law's intentions are undermined. The permitted use of mediation to settle 
compensation claims only exacerbates this situation because a plaintiff is placed in the 
position of having to mediate over return of property that is rightfully the plaintiff's, or 
worse still, mediate over personal injury caused by administrative officials. If the 
administrative decision was unlawful then there should be no question of the plaintiff 
getting his or her property back, and no question of the state not paying relevant medical 
expenses and so on. In short, in some case the compensation system works to further 
opportunities for the state to steal from and injure citizens. 
The compensation application form 
The details required on the compensation application form <M ~ $ lW .=PJ peichang 
shenqing shu) are very similar to those required on the administrative review application 
and Facts of State Compensation Law) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1998), p.104. 
25 ALL, Article 67. 
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form and associated forms. 26 The applicant is asked to provide his or her name, gender, 
year of birth, work unit, occupation, and address. This is followed by a section soliciting 
information on how much money and/or whether return of property is requested. Several 
requests can be dealt with on the one form. The next section covers the facts and the 
grounds for the compensation application. This must include when and where the events 
took place that gave rise to the application, and the outcome of the events. Evidence and 
materials should be included, especially records from hospitals or doctors that refer to the 
applicant's injuries, or repair bills if damaged property is involved. The final section of 
the form contains space for the applicant to record the organ to which the compensation 
application is directed, and the date of the application. The applicant is also asked to 
provide duplicates of important documents such as the administrative review organ's 
decision to cancel an administrative decision, or a court's ruling on an administrative 
litigation application. 
Similar to administrative review applications, if the application form is deficient in some 
way the compensating organ is supposed to advise the applicant that extra information is 
required. It is not permitted to use these deficiencies as an excuse to refuse acceptance of 
the claim. 
The applicant needs to be familiar with this type of document and the provisions of the 
law in order to state his or her case clearly. Since lawyers are not generally known to be 
involved at this stage, the applicant is left very much to his or her own devices and 
knowledge. Further to this, since the compensation claim is to be dealt with by the 
compensating organ only after an administrative review or litigation decision has been 
made, a duplicate copy of the relevant decision gets attached to the compensation 
application. This means that the compensation claims are viewed as connected to, and 
perhaps pre-determined by, any administrative review or litigation decisions. This places 
compensation claims as secondary in importance to review or litigation decisions. 
26 Fang Shaokun, Ding Yuechao and Miao Shengming, 00 * ..IDa ~ ~ ~ l.f ~ ~ * (Principles 
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All applications should be accepted for consideration if the format is correct, if the 
applicant meets the legal conditions, if the demands are within the scope of the law, and if 
the application has been made within the allowed time period. A decision on whether 
compensation will be deemed payable should be made within two months of the 
compensation organ receiving the application.27 
Exclusions from the scope of administrative compensation 
The State Compensation Law does not state any specific exclusions for the scope of 
administrative compensation that are similar to those in the Administrative Litigation 
Law and the Administrative Review Regulations. The State Compensation Law only 
specifically excludes the payment of administrative compensation in the following 
circumstances: 
o where personnel of administrative organs commit individual acts that have no 
relationship to their exercise of powers and functions; 
o where citizens, legal persons, and other organisations cause harm through their own 
acts; and 
o other circumstances prescribed by law.28 
However, explanatory literature on this matter reveals that there are, in fact, exclusions 
and mitigating circumstances for which the state disclaims compensation responsibility, 
some of which are similar to those in the ALL and ARR. The law itself is not the sole 
source of authority in practice.29 This has commonly been the case in PRC law, but it is 
disappointing to discover continuance of this practice in matters that particularly pertain 
to rule of law, as does administrative law. The problem posed by diverse sources of 
authority in this matter is that the diversity may be unending and opaque unless it is 
clearly stated, which in this case it is not. Such a system might work adequately if users of 
the system are aware of all the factors. Where they are not, they are subject to 
and Facts of State Compensation Law) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1998), pp.161-162. 
27 Ibid, p.163. 
28 State Compensation Law, Article 5. 
29 On this concept generally see: Perry Keller "Sources of Order in Chinese Law" in American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 42, 1994, pp.711-759. 
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manipulation by administrative organs and elite or professional services, such as those 
provided by lawyers. For a system that is supposed to protect the rights of citizens and be 
easy and simple to use, forcing applicants for administrative review, compensation, or 
litigation to require the services of a legal professional is at best an unintended 
consequence, and at worst a deliberate strategy to dissuade applicants. 
There are three categories of circumstances for which the state will not assume 
responsibility for administrative compensation, or will assume only partial responsibility. 
The first category consists of circumstances which are fully excluded from the scope of 
administrative compensation. 
o Administrative legislation, as this is considered to be abstract administrative 
behaviour and as such does not directly harm individuals. 
o State action involving national defence, foreign affairs, the enforcement of martial 
law, national planning, and safety, including acts which are closely related to the 
public interest. 
o Internal Cr*J WS neibu) acts, which cover all the internal workings of administrative 
organs, although in some limited situations a person is permitted to apply for 
compensation for property damage caused as a result of an internal departmental 
administrative sanction that was found to be unlawful. 
o Discretionary behaviour of administrative organs such as their choice between 
imposing one administrative penalty or another when both are within the scope of the 
law. Discretionary behaviour can only be unsuitable; it cannot be unlawful. 
The second category consists of circumstances which would considerably hamper the 
state in its duties if it had to assume responsibility for administrative compensation. 
o Military affairs, because military action is not administrative action. For 
compensation for military action one must apply to the military' s internal 
mechanisms. 
The management and installation of publicly owned utilities such as the railway, 
postal service and other public enterprises. If harm is caused by such utilities it is 
dealt with under the civil law or a special law because the management of such 
utilities is not carried out by the state but by the relevant public enterprise. 
The third category consists of circumstances in which the state claims mitigated 
responsibility. 
o The urgent need to prevent danger; 
o Unexpected events or accidents; 
o Acts of God, or force majeure; 
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o Harm caused by a third party as a result of a state act, that is, when the state penalises 
A and it has adverse affects on B.30 
Some of these situations, such as pieces of legislation, national defence, and internal acts 
of organs are also excluded from the scope of the Administrative Litigation Law and the 
Administrative Review Regulations. The additional exclusions and mitigating 
circumstances for compensation applications are quite revealing. As shown above, 
administrative compensation is linked to harm caused to the applicant. It is not based on 
the principle of legality of the related administrative act. It is therefore surprising to find 
discretionary acts of organs excluded on the grounds that such acts can only ever be 
unsuitable rather than unlawful. An "unsuitable" discretionary act to impose an 
administrative penalty of closure of business may cause more harm to the business than 
imposition of a fine. This clause suggests that the state may be trying to dodge any 
possible situation of compensation, rather than being prepared to fairly compensate 
victims of maladministration. 
The exclusion of any military action, including the enforcement of martial law, very 
clearly excludes the possibility of a repeat of the June 1989 circumstances from being 
subject to any compensation claims. These provisions may well benefit citizens in a time 
30 These categories are taken from Hu Chonghan and Zhou Xiongwen (eds), 
qt 00 00 * ~ ~ ~ ::¥ (Jurisprudence of Chinese State Compensation) (Wuhan: Central Southern 
University of Technology Press, 1997), pp.58-61. 
of war or attack from outside the country, but they can also be used against citizens to 
shield the state from the consequences of violence against its own citizens. 
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The third category of ill-defined circumstances could include a wide variety of events that 
the state may find beneficial to itself to exclude. Acts of God, such as floods, would be 
beyond the scope of compensation claims, according to this category. If the state, by its 
mismanagement, ignorance, or constant refusal to deal with corruption that diverts funds 
from infrastructure projects that may assist in flood control, is thereby responsible for a 
bigger disaster than would otherwise have occurred, then it is excused from financial 
responsibility. 
An overall assessment of the pre-trial phase 
One of the central questions to look at in the pre-trial phase is how the use of mediation 
to determine compensation affects the process of justice in protecting plaintiffs from state 
maladministration. To return to Philip Huang's research on civil law during the Qing, to 
what extent does mediation overlap with formal justice? Does the use of mediation 
necessarily mean the plaintiff is worse off than without its use? 
There is clearly a dynamic relationship between formal and informal justice when it 
comes to administrative compensation claims. Greater use of one affects the other. But on 
the whole, mediated justice tends to dilute the full effects of legal responsibility. Where a 
claim is large and significant, the plaintiff is better situated if he or she uses the formal 
legal system. Indeed, plaintiffs are only likely to use the system in these circumstances. 
In similar situations, the Party/state prefers to use informal, mediated justice. 
What happens when the two types of justice intersect? This varies from place to place in 
the PRC, but the significant variables are: 
o the power of the defending administrative organ; 
o the power of the local courts; 
o the persistence of the plaintiff; and 
o the nature of the compensation claim: that is, whether it is a monetary or property 
restoration claim. 
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If the claim is large it tends to be mediated through the Party and involves the courts as 
well as the plaintiff.31 Such mediation is initiated by the Party/state, not the plaintiff, and 
this has several implications for the position of the plaintiff. First, the state has a good 
chance of achieving a cheaper compensation agreement at the expense of the plaintiff. 
Second, the state has a greater capacity to shield its officials from the full legal 
consequences of unlawful administration. Third, being in a negotiating position, 
especially as the instigator, gives the Party/state the upper hand, and the role of the Party 
as the interstitial negotiator therefore may be a source of abuse. If the case is formally 
accepted by the court, the court may then conduct its own mediation to settle 
compensation claims, but it does not appear to have the authority to do this in the 
interstitial phase. This ground belongs to the Party. 
Sources of abuse in this system also relate to legislative deficiencies. The operating 
environment in which administrative organs exist allows them to spend or divert funds 
obtained from fines before any dispute resolution is completed. This could easily be 
overcome by legislation placing a stop on the use of such funds until the time period 
allowed for dispute resolution is passed. 
The limiting of official accountability to the internal authority of administrative organs, 
and the ability of the administrative law system to deal only with the effects of unlawful 
administration, undermine the credibility and authority of the system. 
The State Compensation Law lacks criteria by which administrative compensation claims 
should be assessed, and the criteria which do exist in non-legal sources leave a lot of 
room for the state to avoid responsibility. This is especially so for harm caused by 
institutional deficiencies, such as corruption or poor political decision-making. 
31 Interviews, Beijing, 1998. 
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Mediation is not a suitable method of determining compensation because of the superior 
position of the state. However, the plaintiff may reject the offer and try for a court-
mediated settlement. The outcome of such settlements is not guaranteed to be to the 
plaintiff's advantage, although it does provide more than one option. Further to this, 
mediation can only properly be used to determine monetary compensation, not property 
claims. These latter claims should be linked to the actual damage involved and should not 
be subject to negotiation. 
There is some evidence, however, that administrative organs in the interstitial phase have 
had to yield some power to the influence of a rising legal culture, the courts, and the Party 
bureaucracy. This seems only to occur in extreme cases, though, and in normal 
circumstances the system often does not work effectively as an avenue of redress. The 
few successes are important, but they are mere indicators that a system is in place, not 
that it normally operates satisfactorily or that progress has been made in the rule of law. 
The state remains all too powerful and the decision-making on matters of redress against 
state maladministration remains disconcertingly subject to personalised rather than 
institutionalised systems. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION: CONCEPTS, ACTORS AND ATTITUDES 
If a plaintiff is not satisfied with the outcome of either an administrative review or an 
administrative litigation compensation claim, the next step in most cases is to apply to 
the courts to pursue administrative litigation. As outlined in Chapter Three, some 
administrative disputes may only be taken as far as administrative review within the 
organ concerned, while others may be taken directly to the courts for administrative 
litigation, and in still others the plaintiff may choose whether to first apply for 
administrative review before administrative litigation. Administrative disputes which 
arise frequently, such as public order disputes involving the public security organs, 
are often required to be taken to administrative review first as a step towards reducing 
the caseload on the courts. 
The Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) gives the courts authority to resolve 
administrative disputes 1• In broad terms, this law gives citizens, enterprises, and other 
legal entities the right to sue an administrative organ for certain specific 
administrative decisions that the recipient considers to be unfair or illegal.2 The ALL 
took effect in October 1990 as another of the legal reforms that characterised the 
period of the late 1980s. It has two main aims: first, to protect the legally recognised 
rights of citizens and other legal entities from state encroachment; and second, to 
safeguard and supervise administrative organs to ensure they carry out their duties in 
accordance with the law3. 
This chapter continues the storyline of the plaintiff's journey from receiving an 
administrative penalty notice to challenging the decision in court. The discussion 
covers three broad themes as per the chapter heading. The underlying premise of the 
discussion is that when application is made for administrative litigation, the legal, 
political and administrative cultures and practices impinge on the outcome as much as 
1 Prior to promulgation of the ALL, Chinese courts could settle administrative disputes under either the 
General Principles of Civil Law(~~ Ji .!iJIJ Minfa tongze) or the relevant substantive law such as 
the Trademark Law (li:f 1?-~ Shangbiaofa), but the ALL is regarded as giving the courts wider, 
more general authority to deal with these disputes. 
2 ALL, Articles 2 and 5. 
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does the validity of the complaint. Chapter Seven explores the actual process of an 
administrative litigation appeal, but here we explore the surrounding milieu which 
affects the implementation process. 
A key concept for understanding the judicial part of this process is that of 
"administration according to law." There are two main dimensions to this concept, 
both of which affect how courts adjudicate administrative litigation. The first 
dimension is that of the broad picture in which lawful administration is related to rule 
of law rather than rule by man, the manner in which administrative organs are 
organised, and the various responsibilities of different organs.4 The scope of this 
dimension includes administrative legislation and the implementation of 
administrative policies. The second and narrower dimension of this concept relates to 
the justice of the administrative process, and it is at this point that administrative 
litigation plays a major role by ensuring that administrative organs carry out the 
lawfully required procedures when making specific administrative decisions. 
This chapter will explore these and other theoretical concepts further before moving 
into empirical material relating to the different players in administrative litigation and 
an exploration of their roles. A key issue to be explored here is the extent to which the 
different actors can influence the outcome of an administrative litigation appeal. 
The context of administrative litigation - judicial supervision 
Administrative litigation as a system operates within the context of several different 
structures: it is a system of law alongside criminal and civil law; it is a system of 
remedy for administrative abuse together with the letters/visits system and the appeals 
system; and it is also part of the cluster of tasks that come under the rubric of judicial 
supervision. 
Judicial supervision of administrative behaviour has three main tasks. First, to ensure 
that laws, regulations, rules and so on are correctly implemented. This can range from 
3 ALL, Article 1. 
4 See: Dai Changzhao, "How to Implement Legal Administration" in 9=t 00 D i5t .-g fl (China's 
Administrative Management), 9, 1997, pp.19-20; Ying Son~ian and Xue Gan~ng, "Administrative 
Organisation Law and Administration According to Law" in D i5t ~ ~ :wf ·.71.: (Administrative 
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ensuring that administrative penalty forms are completed correctly by the 
administrative organs to ensuring that the correct law is used as the basis for an 
administrative decision. Second, to prevent, guard against and overcome 
bureaucratism and privilege seeking. This can range from handling administrative 
litigation cases where the plaintiff complains of constant and unnecessary delays and 
capriciousness on the part of officials, to actual requests for bribes in return for the 
issue of a business licence. Third, to investigate and affix lawful responsibility for 
illegal behaviour. This latter task relates to investigating claims by plaintiffs of 
alleged illegal behaviour on the part of officials and can range from outright illegality 
such as smuggling, through to diversions from the intentions of laws and regulations, 
such as would occur in abuse of power situations.5 
Although courts have the authority to supervise all these areas, not all three areas are 
considered equally deserving of the strongest judicial response. Trials, investigations, 
and judicial recommendations are the three main methods used by the courts, and the 
severity of the problem determines the judicial response. Incorrect completion of 
administrative penalty forms, for example, will likely only result in a judicial 
recommendation.6 Incorrect application of law, on the other hand, will likely result in 
the court overturning the administrative decision and ordering a new decision be 
made. 
This distinction between minor procedural deficiencies and what are perceived to be 
more important illegalities is written into the criteria used by the courts to adjudicate 
administrative litigation cases. The two most important criteria used by the courts to 
investigate administrative behaviour are: the application of law, and whether or not 
the facts of the case were used by the administrative organ in making the 
Law Research), 1, 1998,, V.p.12-20; Zhou Xinming et al, "The Concept and Scope of' Administration 
According to Law"' in ~~if Jr (Legal Studies), 1, 1992, pp.7-12. 
5 See: Fang Shirong (ed), i."t Jt. ff fr iE.51: fr 7-J (A Discussion on Concrete Administrative 
Behaviour) (Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 1996), _ _E:271; Zhu Weijiu (ed), 
~m~~~-~-tt~~~m~gmi*~T~~m~•m~ 
(Discussion of the Government Legal Supervision System-The Supervisory System Under the 
Socialist Market Economy) i_Beiji1LJt C_pna Vnh:'.ersity of Politics and Law, 1994 ), pp.351-352; Ge 
Hengmei (ed), ± Jtl!. ~ :f:! q:t If] IT~ W i0 (Administrative Litigation in Land 
Management) (Beijing: Legal System Press, 1993). 
6 Judicial recommendations are discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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administrative decision.7 Courts are prohibited from ruling on the rationality or 
fairness of a specific administrative decision as this is entirely the province of 
administrative organs, except where the administrative behaviour is completely 
improper. In such cases the courts may overturn the administrative behaviour.8 This 
bias towards "major illegalities" rather than "minor illegalities" reveals both a 
continuing primary concern with substantive legality, and the limits of judicial 
supervision over administrative organs. The procedures for correctly completing 
forms, for example, are regarded largely as internal administrative procedures over 
which the courts have no authority. 
Theoretical concepts 
To achieve the aims of protecting individual rights and supervising administrative 
organs, courts have been given the power to determine the legality of any specific 
administrative act that falls within the scope of the ALL. To do this the courts use the 
following criteria: the evidence upon which the administrative decision was made, 
whether or not the correct laws and regulations were used as authority for the decision, 
whether statutory procedures were violated or not, whether the act was beyond the 
authority of the organ, and whether the administrative official abused his or her 
powers of office9• 
Abuses of power and exceeding limits of authority 
Two of the criteria (acts beyond the authority of the organ and acts which abuse 
powers of office) cause misunderstanding because the terms used in the ALL are also 
used, in English translation, to describe administrative behaviour that does not 
necessarily fall within the scope of the ALL. Acts of corruption, bribery, 
embezzlement and malfeasance, which are common among administrative officials in 
the PRC, are often described as acts which overstep the authority of the organ or as 
acts which abuse the powers of office. These general descriptions of corrupt acts are 
not what is meant by these terms within the scope of the ALL. For example, some 
administrative litigation cases may involve an appeal against rejection of an 
7 These criteria are not the only ones, just the main ones. See the section on "Theoretical Concepts" 
below for a full list and explanation of the criteria used. 
8 Zhu Weijiu (ed), ff if9: ff "7-J Bg OJ~~~ (Judicial Supervision of Administrative 
Behaviour) (Taiyuan: Shanxi Education Press, 1997), pp.299-300. 
9 ALL, Article 54, Clause 2. 
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application for a business licence, on the grounds that the administrative official asked 
for a bribe before issuing the business licence. If such a case is heard by the courts it 
may result in a decision that the official abused his or her powers of office, but not all 
cases of bribery occur within the context of administrative relations between citizens 
or enterprises and the state. 
These two criteria, excess of authority cm. ~ AA 19. chaoyue zhiquan) and abuse 
"'I-'" R:t ltrt ~....., of authority (iJIIL m +ITT 1:x. lanyong zhiquan) 10 have similar connotations. Actions 
that exceed an organ's "authorised limits" are chaoyue zhiquan de, often translated in 
English as ultra vires. The authorised limits are either geographical, departmental, or 
statutory limits to any penalties or fines which may be imposed 11 • This criterion is 
concerned with whether or not an administrative organ has the authority, according to 
its place in the structure of the government, to carry out the administrative act in 
question. It is commonly cited by the courts, together with lack of evidence and 
incorrect application of law and rules, as grounds for overturning an administrative 
decision. 12 
The excess of authority (chaoyue zhiquan) clause, as well as being a specific criterion 
in the ALL, is also used as a concept to express the general intention of the ALL as a 
whole: that is, administrative organs must act within the law. This conflation of 
language and ideas exemplifies the concept of administration according to law 
discussed above. 
In administrative practice the excess of authority concept takes one of two forms: 
unauthorised use of administrative power, or unauthorised use of ordinary power. 13 
Unauthorised use of administrative power occurs when a particular law may not have 
been violated but the decision still encroaches upon someone's lawful rights. For 
example, if a violation of the Public Order Management Penalty Regulations involves 
two or more parties, the public security organ may treat it as a civil case, which 
10 ALL, Article 54, Clause 2, c and d. 
11 ;- -:i:fr ;- .;:J... M'-t :;:I .;-_+ 1 l.lt oloc Zhu Weijiu (ed), 11~J\11 /'J CJ'J 1"fJ iz; 1tn -~ , pp.374-375. 
12 Minx.in Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.856, lists 60 out of the sample 219 cases in this 
category. The three categories of "exceeding legal authority", "lack of evidence" and "incorrect 
application of law and rules" together account for 148 out of Pei's sample of 219 cases. 
13 ,,- -:i:tr .::i::: .::1\ )rn 'O -Tr ~ Ma Yuan (ed.), 11 ~J\ llt- 1-4 :7'lJ lh ..x. ff , pp.190-193. 
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permits the organ to make a final ruling~ Ji5j :ti<;~ zhongju caijue). When this 
type of dispute resolution is used it means the PSB has the right to make a final 
decision about the case and the parties are prevented from taking the case to court for 
litigation. 14 Zhongju caijue does not involve the imposition of an administrative 
penalty. It is, in essence, as if the PSB acts as a mediator and the parties must, by law, 
accept the PSB 's decision as final. If, on the other hand, the public security organ 
settles the dispute by imposing an administrative penalty on one or more of the parties, 
then the parties have the right to seek administrative review and litigation. Using 
zhongju caijue can be used as a means of avoiding legal responsibility for an 
administrative decision; this is an example of what is meant by unauthorised use of 
administrative power. 
The second type of unauthorised use of power occurs when an organ exceeds the 
statutory scope of its authority. Unauthorised use of power of this type, as it is 
understood in administrative litigation in the PRC, can occur in several forms, with 
the first two being the most common: 
1. A lower level agency or a lower-level government carrying out tasks that are 
supposed to be allocated to an upper level, or vice versa. A common form of this 
involves a land management agency and a rural township government when a 
rural resident uses cultivated land to build a house. This should be approved by 
the government at county level or above, but sometimes a township government 
improperly approves it. 
2. One organ carrying out another's tasks. This problem commonly involves two 
very powerful organs such as a public security organ and an industry & commerce 
organ. 
3. An administrative organ exceeding the scope of the laws and regulations when 
imposing an administrative penalty. For example, the Public Order Management 
Penalty Regulations stipulate that a person can be detained for a maximum of 15 
days, so if a public security organ detains a person for 16 days this is defined as 
overstepping authorised limits. 
14 For an explanation about the different types of adjudication that administrative organs may 
implement see Fang Xin (ed.), fr iE5{ 'J( i.)( :f~ ~ (A Guide to Administrative Review) (Beijing: 
The Legal Press, 1991), pp.5-6. See also Ma Yuan (ed.), fr iE5{ ~ '1* ~ i..R 3( ,!$. , pp.190-193. 
196 
In contrast, decisions that abuse power are lanyong zhiquan de. These decisions may 
include a situation where an official requests a bribe. Or, more commonly, the phrase 
refers to decisions which are technically within an official's authority in that, for 
example, an offender against public order may be detained for no more than the 
statutorily allowable number of days, but the decision may be grossly out of 
proportion to the offence committed. If it is, then it may be declared to be an abuse of 
power: that is, an abuse of discretionary power15. This criterion is concerned with the 
fairness of an administrative decision. However, very few administrative litigation 
appeals result in court decisions of this nature. 16 
Abuse of power may also take any of the following forms: 
o The motive or intention of the decision-maker was not lawful. The attitude of the 
official might be frivolous or mean, the official might impose an excessively 
heavy fine, or the penalty might be severe with intent to punish the plaintiff for 
making a complaint. 
o The decision-maker used irrelevant considerations in making the decision. 
o Lack of a common standard in the decision-making patterns, possibly indicated by 
capricious behaviour on the part of the official or an imperious, domineering 
attitude. 
o Misuse of proper procedures, possibly indicated by an event such as a public 
security organ using the re-education through labour procedures to deal with a 
mentally ill person rather than the correct civil procedures. 17 
Specific and abstract acts 
The ALL only authorises the courts to review certain specific administrative decisions, 
not abstract decisions. Abstract administrative acts are usually defined as those which 
determine the scope of the laws and regulations. Courts are not permitted to interfere 
in lawful conduct of administrative power, or how broadly the scope of administrative 
15 Zhu Weijiu (ed), D ]'.5t B "7-J tt-J OJ~ JIJ1 'f , pp.375-377. 
16 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.856, lists 16 cases out of the sample 219 in this 
category; only "failure to perform legal responsibility" and "unjust administrative penalties" rated 
fewer cases (14 and 9 respectiv~,!.Y). 
17 See: Ma Yuan (ed.), D i£5t W fl' 9'1J iH )Z J$. (Administrative Litigation Knowledge Series) 
~~eijin~:.._Beijing Teachers' College Press, 1991), pp.193-195; Zhu Weijiu (ed), 
1J t){ IT "7-J tr-J OJ~ Jb1 'f , pp.375-377; Luo Haocai (ed), 
94 00 OJ~.:§: {jitj ~ (China's System of Judicial Review) (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 
1993), pp.407, 415-417. 
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power reaches. Abstract acts are not directed at any particular person or any specific 
occasion. Abstract acts are those such as rules (1;9f, jjr guizhang), explanations 
CM~ jieshi), regulations ( ~ 19~ tiaoli), or sections(~ kuan). 
Specific acts, on the other hand, are those that are directed towards a specific 
individual or group about a specific matter. The Opinion of the Supreme People's 
Court on Some Issues Relating to the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation 
Law (for Trial Implementation) defines a specific administrative act as "unilateral acts 
or conduct, relating to specific matters and the rights and interests of specific citizens, 
legal persons or other organisations, which are made by the country's administrative 
organs and their officials, organisations authorised by laws, organisations authorised 
or entrusted by the administrative organs, and individuals exercising their powers or 
duties during the performance of their administrative functions." 18 
Specific acts commonly involve the use of a decision record form (~ ]E 45 jueding 
shu). 19 They represent the application of a law or regulation to a specific individual or 
group of people. For example, a regulation might stipulate that "all university students 
must pay parking fees on their campuses". This is an abstract administrative act 
because it is a general statement. On the other hand, an administrative decision 
compelling "all students at Beijing University to pay a 10 yuan parking fee" is a 
specific administrative act. If the decision is written to a specified person or group the 
decision is a specific one.20 
The distinction between abstract and specific administrative acts is a grey area that is 
open to abuse by officials who seek to distance their decision-making from scrutiny. 
An interviewee described a case that occurred in Guangzhou in 1997-1998 involving 
the Guangzhou City Government. The government wanted to demolish a part of the 
city's old residential area, requiring the relocation of 500 citizens. The people in 
question organised a group complaint but had great difficulty finding a court to accept 
18 Translation by Lin Feng, Administrative Law: Procedures and Remedies in China, The China Law 
Series (Hong Ko!l,g: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), p.332. For a Chinese language version see Jiang 
Ming' an, D iE)I: Vt 10 ~ ::¥: (Jurisprudence of Administrative Litigation) (Beijing: Beijing 
University Press, 1993), pp.282-296. 
19 •.+. "*" I::: .::.!:b. -l:X. ~- :dt .::i:: .::;:-.,. h!1 :tilt 'A I= '°*"' t;t-1: Zhang Shuyi, fr 7'!; ~ J& J-F - IT ~x wt. ""' i:i'J alt; ~ ~ JSO<. (Conflict and Choice -
The Theory and Practice of Administrative Law) (Current Events Press, 1992), pp.109-110. 
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the case because judges assessing the case for its bona fide administrative dispute 
features took the view that the case was abstract rather than specific. Eventually a 
judge was courageous enough to accept the case, although it is not known on what 
basis the judge determined that the decision was specific. The argument about the 
case being specific or abstract was compounded by the fact that the Guangzhou City 
Government had not written 500 individual administrative decision forms, but rather 
had put up public notices in the compounds and foyers of the residential buildings.21 
Despite the Supreme People's Court's "Opinion", it is recognised that the 
determination of a specific administrative act depends a great deal on the judges 
involved. 22 
Violations of statutory procedures 
As with the criteria for administrative review discussed in Chapter Four, the concept 
of violation of statutory procedures is related to the degree to which such violations 
affect the plaintiff's substantive rights. Theoretically, even minor violations affecting 
a plaintiff's rights should result in the court overturning the administrative decision,23 
since the ALL stipulates that where statutory procedures have been violated the 
administrative decision should be overturned.24 However, in practice this is only seen 
as necessary when the substantive rights of the person have been harmed. For 
example, the court may judge that even though the defending administrative organ did 
not fill out the forms correctly when imposing an administrative penalty, the offender 
was certainly deserving of the penalty and the decision would not be overturned. Such 
minor violations are often dealt with through the use of a judicial recommendation to 
the defending organ, which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
An important feature of procedural violations is that even if the court overturns the 
decision, compensation is not always payable. For example, if a public security organ 
decides to confiscate goods or seal up someone's property, the organ is legally 
required to give notice to the property owner to this effect, and also to give a receipt 
for any goods confiscated. Public security organs often either do not notify the party 
20 Interviews with judicial officials of the Supreme People's Court, Beijing, 1998. 
21 Interviews with lawyers, Beijing, 1998. 
22 Interviews with lawyers, BeiRng'...1998. 
23 Ma Yuan (ed.), fr~ W Yi: 9iO i.Q ~ $ , p.189. 
24 ALL, Article 54, clause c. 
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at all, or do so after the event, and regularly fail to give receipts for confiscated goods. 
Under such circumstances, the plaintiff has the right to administrative litigation and 
the court may indeed overturn the administrative decision resulting in the plaintiff 
getting the property back, but no compensation is payable.25 Such an interpretation 
undercuts the implementation of the State Compensation Law examined in Chapter 
Five, which connects compensation to harm caused to the plaintiff. The lack of 
recompense in such instances indicates that "legal" means "legal in substantive terms", 
leaving the plaintiff no financial redress against defective administrative procedures. 
Application of law 
The application of law refers to which laws, regulations, clauses, and provisions are 
used as the basis for making an administrative decision. It is a legal requirement that 
administrative organs notify parties about such matters. In the application of law in 
administrative cases there are a number of errors that regularly arise under the rubric 
of "technical mistakes." These are described as follows: 
o A particular law or regulation is used, when another should be. 
o One particular clause is used when another is more appropriate. 
o An administrative penalty should be imposed on the basis of two or more laws and 
regulations at the same time, but is imposed only on the basis of one, or an 
insufficient number of laws. 
o Where out-dated regulations are used, or those which have had a further 
explanation issued about them. 26 
At first glance these guidelines appear straightforward and in many instances the 
courts use the "application of law" criterion in a straight forward manner to simply 
improve the accuracy of legal administrative decision-making. However, some 
"technical mistakes" can completely change the nature of an administrative litigation 
case, to the point where different clauses of the same law can be used to allocate 
blame to different parties. 
25 Interviews with judicial officials, Beii~·n , 1998. 
,,- -:ctr ;- ..::J... M·- .;-_+ 11-'< -!f.X. 26 Zhu Weijiu (ed), 1T ll-)<. 1T /'J CJ'J i:r iz; .h:tt ·l§f ' pp.328, 371. 
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An example will help explain this very interesting avenue of possible manipulation 
and alert the reader to the fact that good legal advice may play a significant role in 
determining the outcome of a case before the courts. 
The case has its origins in 1984 and occurred in an unnamed city.27 The plaintiff is a 
mechanical engineering contracting company and the defending administrative organ 
is the district government's water conservation office. 
In 1984 the contracting company and the district government made an agreement that 
the contractor would demolish an old part of the city's residential area and construct 
new living quarters. It was the responsibility of the district housing office to relocate 
the residents. In February 1987 the contractor met with the housing office to ensure 
the procedures for the departure of residents were in hand. In 1989 demolition 
proceeded apace and only 2 compounds remained. One of the households moved out 
and its compound was demolished, leaving only a wall which it had in common with 
the neighbouring compound. In February 1990 the remaining household refused to 
move out because they did not like the alternative accommodation they had been 
offered. The contractor, in demolishing the second-last compound, left a tap in place 
because the residents were still there. The tap water spilled onto the street, eventually 
made a watery mess, and became a hazard for which no one was taking responsibility. 
Eventually the neighbourhood residents' committee contacted the emergency repairs 
office and the contractor. It was determined that the contractor would repair the tap. 
Concurrent with these events, the water conservation office's water metre readings 
recorded a huge increase in water consumption by this tap in February, March and 
April of 1990. On 21 April the office imposed an administrative penalty fine of 1382 
yuan on the contracting company for not maintaining and repairing the tap and 
thereby wasting water. The company was charged according to the "Township and 
Village Water Wastage Penalty Rules", Clause 3, Section 1, Number 6. The 
contractor disagreed with the decision on the grounds that the company was not the 
27 Liu Tianxing (ed.), 9:f !JD fi ~ 1i fj ~ '1fi ~ 1i ~ ~ ~ 19~ ~ m (Selected Cases for 
Teaching Chinese Administrative Law and Administrative Litigation Law) (Beijing: The People's 
Legal Press, 1992), pp.8-11. 
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body responsible for the tap. The contractor applied to the district court to pursue 
administrative litigation. 
The court took the view that laying responsibility with the company was not 
unsuitable; however, the rules regarding the use of neighbourhood water taps should 
also be considered as part of this case. The court held that the same piece of 
legislation was applicable, but that the penalty should have been imposed according to 
Clause 4, Section 1, Number 6, under which the residents could be held liable. Thus it 
determined that the application of law was unsuitable. The decision was overturned 
and the water conservation office was ordered to impose a new decision. 
The water conservation office disagreed with the court's ruling and appealed to the 
city intermediate court to overturn the first court's decision and to uphold the 
administrative organ's con-ect and lawful behaviour. 
The second court took the following view: 
1. responsibility for the wasted water lay with the company; 
2. the company should assume responsibility for the repairs of the taps; 
3. the amount of the fine was con-ect, and 
4. saving water is very important and the city water conservation office should 
support administrative organs which are involved in controlling water wastage. 
In this case, the alternative to laying responsibility with the company would have been 
to blame the residents under Clause 4. The significant point to note is that different 
legal clauses can be used according to where it is perceived that responsibility lies. 
The editors' commentary which follows the record of this case refers to a State 
Council circular about water equipment. The circular states that the maintenance of 
such equipment is the responsibility of the water conservation organ, the housing and 
property organ, and all work units who use it, leaving this case unclear as to who 
should pay for the wasted water. The second court decided the contractor should bear 
responsibility in this case, thereby supporting an important state policy over and 
above the close relationship between the contractor and district government, a 
relationship which may well have driven the first court (at the same level as the 
district government) to arrive at its decision. 
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Evidence 
Evidence relating to administrative litigation cases, like that relating to administrative 
review cases, can be broadly classified as either important or unimportant evidence. 
Also parallel to administrative review, only important evidence is regarded as 
affecting the facts of the case and therefore open to scrutiny by the courts. 28 
In common law countries such as Australia, courts have the power to review the 
evidence relating to a judicial review case because evidence in such systems is treated 
as a legal issue and thus reviewable by the courts. In China, evidence is treated as part 
of the facts of an administrative litigation case rather than as a legal issue. At present, 
Chinese courts have the authority to establish the facts of an administrative litigation 
case, and therefore review the evidence, but there is dissent among high-level 
administrative and judicial figures as to the appropriateness of this. The director of the 
Department of Policies, Laws and Supervision of the State Land Administration of the 
PRC holds the view that Chinese courts should not have the authority to review the 
facts of land dispute cases because the low level of professionalism among Chinese 
judges makes it difficult for them to fully understand the facts of such cases. The 
director would, thus, prefer that the courts be limited to reviewing the application of 
law.29 Of course, the director may be influenced by a desire to retain power to review 
the facts of a case and preclude another organ from exercising this power. 
Support for this view is also to be found among some judicial officials of the Supreme 
People's Court, who regard the authority of the courts to review evidence as a stop-
gap measure until the level of professionalism in administrative decision-making rises 
sufficiently to preclude the need for judicial review. 30 This institutionalised 
favouritism for further strengthening the power of administrative organs at the 
expense of the courts reveals a continued distrust of external controls on 
administrative power. 
28 Ge Hengmei (ed), ± Jt!!. ~:fl 9::f BtJ fr iE)( W fC (Administrative Litigation in Land 
Management) (Beijing: Legal System Press, 1993), p.125. See also Chapter Four for details on 
important and unimportant facts in administrative review. 
29 Interview, Beijing, 1998. 
30 Interviews with officials from the Supreme People's Court of the PRC, Beijing, 1998. 
The players in the system and their relative positions of power 
Courts and judges 
203 
Courts and judges in China, as is well known, are considered an integral part of the 
state bureaucracy. In this section I will not refer to the position of courts and judges in 
this broad sense, as such matters have been adequately covered by other writers. 31 I 
will concentrate here on the specific characteristics of courts and judges in 
administrative litigation trials. There are well known problems with courts and 
judicial personnel that affect many trials, such as the lack of judicial independence 
and the low level of legal education of trial judges, and more will be said about this 
below. The most distinguishing feature of administrative trials, however, is the phase 
of court acceptance of the case. At this point, prior to any formal investigation or 
hearing, the courts and their personnel already begin to have a major influence on the 
outcome of the litigation appeal. 
Each court is organised into divisions such as economic, civil, criminal and 
administrative, which hear cases in those areas. Other organisational features cut 
across these divisions and supplement them, such as the judicial committee 
($' -*1J * ITT % shenpan weiyuanhui), the professional division 
dl * M yewu ting), the judicial bench division (..g.-1.)( M heyi ting), and the 
sole judge division (3$ 1f- M duren ting). 
The role of the judicial committee has been explored elsewhere32 and can be 
summarised as involving three main tasks: to coordinate and regularise judicial work, 
to discuss difficult or important cases, and to discuss issues relating to other judicial 
work such as the development of the legal system and determining the professional 
qualifications of judges. 33 
31 See for example: Ronald C. Brown, Understanding Chinese Courts and Legal Process: Law with 
Chinese Characteristics (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997); Albert Hung-yee Chen, An 
Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (Singapore: Butterworths Asia, 
1992). 
32 Albert Hung1ee Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System, p.121; Ge Hengmei (ed), 
± :!!!!. ~ JI 9:! e!J fi ]:)/: W -U: (Administrative Litigation in Land Management) (Beijing: 
Legal System Press, 1993), ~p.48-50. 
33 Wen Jing, ~ ~ '$' -*'J jl -%-~ JI (Managing Judicial Work of the Courts) (Beijing: The 
Legal Press, 1992, pp.96-112. 
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The professional division is the body responsible for accepting, distributing and 
assigning cases as they come into the court. The way this is done varies from court to 
court. This appears to be quite acceptable in the Chinese writings on the court system, 
although the varied methods of handling cases at this point must have a significant 
impact on whether or not a case is accepted by a court for hearing. There are four 
main variants: 
o Some courts distribute cases to the judges in the order in which they are received 
without taking account of whether the case is major, minor, difficult or otherwise. 
o Some courts allow ordinary cases to be chosen freely by the judges available but 
determine the method of handling difficult or complicated cases, such as 
authorising a judge to act on his or her own or stipulating that a judicial bench 
consisting of at least one senior judge handle the case. 
o Some courts divide the judges into groups and call for each group to handle 
particular cases. 
o Some courts distinguish the cases by their type, such as real estate, divorce, 
economic contracts, public order disputes, and so on. There are perceived to be 
benefits in having groups of judges who specialise in certain types of cases.34 
There are still other methods employed. Some areas have a special division which 
checks over the superficial aspects of an administrative litigation appeal, such as 
whether there is a clear defendant and a clear plaintiff and whether the facts and 
evidence appear to be in order. Yet another system exists where the chief justice, or 
head of the administrative division, or several judges from the administrative division 
will decide whether to accept a case.35 There is an implied expectation though, that 
the judicial bench plays a major role in accepting cases, rather than just an 
individual. 36 
The judicial bench or collegiate bench division organises which judges will sit on 
which cases. It is stipulated in the ALL that administrative litigation cases must be 
heard by a collegiate bench37 and collegiate benches consist of three or more judges. 
34 Ibid, p.118. 
35 Interviews with legal academics, Beijing, 1998. 
36 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.367. 
37 ALL, Article 6. 
This is an indication of the higher degree of sensitivity attached to administrative 
cases compared to civil cases, which may be heard by only one judge. 
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The "sole judge" division is the organisational mechanism which appoints individual 
judges to hear cases on their own. This is authorised for civil cases and minor criminal 
cases at a court of first hearing. Second hearings must be heard by a collegiate 
bench. 38 As many administrative litigation cases are public order disputes that, if more 
serious, would be minor criminal offences and thus able to be heard by an individual 
judge, it is anomalous that such cases are currently excluded from the range which an 
individual judge may hear. The explanation may possibly lie in the different power 
relationships that exist in criminal and administrative cases. 
Judges are susceptible to being pressured by administrative organs when handling 
administrative litigation cases. Several factors feed into this. First is the quality of 
judges in terms of their education and legal qualifications. The PRC Law on Judges 
was passed in 1995 in an attempt to clarify the expectations of, and improve the 
standard of, judges.39 The then Supreme People's Court President, Ren Jianxin, made 
a significant, open admission that in the four decades since the founding of the 
People's Republic judges have been managed as administrative personnel rather than 
judicial personnel and that this has been inadequate. The PRC Law on Judges states 
that judges must strictly enforce the law, and Ren was acknow !edging that judges had 
difficulty doing this when they were treated as administrative officials rather than as a 
distinct profession in their own right. The new law sets standards for professional 
qualifications and personal ethics but does not go as far as changing the system that 
maintains state control over the courts. 
Despite adopting new laws, though, the Chinese state has not left behind its old forms 
of behaviour modification. The model hero, "Judge Tan Yan", appeared on the 
propaganda stage shortly after the new Law on Judges was passed. Tan Yan is a 
young judge from Ji' an City in Jilin Province who has been noted for his outstanding 
38 Wen Jing,~~'$' }IJ .ill:-%-~ t! (Manai{1g Judicial \)'.s?rk of, the, Courts) (Beijing: The 
Legal Press, 1992, p.150; Ge Hengmei (ed), ± J& 15 t! i:p B!J 11:if){W1* 
(Administrative Litigation in Land Management) (Beijing: Legal System Press, 1993), pp.48-50. 
39 FBIS-CHI-95-054 "Ren Jianxin Discusses Law on Judges." 
206 
impartiality, civilized manner, honesty and efficiency.40 Despite the low standard of 
personnel and professional ethics among judges, they more commonly conduct 
themselves illegally when handling economic or criminal cases rather than 
administrative cases,41 due to the amounts of money involved and the higher stakes. 
Nevertheless, such occurrences give some indication of the lack of judicial 
professionalism. 
Another major factor that contributes to the weak position of courts and judges in 
administrative litigation trials is the well-known problem that the funding of courts 
and their personnel is tied to the local government and Party committee. It is 
extremely common for an administrative organ's decision to be upheld in a local 
county court, and subsequently appealed in the prefectural court,42 a course of action 
which results in a higher rate of success for the plaintiff. This problem is often 
described as one that relates to judicial independence rather than administrative 
litigation, but there are grounds for the view that administrative litigation trials are 
more problematic than criminal, civil, or economic trials, giving rise to greater 
interference from local governments. 
An example which aptly illustrates this pattern is recorded as having taken place in 
early 1991.43 In Wan' an County, Jiangxi Province, a peasant and some others got into 
a fight with a teacher. The public security organ imposed an administrative detention 
penalty of 15 days on the peasant and made him pay compensation, including hospital 
costs of 760 yuan. The peasant did not agree with the penalty and applied for 
administrative review. The review organ reaffirmed the 15 day detention penalty but 
reduced the compensation and hospital costs to 563 yuan. The peasant still did not 
agree, and on 5 June 1991 he applied to the Wan'an County Court for litigation. This 
court reaffirmed the public security organ's decision. The peasant subsequently 
appealed to the prefectural court in Ji'an, which found that the methods of the first 
court were unsuitable, the facts were mistaken, unsuitable regulations were used as 
the basis for the decision, and that the county court judgement should be changed. The 
4° FBIS-CHI-96-163 "PRC: Courts Launch Drive on Emulating Judge Tan Yan." 
41 FBIS-CHI-1999-0614 "Dalian Court Judges Disciplined for Violating Law." 
42 Interviews with judicial personnel, legal academics, legal practitioners, and administrative officials, 
Beijing, 1998. 
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second court overturned the decisions of both the public security organ and the first 
court. 
Some scholars in China have suggested that a solution to this problem of localism is 
to make the first court of appeal the intermediate court rather than the local court, but 
this is likely to have mixed results. Party secretaries of urban areas have close 
relationships with the adjoining county Party secretaries, and so can easily influence 
the intermediate court in favour of the county.44 In addition, others view the idea of 
making the intermediate court the first court of appeal as detrimental to the rights of 
ordinary rural people (laobaixing) who already regard the local state (in the form of 
approaching the local court to sue a local government department) as a high and 
distant body. If they had to go all the way (both geographical and psychological) to 
the intermediate court as a first step they would be much less likely to appeal than 
now. Thus, these scholars see the solution as lying in the establishment of judicial 
. d d ki 45 m epen ence as a wor ng concept. 
Further suggestions are to take the funding of judicial personnel out of the hands of 
the local Party, and to appoint judges from at least the provincial level, if not the 
centre.46 These suggestions have merit, but do not adequately account for the fact that 
judges still have to live and work in the local towns, and this can be a source of direct 
influence by the local Party Secretary and government. 
Still other suggestions include the establishment of a separate administrative court to 
replace the current administrative divisions in ordinary courts.47 Research has also 
taken place on reforming the system by locating prefectural courts in county towns 
and broadening the geographical area over which they will have jurisdiction.48 
Changes that have actually been implemented may indicate at least limited support for 
serious change, as they focus on moving senior judicial personnel around for both 
43 9:J 00 "'$' ¥JJ ~ ~~ ~ 1lf (Important Chinese Trial Cases) (Beijing: Chinese People's Public 
Security University Press, 1992), pp.1168-1172. 
44 Interviews with legal academics and lawyers, Beijing, 1998. 
45 Interviews with legal scholars and judges, Beijing, 1998. 
46 Interviews with judicial personnel, Beijing, 1998. See also Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative 
Report", 1998, p.340 which recommends that courts be independently funded. 
47 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.340. 
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training and to deepen their experience. Judges at high-level courts, presidents of 
intermediate-level courts, and judges in charge of various divisions such as civil, 
economic, criminal, and administrative are now sent for specialised training classes to 
the Supreme People's Court or to a national law college. County court presidents are 
regularly transferred or exchanged to different county courts for work,49 the aim being 
to lessen the effects of localism. 
Table 13: Age and education level of judicial personnel in Hunan, 1997 
Age or education level 
over 40 years of age 
23 - 40 years of age 
post-secondary (dazhuan) specialist 
education or higher 
PhD in jurisprudence 
l 0 or more years experience in 
judicial work 
5 - 10 years experience in judicial 
work 
less than 5 years experience in 
judicial work 
No. of personnel 
124 
400 
146 
3 
346 
104 
74 
Percentage 
23.7% 
76.3% 
36% 
0.56% 
66% 
19.8% 
4.2% 
Source: Deputy Head of the Administrative Division of Hunan Province High-level Court, in Jiang 
Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.343. Note: dazhuan requires two or three years legal 
study at an approved college or a similar course through correspondence or self-study; see Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers in China, 1998, p.61, Note 218. 
Education is often touted as an important means to overcoming the lack of judicial 
independence. But as will be shown in Chapter Seven this is not borne out in practice, 
despite improvements in the level of education among judges. The patterns of judicial 
48 Interviews with judicial personnel of the Supreme People's Court, Beijing, 1998. 
49 FBIS-CHI-2000-0319 "Supreme People's Court Report to NPC." 
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education vary greatly across the country. In 1988 in Hunan Province, for example, 
over 80% of judicial personnel only had secondary level educations (gaozhong). 50 
whereas by 1997 that proportion had shrunk to 63% or less (Table 13). 
Table 14: Gender, age and education levels of judges in Beijing, 1997 
Male 
Female 
Total 
23 - 30 years of age 
30 - 40 years of age 
41 - 50 years of age 
50 years or over 
Total 
PhD 
Bachelor degree 
Post-secondary specialist training (dazhuan) 
Secondary-level specialist training (zhongzhuan) 
Secondary (gaozhong) 
79 
47 
126 
33 
33 
54 
6 
126 
2 
25 
89 
5 
5 
Source: Judge of the Beijing City High-Level Court, Deputy Head of the Administrative Division of 
Chongwen District Court of Beijing City, and an official from the National Judges Training Institute, in 
Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Reort", 1998, pp.403-404. Note: zhongzhuan involves two or three 
years specialist education for secondary school aged students. It provides a lower level of study than 
dazhuan which is for students who have graduated successfully from secondary school but failed to get 
into a bachelor's degree course. 
In Beijing, over 92% of judges had an education level in 1997 of post-secondary 
specialist training (dazhuan) or above (Table 14). This is quite different to the 
situation in Hunan Province, where only 37% of judges had this level of education. 
Also unlike Hunan is the age distribution of Beijing judges. They are generally older, 
as nearly 48% are over 40 years of age, compared to fewer than 24% in Hunan 
Province. 
50 Deputy Head of the Administrative Division of Hunan Province High-level Court, in Jiang Ming' an 
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There is insufficient data available to determine the effect of changing education 
patterns on the pattern of administrative litigation appeals in Hunan Province. Some 
data is available for Beijing and this will be examined in Chapter Seven. As judges in 
Beijing are markedly better educated than those in Hunan, the patterns described for 
Beijing in Chapter Seven reveal that even with dramatic improvements in education, 
judges and courts still act more out of consideration for the state's rights than 
individual rights. 
Administrative organs 
The power in court of the different administrative agencies varies according to the 
particular organ and its functional power. Minxin Pei claims that the more powerful 
government organs such as local governments and public security organs enjoy more 
favourable treatment from the courts,51 as measured by the rate of court rulings in 
their favour. But the figures on which this interpretation is based cannot tell us 
anything about the quality of the decision-making in the various administrative organs 
and how this affects the outcome of administrative litigation. 
For example, Pei claims that cultural and public hygiene agencies were less likely to 
have their actions upheld by courts and more likely to have them overturned than 
were local governments and important departments. This does not mean, 
conclusively, that the latter agencies are unduly pressuring the courts to decide in their 
favour. It may also mean that such agencies have made better administrative decisions 
in the first place than other organs, thus resulting in a higher rate of actions upheld by 
the court. It may also mean that plaintiffs who have an administrative penalty imposed 
(in their view, unjustly) by cultural and public hygiene agencies or other less powerful 
agencies are proportionately more likely to appeal the decision than are plaintiffs who 
have an administrative penalty imposed by a local government agency, perhaps on the 
reasoning that there is a higher chance of success. Still another interpretation may be 
that people who have an administrative penalty imposed on them by the public 
security organs or other powerful organs have more to lose from the decision than 
those who have penalties imposed by cultural or public hygiene organs, resulting in a 
proportionately higher rate of appeal. This rate may not be controlled primarily by the 
(ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.342. 
51 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins'', 1997, p.845. 
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perceived illegality of the decision but rather by the desperate circumstances of the 
plaintiff.s2 Linked to all these alternative explanations is the influence of the identity 
and status of the plaintiff on the outcome of the case. 
Pei suggests, for example, that private entrepreneurs are disproportionately active 
litigants against the state, and that individuals of a higher socio-economic status 
accounted for a smaller percentage of cases. But we do not know how many 
administrative penalties are imposed on these groups in any given year and thus we 
cannot make conclusions about their litigious tendencies as groups per se. We can 
only compare their rates of appearance in administrative litigation suits. Without 
complete statistics about the number of administrative penalties imposed by various 
organs, on which they are imposed, and the outcomes in administrative litigation 
trials, no conclusive interpretation can be made. At best, partial statistical patterns can 
be drawn. 
The other factor that is unaccounted for in the statistical study by Pei is that there is 
no clear pattern in the relationship between the power of an administrative organ and 
the outcome of administrative litigation against organs. Administrative organs do not 
appear to the same degree in administrative litigation trials. The taxation organs, for 
example, although very powerful,s3 are virtually absent from administrative litigation 
trial statistics. In Pei's study of national figures from 1988-1995, tax organs do not 
appear as a discrete category, nor do environment protection organs, but public health 
organs do.s4 In the narrower selection of case studies Pei draws upon for his own 
study, the supposedly powerful tax organs appear in only 6% of the cases, while the 
equally powerful public security and land management organs appear in 25% and 
21 % of the cases. Non-powerful organs such as environment protection agencies 
appear in only 2% of the cases, a rate comparable to that of the powerful taxation 
organs.ss The power and function of an administrative organ plays a much more 
52 See~ ~a (fJ JI ~ ~ lJ[ ~ (The Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law) (Beijing: China 
University of Politics and Law, 1993), p.264, which recounts the plight of an individual entrepreneur 
expressing in melodramatic style how extreme an action it is for someone in his position to sue the 
f:ovemment. 
3 In interview, legal scholars listed the most powerful government organs as public security, tax, city 
planning, and industry & commerce. Environment protection organs were not regarded as very 
~werful at all. 
4 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins'', 1997, p.840. 
55 Ibid, p.849. 
212 
important and broader role in administrative litigation than simply affecting the trial 
outcome. It affects the quality of the decision-making by the organ in the first place, it 
affects the inclination of plaintiffs to appeal, 56 and it affects the trial outcome. More 
will be said about these matters in Chapter Seven. 
Administrative organs have a distinct advantage over plaintiffs in administrative 
litigation trials because their personnel have been educated and briefed about the law 
in general and the ALL in particular. Training for administrative officials falls into a 
number of categories: training for newly employed personnel about basic work 
procedures and methods, organisational discipline, and so on; training for specific 
tasks such as leadership, policy implementation, and maintenance of standards; 
specialist training for specific professional areas; and training in the use of new 
knowledge such as the ALL.57 It is common for administrative officials who are going 
to handle administrative cases to be sent for specialist training about the aim, purpose, 
and application of the ALL, not just on a one-off basis but regularly.58 
In Beijing during May-June 1998, I attended a weekly class on administrative law 
given by the head of Beijing University's Administrative Law section. The classes 
were for Party and government officials from Haidian District who were enrolled in 
the Beijing University Masters degree in Contemporary Public Management. The 
course covered the basics of administrative law, such as its history, purpose, key 
concepts, the content of the ALL and how it should be applied and implemented. 
Most of the participants in the course were leaders or deputy leaders of local 
functional administrative offices, with a few others located in Party bodies. All were 
university graduates. The ones I talked to readily agreed that administrative law was 
very important to their work, but were less enthusiastic about the ALL. They 
generally said the administrative disputes in their sections were mostly handled 
informally between the complainant and the official concerned, resulting in very few 
applications for administrative review. 
56 People are disinclined to appeal against the tax organ, for example, because they have to deal with 
the tax organ on a regular basis and appeals are perceived as merely resulting in harsher treatment from 
the organ in subsequent years. Interviews, Beijing, 1998. 
57 Interviews with administrative officials and teachers of administrative law, Beijing, 1998. See also 
Sun Ninghua (ed), 19. JJ ~ "*J ¥J - .fJ :i£5I: ~ ffl Jr (Power and its Control -
Administrative Law Research), (Beijing: Science and Technology Literature Press, 1995), pp.130-139. 
58 Jiang Ming'an (ed), "Investigative Report", 1998, Section 6 "Administrative Litigation". 
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Courts and their personnel are ranked lower in the administrative hierarchy than 
administrative officials in an organ at the same level. This means, for example, that 
the president of a provincial high court is equivalent in rank to the deputy governor of 
the province rather than the governor. 59 This leaves the courts with less status and 
leverage over administrative organs; the opposite is more often the case. Although the 
bureaucratic levels are close to being on a par, the leaders of administrative organs 
tend to have a low regard for the courts and their power. Despite ten or more years of 
implementation of the ALL, little progress appears to have been made in improving 
the degree to which administrative organs operate in strict accordance with the law. 
Administrative organs are a significant source of interference in administrative 
litigation suits. A survey carried out in China in 1992 that consulted judges, lawyers, 
administrative officials and applicants for litigation, asked interviewees about the 
sources of interference in administrative suits. A minuscule 7 .5% replied that the 
Party interferes, followed by 26.3% who rated government organs as a significant 
source, and a comparable 28.8% who identified outside people as the main source of 
interference.60 This is an important finding for our understanding of the Party and 
government in contemporary China. Although government organs are imbued with 
Party control, the administrative organs as institutions, with their own bureaucratic 
aims and agendas, are more active than the Party in administrative litigation suits. 
This situation has not abated or improved since 1992. A 1998 investigative report 
from Ningxia identified the relationships between leading judges and administrative 
organs as a significant source of interference in administrative litigation, and noted 
that this interference becomes active starting with the acceptance phase of the case.61 
Similarly in Anhui Province in 1997, 72% of judges claim that interference in 
administrative litigation cases comes from administrative organs.62 
Of all administrative organs, public security organs are the most lax in their 
administrative tasks, which combines with a typically non-cooperative attitude after 
59 Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (Singapore: 
Butterworths Asia, 1992), p.123. 
60 ~ ~t:f 8t; JI~, ~ lJil. ~ (The Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law) (Beijing: China University 
of Politics and Law, 1993), p.259. 
61 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.367. 
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an administrative litigation suit has been filed. In Guizhou Province, for example, the 
following problems are common: 
o The administrative penalty decision form is not systematically completed by the 
organs. 
o Administrative penalty decisions are not made on the basis of a clear 
understanding of the facts of the situation. 
0 Delivery of the penalty forms and general communication with the offender is 
incomplete and poor. 
o Offenders are not informed of their rights when a penalty is imposed. 
o If property is confiscated, proper notification and receipts are not given to the 
person. 
o Administrative penalties are often enforced not by the relevant administrative 
organ, but by another organ such as the procuratorate.63 
Even when an administrative litigation suit is filed at court and the court accepts the 
case for hearing and sends out the notices to the administrative organ, it is not 
uncommon for the following "five nots" to occur: 
o The administrative organ does not answer or reply to an accusation. 
o The organ does not deliver the relevant case materials as requested. 
o The organ does not accept a summons to court and simply does not turn up on the 
day. 
o The organ does not accept questions or enquiries about the case. 
o The organ does not implement the courtjudgement.64 
These behaviours have also been observed by lawyers who have dealt with 
administrative litigation cases. Administrative organs will often not reply to or 
62 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.444. 
63 Zhu Weijiu (ed), 
~-~*n•~-tt~~~~~~m~*T~~mn•m* 
(Discussion of the Government Legal Supervision System - The Supervisory System Under the 
Socialist Market Economy) (Beijing: China University of Politics and Law, 1994), pp.388-390. 
64 Zhu Weijiu (ed), 
~-~*n•~-tt~~~~~~m~*T~~mn•m* 
(Discussion of the Government Legal Supervision System - The Supervisory System Under the 
Socialist Market Economy) (Beijing: China University of Politics and Law, 1994), pp.388-390. See 
also Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.386 where it is re.i>orted that similar things 
occur in Yunnan Province. · 
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cooperate with large law firms, let alone anyone else.65 In such situations courts will 
often proceed with trial by default without the defending organ present, and this can 
occur in up to 90% of cases in some provinces.66 
Local governments, too, are a common source of illegal administrative behaviour, 
particularly in the imposition of illegal fee collection.67 Such cases often arise as 
group litigation cases, with a large number of plaintiffs challenging a local 
government's fee collection activities. The central government has been legislating 
furiously during the 1990s to overcome such problems68 and has announced fresh 
attempts by the courts to deal more carefully with such cases. 69 Concern about the 
level of social unrest caused by such cases is quite high and the catchphrase "alleviate 
the peasants' burdens" has been coined to describe the state's response.70 Officially 
farmers are encouraged to use the law to protect their rights and interests, but there is 
open acknowledgment that courts and defending organs collude to dissuade 
plaintiffs.71 
When administrative organs do cooperate with the courts in an administrative 
litigation case it is often done grudgingly because the organs regard the courts as 
professionally incompetent to handle certain administrative matters. The director of 
the Department of Policies, Laws and Supervision in the State Land Administration of 
the PRC claims that courts have very little professional knowledge of land 
administration, which directly affects the standard of handling land management 
cases. The director holds the view that courts are specialists in law and the application 
of law and should not be involved in ascertaining the facts of land cases because they 
do not have the requisite administrative management knowledge.72 This view is 
supported by personnel of the Supreme People's Court, who expressed the hope that 
in the future, when administrative decision-making improves sufficiently, courts will 
65 futerviews with lawyers, Beijing, 1998. 
66 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "fuvestigative Report", 1998, p.352. 
67 FBIS-CHI-96-209 "PRC: Law Courts Must Protect Legal Rights of Farmers." 
68 See for example: Administrative Penalty Law of the PRC 1996; Regulations Governing Fees and 
Labour Services Borne by Peasants, State Council 1991. 
69 FBIS-CHI-96-209 "PRC: Law Courts Must Protect Legal Rights of Farmers"; FBIS-CHI-96-238 
"CHINA: Law Protects Farmers' Interests." 
70 FBIS-CHI-98-084 "China: Supreme People's Court Work Report 1998." 
71 FBIS-CHI-96-209 "PRC: Courts Must Protect Legal Rights of Farmers." 
72 futerview, Beijing, 1998. 
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be precluded from reviewing the facts of land cases and will only be required to 
review the application of law.73 These views from high-level personnel indicate an 
expectation that the power of administrative organs will only strengthen in relation to 
that of the courts, rather than weaken, and that the courts are acquiescent regarding 
this. 
The land administration organs in particular regard the work of the courts in 
administrative litigation as a nuisance, because it can adversely affect the ability of 
these organs to enforce their administrative decisions. There is a tension between 
proper legal process and efficiency that is more apparent in land administration cases 
than public order cases. For example, if the land management organ discovers a house 
being built without proper administrative permission it may use an administrative 
penalty decision to order demolition, but if the demolition order is ignored the organ 
must then ask the court to enforce the order by authorising the organ to demolish the 
house. The organ does not have the authority to demolish the house on its own 
volition. In practice this often means that an illegally-built house is either completed 
or close to completion by the time the court authorises demolition, which makes the 
demolition more difficult than if construction had just begun. The director of the 
Department of Policies, Laws and Supervision in the State Land Administration of the 
PRC describes this gap in administrative authority as a hindrance to proper 
implementation of land management,74 thereby revealing a significant tension 
between administrative implementation and the rights of citizens and their property to 
be protected by the law. 
This balance of public and private interests, as well as impacting upon the efficiency 
of the administrative process, is also at the heart of the balance theory discussed in 
Chapter Three. The superior position of administrative organs at the outset is widely 
acknowledged as the driving force behind the "control" part of the balance theory.75 
Administrative organs are predisposed towards upholding public interests over and 
above private interests and this is where the balance theory has failed to adequately 
impact upon administrative practice. There are no criteria by which a judge can 
73 Interview with an official from the Supreme People's Court of the PRC, Beijing, 1998. 
74 Interview, Beijing, May 1998. 
75 Interviews, Beijing, 1998. 
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determine the correct balance, and thus the balance of any given administrative 
litigation case will depend on the judge to a certain extent. By and large public 
interests prevail, despite a growing appreciation of private interests.76 This applies to 
the level of compensation as much as to administrative decision-making. 
The proper process of administrative penalty implementation has varied effects on 
public and private interests. This depends upon the type of administrative organs 
involved and their powers of enforcement. Public security organs, for example, have 
the authority to detain an offender and directly implement an administrative detention 
penalty, and because the law insists the penalty be implemented even if the recipient 
thinks it is illegal or unfair and appeals the decision, public security organs are well 
placed to infringe the private rights of the offender. Land administration organs, on 
the other hand, also have the authority to implement administrative penalties such as 
those discussed above relating to illegally constructed houses, but do not have the 
authority to directly enforce their decisions in the same way that public security 
organs do. Thus, the private rights of citizens have more sway in the current 
implementation of land administration than in public security. 
Lawyers 
The use of legal counsels in administrative litigation cases has been explored briefly 
by Minxin Pei,77 but some aspects of the analysis are misleading. Pei's data show that 
plaintiffs' use of lawyers increased sharply in the very early years of administrative 
litigation and then declined steadily, and by 1995 was back to its 1991 level. The data 
for defending organs, by contrast, do not show an initial increase in agencies' use of 
lawyers, but rather a steady decline over the same period. 78 Pei explains the pattern 
for defending organs thus: 
The most important reason for this general trend is, however, 
the emergence of out-of-court settlement as the dominant form 
of resolution, which greatly reduced the need of professional counsel (by 
d . . . . ) 79 a mm1strauve agencies . 
76 Interviews, Beijing, 1998. 
77 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.852. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, p.854. 
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This explanation could be a little misleading, as Pei does not explain where out-of-
court settlements come from. Are these cases that were initially filed as administrative 
litigation suits and were subsequently resolved by the parties informally, as might 
occur with cases in the category of "withdrawn suits" (see Chapter Four)? Or are they 
cases where the plaintiff indicated disagreement with the administrative penalty and a 
desire to negotiate another resolution, leading to a settlement that was negotiated 
entirely outside the legal system? 
Withdrawn suits cannot be accurately described as "out-of-court settlements", because 
their key feature is that judges more often than not are still intimately involved in the 
process. It is better to call such suits "pre-end-of-trial settlements" and to understand 
that they occur fully within the control of the court but not within the confines of a 
trial. It is not uncommon for one or more parties to a case to meet with the judge 
and/or their lawyers in a social setting in order to influence the judge's decision.so 
Often these relationships are not merely expedient for the case at hand but represent 
more permanent business ventures between courts and administrative organs or courts 
and lawyers.s1 Such practices have led to promulgation of "Certain Stipulations on 
Strictly Implementing the Challenge System by the Adjudication Personnel" by the 
Supreme People's Court, which states that litigants have the right to ask adjudication 
personnel to refrain from privately meeting with other parties and their lawyers, and 
from attending banquets at the expense of other parties to the case.s2 
Furthermore, there is no rational reason why withdrawn cases, or other cases that have 
not gone to court at all, should need a lower rate of professional counsel than cases 
which run the full trial process. If a plaintiff has to negotiate with an administrative 
organ it would seem more crucial than ever to have adequate legal counsel to assist, 
despite the weak role of lawyers in China. The declining rate of access to legal 
counsel is more likely to mean that judges and defending organs are engaging in more 
mediatory tactics, such as those that occur within a social setting, than when the ALL 
was first implemented. s3 
80 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers in China - Obstacles to Independence and the 
Defense of Rights (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1998), p.101. 
81 FBIS-CHl-1999-0323 "Supreme People's Court Work Report." 
82 FBIS-CHl-2000-0319 "Supreme People's Court Report to NPC." · 
83 See the sections on "Courts and Judges" and "Administrative Organs" above. 
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It is also difficult for administrative litigation plaintiffs to find lawyers who will agree 
to represent them. The main reason is that there is relatively little monetary reward for 
lawyers who handle administrative litigation cases. Most prefer to take on commercial 
cases, which is a better source of income. 84 Even though the state has less leverage 
over lawyers than during the 1980s, a necessary move to increase the number and 
quality of lawyers available to provide legal services, the 1996 Law on Lawyers 
(Chapter Six) clarifies that they are still required to provide legal aid services. 
The success of these measures is limited, though. The PRC Justice Minister had to 
resort to publicly urging the All-China Lawyers Association to play its proper role of 
disciplining lawyers who lack a sense of social responsibility as evidenced by requests 
for exorbitant legal fees and a disregard for the legal rights of the poor.85 Such 
attitudes are viewed dimly by the state because they impact negatively on the socially 
sensitive rural sector, leaving peasants and township enterprises without access to 
affordable legal aid.86 
An additional difficulty faced by administrative litigation plaintiffs seeking legal 
representation is that many law firms will not take on administrative cases because 
"they are too complicated", which essentially means that pitting oneself against a 
government administrative organ is not seen as a desirable course of action.87 
Lawyers in China today are in a complex position as both independent of, and 
compliant to, the state. Some lawyers have developed reputations for an interest in 
administrative litigation cases due to the frequency with which they publish articles 
about the subject in law magazines and newspapers, and ordinary people have access 
to such material and rely on it as a means of finding a lawyer who may be 
sympathetic to their cause. One interviewee who has such a reputation recounted that 
a group of farmers from just outside Beijing came to see him in 1998 to ask for his 
help in an administrative litigation case. He listened and then told them that he could 
84 Li Yuwen, "Lawyers in China" in China Perspectives, No.27, January-February2000, pp.31-32. 
85 FBIS-CHI-1999-0428 "Minister Urges BAR Association to Defend Rights of Lawyer." 
86 FBIS-CHI-97-175 "China: Lawyers Urged to Serve Agriculture, Rural Affairs." 
87 Interviews with lawyers, Beijing, 1998. See also Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, 
p.420. 
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not help them because his firm would not permit it. The farmers had tried different 
law firms all over the city but had been unsuccessful.88 Similar responses are to be 
heard among some of the academic lawyers at Beijing University, but this does vary 
according to the financial position of the plaintiff. Some academic lawyers from 
institutions in Beijing were involved in a high-profile administrative litigation case 
that was before the Supreme People's Court in 1998. The case had been appealed 
from the Guangdong Provincial court and involved an industry & commerce organ 
and a profitable commercial business. The lawyers had been retained by the business. 
The problems faced by lawyers in handling administrative litigation cases are 
threefold: undertaking a lawsuit against an administrative organ is difficult because of 
the superior power of administrative organs; obtaining evidence is difficult due to the 
fact (discussed above) that administrative organs often do not reply to requests for 
evidence; and consequently, it is difficult to appear in court well prepared and in a 
• • . 89 position to wm. 
Nevertheless, some lawyers do represent plaintiffs. The national figures used by Pei 
perhaps do not do justice to the enormous variations that occur across China. For 
example, statistics from Yunnan Province place the rate of legal representation in 
administrative litigation cases during 1996 at 55.2% for plaintiffs and 44.8% for 
defendants. For the 820 administrative cases heard in Yunnan courts that year, 
lawyers assisted plaintiffs in 426 cases and defendants in 336 cases.90 
When lawyers are involved in administrative cases they fulfil a number of roles, one 
of which is as a consultant-coordinator. There are two main times at which this 
occurs. 
91 The first is before the case is formally established or at the time of filing the 
suit. The lawyers will gather the parties together to discuss the case, which may result 
in either the administrative organ altering its original mistaken decision, or the 
88 Interview with lawyer, Beijing, 1998. See also FBIS-CHI-97-175 "China: Lawyers Urged to Serve 
Agriculture, Rural Affairs." 
89 Zhu Weijiu (ed), 
~M~~~-~-tt~~x~~~m~~T~~M~-~~ 
(Discussion of the Government Legal Supervision System - The Supervisory System Under the 
Socialist Market Economy) (Beijing: China University of Politics and Law, 1994), pp.388-390. See 
also Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.420. 
90 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.416. 
91 Ibid. 
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plaintiff realising that the organ's decision was lawful. This occurred in Yunnan in 
1997 in a case involving a rural township government which ordered detention of a 
person for illegally transporting timber. The parties first went to the lawyers' office 
for a consultation about the case which focussed on two particular aspects. The first 
was legal knowledge about the case, and the lawyers were able to help in that aspect. 
The second involved an exchange of views between the offender and the government 
about the government's work. After this, the government came to see that its decision 
was in error and agreed to redress the situation. Notwithstanding any bribes which 
may have passed hands at this point, this kind of coordinating work is regarded as 
beneficial for the prompt resolution of disputes, keeping losses to a minimum and 
protecting the rights of all parties. Even if a bribe was the catalyst for resolution in the 
offender's favour, it is significant that lawyers are recorded as bringing the parties 
together. The consultative role of lawyers is regarded as particularly useful during the 
administrative review phase, as this allows maximum time for consultation and 
revision of illegal administrative decisions. 
The second time at which lawyers play a consultative-coordinating role is after the 
administrative litigation suit has been formally established. Their role during this 
phase is still outside the court rather than within it. The ALL prohibits the use of 
mediation to formally settle administrative litigation disputes in court, but does allow 
a plaintiff to cancel a suit before a ruling is given, and also allows defendants to alter 
their decisions and for a plaintiff to respond to this by cancelling the suit. The 
coordination required for all this is essentially mediatory in nature, so either judges 
are placed in the awkward position of having to actively and directly facilitate this, or 
alternatively, lawyers can play this role. 
A study conducted in Yunnan Province in 1997 found that lawyers there were playing 
a significant role in these matters, supposedly based on their considered legal opinion 
of the case. That is, if they thought the defending organ had acted lawfully they would 
tell the plaintiff that he or she did not really have a case, and encourage withdrawal of 
the suit. Alternatively, if the lawyers thought the defending organ had acted 
unlawfully, they would talk to the organ's representatives about why the 
administrative decision was unlawful, and encourage alteration of the decision. There 
is no way of determining whether lawyers acted in favour of the state in such 
situations, but it is significant that they are now becoming involved in this way. 
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The role of lawyers in administrative litigation is intended to be broader than just 
representing either the plaintiff or the defendant, and it is in these additional roles that 
we can clearly see their position as state-approved legal workers. They are supposed 
to help judges correctly handle all aspects of administrative trials, and judges in 
Yunnan, at least, welcome their presence in a case as a positive influence.92 The four 
main ways in which they do this are: by helping judges run the trial according to the 
procedures laid down in the ALL, by helping judges discover and clarify the facts of a 
case, by helping judges correctly apply the law, and by helping judges make just 
rulings. 
The plaintiff 
Each of the players in an administrative litigation dispute possesses different amounts 
of power at different stages of the process, and the plaintiff is in his or her strongest 
position during the lawsuit phase. The courts are at the peak of their influence during 
the accusation period, that is, deciding whether to accept the case for hearing, and 
administrative organs have most influence during the enforcement period of the 
administrative penalty.93 As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the plaintiff has a 
30% to 40% chance of succeeding with the complaint providing the case makes it past 
the acceptance phase of the court. If a court accepts a case for hearing, it is like saying: 
"There is a definite possibility that this administrative action is illegal or unfair." 
Within this relative position of strength, the plaintiff's position varies according to 
which administrative organ he or she is dealing with, and the nature of the 
administrative behaviour that is being challenged. As already seen, plaintiffs seeking 
to overturn public security organs' public order administrative penalties, for example, 
are in a weak position because most often they have served their period of detention 
before the case makes it to court, whereas plaintiffs against land management organs 
are better off because the organ cannot enforce its orders without court approval. 
92 Ibid, p.418. 
93 Interview with legal academic, Beijing, 1998. 
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Who is a typical plaintiff? This question has been partly answered by Minxin Pei,94 
who rightly draws our attention to the high proportion of workers, peasants, and 
private entrepreneurs represented in administrative litigation cases. It should be added, 
that by far the majority of plaintiffs are male and aged between thirty-five and forty-
five. By way of example,95 of the sixty-two administrative litigation cases recorded in 
the 9J 00 '$' "*1J ~ 19~ ¥ 1if 1996 (Important Chinese Trial Cases, 1996), only 
four record a woman as plaintiff. Likewise, the A~~~ ~19~ ~ 1992-1996 
(Selected Cases from the People's Courts 1992-1996) volume of administrative cases 
records only thirteen females as plaintiffs among fifty-one cases (being twenty-six 
public security cases, twenty-one industry & commerce cases, and four land 
management cases). Similar to the volume of trial cases, the selected court cases 
record average ages of between thirty-five and forty-five years. 
This finding is comparable with that of Tianjian Shi, who examined appeal activities 
in Beijing and discovered that people aged eighteen to twenty-two are least likely to 
make appeals to government officials, but that the likelihood increases with age and 
peaks at ages forty-five to fifty-three. 96 It should be borne in mind that Shi is referring 
to appeals of all types, not just to formal legal system appeals such as administrative 
litigation. The figures from the two volumes quoted above are for administrative 
litigation cases taken from all over China, not just Beijing, but the trend of the thirty 
to fifty years age group being most likely to approach the state to resolve a problem 
appears to hold for both general appeals and appeals to a court of law. 
One area in which the pattern of administrative litigation plaintiffs differs markedly 
from other complainants to the state regards gender. Shi found that in Beijing, 
contrary to patterns in most societies, women were more active than men in 
adversarial activities.97 In administrative litigation, men are more active, presumably 
because they are more often subjects of administrative penalties. We do not know, 
94 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.848. 
95 The selection of cases referred to at this point is made by the courts themselves, and may not be 
representative of the totality of cases filed at or heard by the courts. 
96 Tianjian Shi, Political Participation in Beijing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), p.210. 
97 Ibid, p.242. 
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however, the rate of imposition of administrative penalties on men and women, so it is 
difficult to be conclusive about this. 
The judicial environment in which a plaintiff appeals for administrative litigation is 
weighted against his or her interests. The concept of judicial supervision has a limited 
role and lacks legal effect; courts may only recommend alternative administrative 
decision-making on sensitive internal administrative matters. The theoretical concepts 
underpinning administrative litigation are weighted more to management, and thus the 
state's interests, than to protection of individual rights. The backlash from 
administrative organs leaves plaintiffs with little strength during the phase of filing 
the case at court, despite improvements in the education levels of judges. 
Furthermore, the nascent role of lawyers is potentially beneficial to plaintiffs, but is 
undercut by their continued dual role as independent counsels and state-approved 
legal workers. 
Of all the players in administrative litigation, administrative organs have the most 
influence on the process, although this varies according to the organ. The coercive 
power of administrative officials means, however, that even the least powerful organs 
can influence the process of a case more than an independent-minded judge. Having 
set the actors in their environment, the question now arises as to the precise process of 
an administrative litigation appeal, and the characteristics of such appeals. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION: THE PROCESS AND 
CHARACTERISTICS 
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The final phase in using the new system of administrative law to address an 
administrative grievance is to lodge an administrative litigation appeal and attend 
court for the trial and judgement. The forms used in the process of appeal will be 
examined, followed by analysis of a court case, and consideration of the role of 
judicial recommendations. Analysis of the characteristics of appeals in several local 
areas of China, as compared to the national situation, completes the study of the 
appeal process. A key question considered here is how the dominant features of the 
administrative grievance process thus far affect the final outcome. 
The process: applying to pursue litigation 
I was unable to obtain copies, either published examples or bona fide originals, of the 
forms used for administrative litigation appeals. The administrative review forms used 
in Chapter Four were published examples of such forms and, when compared with the 
type of information found in published administrative review cases, appear to be 
authentic. The forms used in administrative litigation proved much more difficult to 
obtain. I was able to view a public security case at a district court in Beijing, an 
account of which will be given below. While there, I asked for copies of 
administrative litigation appeal forms and other associated forms. The request was 
denied without specific grounds, but on the standard vague rider that it would be 
inconvenient and inappropriate. 
Thus the administrative litigation appeal form below has been constructed using two 
main sources. The first is the background provided by the administrative review 
forms, as it is reasonable to assume there is a similarity and continuity in the type of 
information required by the system. The second is published administrative litigation 
cases. Where the same type of information is recorded in case after case, and it is laid 
out in the same order each time, it is reasonable to assume that the information was 
taken from an administrative litigation appeal form. I have used these patterns to work 
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FORM Q: Administrative litigation appeal form 
Administrative Litigation Appeal 
Applicant: name ______________ , gender ____________ _ 
age ______________ , ethnicity _______________ _ 
place of origin , occupation---------------
address _______________________________ _ 
legal representative ____________________________ . 
Defendant: name. ____________________________ _ 
Legal representative---------------------------
Plaintiff disagrees with defendant's decision no. _________________ of 
__ year __ month __ day which resulted in----------------
__________________________ administrative penalty and 
herewith applies for administrative litigation. 
Plaintiffs request ____________________________ _ 
Facts and grounds for the request. _______________________ _ 
Received. _________________ ( court receiving the appeal) 
Plaintiff _______ (.signature or seal) 
__ year ___ month ___ day 
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backwards to obtain a picture of what the forms probably look like. The purpose of 
doing this is to see what can be gleaned about the process of administrative litigation. 
The information required is fairly standard. It is reasonable to assume that this 
application would be responded to with a series of forms and processes similar to 
those used in administrative review (see Chapter Four). The court would need to 
undertake an initial investigation to determine whether the requisite ingredients exist 
for administrative litigation, such as a clear plaintiff, a clear defendant, a specific 
administrative offence, and so on. As discussed in Chapter Five, it is often at this 
point that the court begins the mediation process by contacting the defending organ 
and making informal enquiries about the case. The sensitive nature of this phase and 
the power of courts and judges at this point is indicated by the response of one 
interviewee, who maintained that the main factor in whether a court accepts a case is 
the judge who has to decide to accept the case. If the judge is brave enough to take on 
a particular administrative organ then the case will be accepted, and the main factor 
here is the experience and qualifications of the individual judge.1 
One of the most significant problems in administrative litigation appeals is that courts 
often do not accept all of the cases that they should. There are two main reasons for 
this: first, judges are under pressure from administrative organs and officials not to 
accept cases that may result in a ruling unfavourable to administrative organs (see 
Chapter Six); and second, whether any anti-crime campaigns are running at the time. 
This second explanatory reason will be examined more fully below in the sections 
that compare local and national administrative litigation patterns. It is sufficient at this 
point to note that for any year in which an anti-crime campaign is running, there is 
likely to be more administrative litigation cases accepted by courts. 
If a case is accepted, and if possible mediation and involvement by lawyers at this 
point does not resolve the case, the formal trial process begins. I was able to view an 
administrative litigation trial of a re-education-through-labour case. The trial took 
place at Xuanwu district court at Beijing on Wednesday, 27 May 1998. The trial 
opened shortly after 9.00am and concluded about 10.20am. Re-education-through-
1 Interviews with lawyers and legal academics, Beijing, 1998. 
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labour penalties are, strictly speaking, not administrative penalties but enforcement 
measures. But for all intents and purposes they are administrative penalties because 
they are imposed by administrative fiat and are appealable under the ALL.2 
An account of the trial 
There were three judges, all female. One was obviously the head judge and took 
charge of the case. She managed the proceedings and directed the parties as to what to 
do and when. A second judge assisted the head judge with the paperwork, followed 
the proceedings, but did not ask any questions. The third judge appeared quite 
disinterested in the whole process and on many occasions during the trial was not 
even following the proceedings. 
The courtroom looked like a theatre in that the judicial bench rested on a raised stage 
which was flanked by several sections of heavy velvet black, brown and red curtains. 
The bench faced the audience. The PRC court logo was suspended high behind the 
head judge. The audience's seating sloped downwards from the rear of the auditorium 
towards the stage. 
The defendant was the Beijing City Re-education Through Labour Committee. Its 
case was led by a female in her late twenties. She was assisted by another person from 
the organ, a young male clerical officer. Neither were lawyers and they had no lawyer 
assisting them. 
The plaintiff was a young male in his mid-twenties from Hebei Province. He was 
clean and neatly dressed in a light blue tracksuit of the type supplied by a detention 
institution. He was a peasant. He had no legal counsel to assist his case and so spoke 
on his own behalf. 
Apart from myself and three students from Beijing University who accompanied me, 
there was only one other person in the gallery to view the proceedings. There was also 
a young male court guard seated behind the plaintiff. He had a set of handcuffs and an 
2 Although they only became so through the Opinion of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues 
Relating to the Implementation of the Administrative Litigation Law (For Trial Implementation), 29 
May 1991. 
electric baton attached to his belt. A female clerk recorded the proceedings of the 
court. 
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The trial opened with the head judge asking the plaintiff to confirm his name, birth 
date, ethnicity and place of residence. The defending organ was also asked to confirm 
its identity and the subject of the trial. Each party had a chance to present its story and 
respond to the other party's accusations. My overall impression was of a system that 
patiently listened to the plaintiff's case, and this was about all. 
The story was this: the plaintiff had been detained and investigated by public security 
organs for a variety of minor offences since about 1988. In late 1997 the plaintiff went 
to a public bath house to have a shower. While there he rented a locker to put his 
clothes in. During the time that he had this locker, he took the key and duplicated it. 
(The lock and key were presented as evidence.) Some time later he returned to the 
locker and used his duplicated key to steal 10 yuan from someone else's belongings. 
The district public security organ imposed a 15-day administrative detention penalty 
for this offence. After he had served the 15 days he was not released. The public 
security organ then overturned the administrative detention penalty (notably, after it 
had been served!) and arranged for the Re-education Through Labour Committee to 
impose a compulsory detention penalty on the plaintiff. The plaintiff then appealed to 
the court on the grounds that this second punishment was illegal. His view was that he 
had already been penalised for his offence and had served the detention. He also 
claimed that the re-education through labour penalty was too severe for such a minor 
offence as stealing 10 yuan. The defendant's view was that the public security penalty 
had been overturned because the bureau realised it was too light a penalty, and it 
subsequently imposed the compulsory detention penalty, which was more appropriate. 
The trial ended after hearing the two parties' positions. The court judgement was not 
made public. The court had three months within which to make a decision. At the 
time of judgement, the court was not to be re-convened but the parties were to be 
called to an office at the court and advised of the outcome. Meanwhile, the plaintiff 
was held at a remand centre. 
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Discussion 
It appears that the plaintiff was an itinerant worker as he had no specific business in 
Beijing when he was detained by a Beijing public security organ. This possibly 
contributed to the severe penalty of fifteen days' detention he was initially given. It is 
not my concern here to comment on the justice of overturning a penalty that had 
already been served and replacing it with one more severe, but rather to draw 
attention to the factors at work in administrative litigation trials. Re-education through 
labour penalties can be imposed in the following circumstances: 
o Minor offences of a counter-revolutionary, anti-Party or anti-socialist nature. 
o Colluding with murderers and so on, to a minor degree. 
o Hooliganism and prostitution. 
o Striking people and disturbing the social order. 
o Refusing to work at a work unit or otherwise breaking labour discipline. 
o Teaching others to violate the law. 
o Repeat offences of any of these minor offences. 
o The person's residence is in the countryside but he or she is in the city working 
without a permit.3 
Although the offence was minor, the plaintiff was a repeat offender. As he had no 
employment to go to the Re-education Through Labour Committee may have 
considered his situation fell within the bounds of these categories. 
Several things must be noted about the trial itself. First, the head judge appeared to 
have the most influence on the process. This does not mean that she had the most 
influence on the judgment that was made, as we do not know what pressure the 
administrative organ was able to exert outside the context of the trial. The judge 
definitely has the power to assist or hinder the plaintiff's case, though. The plaintiff in 
this case was a relatively young man, uneducated and inarticulate. Having to present 
his own case was clearly more than a little trouble for him. At one stage during the 
proceedings he was getting tongue-tied and bogged down in what he was saying. He 
stumbled over his words and eventually stopped speaking in mid-sentence. At this 
point the head judge intervened and said to him: "Are you trying to say that you think 
their actions (she indicated towards the defendants across the room) are illegal?" The 
3 Li Minfa (ed), ./~ ~ fT :iE5( W "Tl' (Public Security Administrative Litigation) (Chongqing: 
Chongqing University Press, 1991, p.70. 
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plaintiff grinned with relief and responded with an emphatic "yes". This incident 
demonstrates the ability of the judge to control the direction of a plaintiffs case and 
we do not know to what outcome. 
Second, there is clearly a great deal of work relating to the judgement of the case that 
happens outside of the trial context. There was no time during the trial proceedings 
given over to examining the administrative penalty forms for completeness and 
correctness. As discussed in Chapter Four, administrative organs often do not pay 
attention to such matters, and this is sufficient grounds for the court to make a judicial 
recommendation to the administrative organ to improve its performance in these 
areas. The trial concentrated entirely on ascertaining the facts and going over the 
evidence of the case. Clearly if there were problems in the area of minor procedural 
matters, or if the application of law was incorrect, then the court did not consider 
these matters relevant to the trial part of the appeal. The administrative litigation 
appeal is perhaps best understood as a process that has several parts to it: the 
acceptance by the court to hear the case, administrative matters relating to non-
substantive justice issues which are ascertained by the court (such as whether the 
paperwork has been correctly completed), the trial itself wherein the plaintiff has his 
or her say, and coalescing the information obtained from all these discrete processes 
which finds its expression in the written court judgment. 
Third, the Chinese judicial practice of "first decide, then try"4 fits the four-part 
process outlined above. The final part - that of drawing together all the information 
about the case - may be done by the judicial bench or the judicial committee, and it 
may occur either before or after the trial. On occasion the trial may well be more of a 
process of confirming the facts and evidence rather than a process of discovery. 
The judicial recommendation OJ ~ ~ i.5( (sifa jianyi) 
The judicial recommendation is a written method that enables communication 
between the court and the administrative organ on matters that the court does not have 
the authority to make rulings upon, but only has authority to make suggestions about. 
It is a mechanism to provide feedback to administrative organs on their performance. 
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If the court decides that a judicial recommendation to the defending administrative 
organ is necessary, this is done at the time of writing up the final judgement. The 
main problem with the judicial recommendation is that it does not have any legal 
effect; administrative organs are not required by law to implement any of the 
suggestions contained therein. The administrative organ either accepts or rejects the 
recommendation, but even acceptance does not bind the organ to undertake the action. 
In the case of a procedural violation which the court considers did not harm the 
plaintiffs substantive rights, the court should write a judicial recommendation 
suggesting that the administrative organ pay more attention in future to the problem in 
question. If cases continue to come before the courts involving a defending organ that 
has persistently ignored the judicial recommendations, then the court has the authority 
to cancel the administrative decision simply on the grounds of minor procedural 
irregularities.5 Whether a court would actually do so, however, is open to question. 
Judicial recommendations in the context of administrative litigation commonly relate 
to the laxness of administrative organs when completing the required forms for an 
administrative penalty to be imposed. This is an acknowledged problem6 and usually 
involves omissions of information such as the year, month and day the penalty was 
imposed, notification to the parties of their right to appeal, and lack of attention to 
completing procedures in the correct order. The public security organ, a common 
offender of this latter type of procedural violation, will often confiscate property 
without issuing the correct notice beforehand. Often the notice is issued concurrently 
with the property confiscation, or afterwards, or not at all. Situations like this should 
be overturned by the court but do not allow any compensation to be paid to the 
plaintiff. 7 
There is some evidence to indicate that judicial recommendations are a very common 
occurrence. In 1994 courts across China made nearly 40,000 judicial 
4 See Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (Singapore: 
Butterworths, 1992), p.120. 
5 Interviews with judge~ Bei.~, 1998. 
6 Dong Jianguo (ed.), fr :iE)t ~ i.)( .=f. JllJ- (A Handbook on Administrative Review) (Beijing: China 
Legal Press, 1991), pp.53-54. 
7 Interview with a judge of 10 years experience in the administrative division of the Supreme People's 
Court of the PRC. 
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recommendations to various organs on how to strengthen management and perfect 
systems.8 As there were 34,567 administrative litigation cases tried by courts across 
the whole country that year,9 this is a rate of at least one judicial recommendation per 
case, which is an astonishingly frequent rate. A similar ratio of almost one judicial 
recommendation per case is reported for Sichuan Province in 1995, where courts 
concluded 3,212 administrative litigation cases and made 3,010 judicial suggestions to 
various organs. 10 Most of these recommendations were to public security organs as 
they addressed public order issues. However, by 1998 the number of judicial 
recommendations made by courts across the whole country had dropped to 17,000. 11 
In Guangxi, over the seven years from 1990 to 1996, the courts tried 9,778 
administrative litigation cases. Of these, 5,628 cases or 57.6% were disputes related to 
natural resources. Of these, plaintiffs won 2, 294 of the suits or 23.5%. But again the 
most astonishing feature is the recorded figure of over 1,000 judicial 
recommendations made during this time to administrative organs about how to 
improve their management methods or implementation. 12 This works out at 143 
recommendations per year or nearly three per week! If there were 1,397 
administrative cases per year or about 27 cases per week, then every ninth case was 
cause for a judicial recommendation. If an average of five cases per day were handled 
by the courts in this region, then every second day and relentlessly for the entire year, 
courts wrote a judicial recommendation to an administrative organ. If these figures are 
accurate they do not present a flattering picture of the administrative organs in 
Guangxi. We do not know that the rate of writing such recommendations was steady 
over the seven year period. There may have been a spate in the early years followed 
by a slowing in the rate. This is what would be expected if administrative organs were 
taking any notice at all of the recommendations. On the other hand, seven years is a 
long time to be still writing recommendations about the same sorts of matters. If the 
education of officials on the subject of the ALL was effective, that combined with the 
FORM R: Administrative litigation judicial decision form 
8 FBIS-CHI-95-058 "Further Reportage on Developments During NPC - Ren Jianxin on Court Work." 
9 9::t 00 ~ 4$ ip ~ 1995 (China Law Yearbook, 1995), p.96. 
10 FBIS-CHI-96-095 "PRC: Sichuan People's Higher Court Issues Work Report." 
11 FBIS-CHI-1999-0323 "Supreme People's Court Work Report." 
12 Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.318. 
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Administrative Litigation Judicial Decision 
1. Heading 
1.Courtverdictnumber __________________________ _ 
2. Reasons for the appeal __________________________ _ 
3. Parties to the litigation 
Plaintiff: Name _____ , gender ____ , age ____ , ethnic origin ______ _ 
place of origin , residence----------------
occupation. _______________________________ _ 
Plaintiffs representative---------------------------
Plaintiff: Name _____ , gender _____ , age _____ , ethnic origin _____ _ 
place of origin , residence----------------
occupation--------------------------------
Plaintiff's representative:--------------------------
Plaintiff: Name ______ , gender _____ , age _____ , ethnic origin ____ _ 
place of origin , residence---------------
occupation--------------------------------
Legal representative:----------------------------
Plaintiffs representative:---------------------------
Defendant: (Name of organ)-------------------------
Legal representative:----------------------------
Defendant's representative:--------------------------
5. Trial organ and organisation: 
Trial organ:--------------------------------
Members of the collegiate bench: 
Trial head: Judge: _______ .Judicial representative: _______ _ 
6. Date of trial:-------------------------------
2. Plea positions 
1. The specific administrative behaviour of the defending litigant: 
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2. Statements by the plaintiffs: 
3. Statements by the defendant: 
3. Facts and evidence 
4. Grounds for deciding the case 
5. Concluding verdict 
!.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
2.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
3.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Case handling fees: To be paid by: (the defendant or the plaintiff) 
6. Comments 
fact that word soon gets around in bureaucracies should have had a more positive 
impact on the standard of administration. 
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The court judgement 
The final step in an administrative litigation trial is the court judgement, which 
contains the public version of the court's decision. It may also contain references to 
any judicial recommendations that were made, but does not contain the text of these. 
Published judicial decisions on administrative litigation cases have, in recent years, 
become longer and present more substantial reasoning about the case. But they are 
also limited, for the most part, to discussing the facts and evidence of the case, 
although occasionally the application of law will be discussed too. As with the 
administrative litigation appeal form above, I have constructed the judicial decision 
form above (Form R) by observing the repeated patterns in published cases and 
working back to the framework from which published case material has most likely 
been taken. Many of the sections in the form, such as those for facts and evidence, the 
grounds for deciding the case, and the comments, are longer than the space I have 
allowed on the forms, and as each case varies in complexity the forms must be 
supplemented by information provided on additional paper. 
Fees 
The verdict section of the form closes with a statement as to who will pay the 
administrative litigation fees charged by the court because this is based on who wins 
the case. The loser pays the fees, or if the administrative decision is partially upheld 
and partially overturned the cost is shared between the plaintiff(s) and the 
defendant(s). 13 
There are two categories of fees which parties are subject to when they conduct 
administrative litigation in Chinese courts. There is a basic filing fee charged by the 
court and this is a fairly modest amount. It varies according to the type of case. For 
example, 5-30 yuan may be charged for public order cases, 30-50 yuan for re-
education through labour cases, and 30-100 yuan for other categories of cases. 14 
These fees were set in 1989, and published cases initially recorded fees charged 
within this range. Throughout the 1990s however, fees have crept upwards and have 
ranged from 50-300 yuan for all types of cases. 
13 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Relating to the Implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation law (For Trial Implementation), 1991, Clause 106. 
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Remission or reduction of court fees is not included in the legal aid requirements 
stipulated elsewhere such as in the Law on Lawyers, but the courts claim to have their 
own scale of fee reduction according to the financial situation of the person filing the 
case.
15 Published cases though, do not record any such reductions. New regulations 
were announced in 1998 that require a separation of the two processes of imposition 
and collection of administrative fees. Sections or units which have authority to impose 
fees must not also collect the fees. Such fees must now be paid by the party direct to a 
special bank account from where it will be transferred to the state treasury. 16 Such 
measures indicate that fee collection by courts has been subject to abuse in the past. 
The second category of fees to which parties are subject includes any other costs that 
are incurred by the court in the process of conducting the litigation. These can include 
investigation costs, advertisement costs, translation costs, examination and appraisal 
costs, the costs associated with calling a witness, and any other relevant costs such as 
accommodation and meals borne by court personnel in the course of the investigation 
of the case. The highest charge I have come across is a fee of 15,000 yuan and related 
fees of 20,000 yuan for property evaluation. 17 Another case records fees of 1,438 
18 yuan. 
Fees must be paid in advance within a specified time limit or application must be 
made for a postponement of the payment. If neither occurs, the case is treated as a 
voluntary withdrawal of the application. 19 And if a suit is withdrawn, the plaintiff is 
still liable for a fee, which is to be reduced to half what was charged. Likewise if a 
suit is dismissed, the one who brought the suit must pay the filing fees. 20 
14 People's Courts Fees for Handling Litigation, 29 June 1989, Supreme People's Court, Article 5, Nos. 
6 and 7. 
15 FBIS-CHI-96-111 "PRC: Legal Aid System Discussed." 
16 FBIS-CHI-98-182 "China: PRC Administrative Fee Regulations." 
17 These are the fees listed in a case in 9:! 00 '$' *IJ ~ 19~ ¥ 1{E 1996 (Important Chinese Trial 
Cases, 1996), economic and administrative cases volume (Beijing: People's University Press, 1997), 
p.513. 
18 9:! 00 '$' *IJ ~ 19~ ¥ 1{E 1996 (Important Chinese Trial Cases, I 996), economic and 
administrative cases volume (Beijing: People's University Press, 1997), p.524. 
19 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Relating to the Implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law (For Trial Implementation), 1991, Clause 108. 
20 People's Courts Fees for Handling Litigation, 29 June 1989, Supreme People's Court, Article 23. 
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Expenses other than those directly related to the administrative litigation, such as the 
property evaluation fees referred to above, are collected according to actual 
expenditure. 21 This means they cannot be collected until after the case is either 
underway or concluded. It is not clear what happens to a case if a plaintiff or 
defendant is unable to pay any such fees. 
The fee payment system clearly links the process of the case to payment of the fees. 
We do not know if financial intimidation is directly responsible in any degree for the 
large proportion of withdrawn cases but it is certainly a possible source of pressure on 
the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff withdraws the case on his or her own volition or 
after the defending organ has altered the decision, he or she is still liable for half the 
filing fee. Likewise if the case is dismissed or confirmed by the court, the plaintiff 
must pay the fees. Plaintiffs win in about 40% of cases (Table 17 below, 1997) but are 
liable for court fees in 78%-85% of cases (Table 15 below, 1997) - that is, all cases 
except those overturned or changed by the court. Combined with the acknowledged 
pressure that judges apply on plaintiffs, the system of fees for filing litigation is a 
weak point in the system. 
The patterns of administrative appeals 
Minxin Pei draws a picture of the patterns in administrative litigation appeals based 
on national figures and case studies.22 Although a very helpful handle for us to grasp 
the broad sweep of administrative litigation in China, his study does not have room to 
tell us about the quality and nuances of administrative appeals. This is partly because 
in a country the size of China, national figures and trends drawn on the basis of 
compiled statistics inevitably blur any local patterns and important distinctions. 
This final section of the dissertation will attempt to do just that. Published sources that 
have not been used to date will further our understanding of nationwide patterns in 
administrative litigation. The evidence may appear patchy to the reader and we should 
not, of course, take any source as authoritative on its own. The aim is to provide 
additional building blocks that, when viewed as part of the entire process of making 
21 Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Some Issues Relating to the Implementation of the 
Administrative Litigation Law (For Trial Implementation), 1991, Clause 107. 
22 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997. 
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an administrative appeal, give a picture consistent with previous studies, but more 
nuanced. Much of the material was gathered by Beijing-based Chinese scholars in a 
series of investigative studies conducted in various provinces throughout China in 
1997. The methodology used involved polling among judges, administrative officials, 
and on occasion citizens. It is advantageous in that if respondents are honest - and we 
may as well accept that they are unless we have reliable information to the contrary -
it is useful for illuminating local patterns that are subsumed into national figures. A 
similar methodology was used in a 1992 study.23 
One of the interesting features of the information discussed below is that some of it 
pertains both to wealthy centres of political power such as Beijing and to ethnic 
minority areas, and can therefore further our understanding of the complex 
relationship between economic growth, wealth, political environment and tendency to 
use the legal system. 
National patterns and the puzzle of cases withdrawn from the administrative litigation 
process will be examined first. 
Table 15 represents the national pattern of disposition of administrative litigation 
cases. The initial pattern was that cases were more likely to be confirmed by the 
courts or withdrawn by the plaintiff, but the latter pattern is a trend towards a higher 
proportion of cases to be withdrawn by the plaintiff. 
The phenomenon of withdrawn cases has caused debate among Chinese and Western 
scholars as to the reasons behind the withdrawals.24 Chinese scholars consistently 
refer to withdrawn cases as a negative feature of administrative litigation in China.25 
They cite the cause of most withdrawals as the weakness of the courts and their fear to 
upset administrative organs by making a ruling against them, resulting in plaintiffs 
losing hope in the courts and withdrawing their case. 
23 ~ :J-t:f (fJ JI ~, ~ l.l\!. ~ (The Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law) (Beijing: China University 
of Politics and Law, 1993). 
24 See Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.843. 
25 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.337. 
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Table 15: Disposition of tried cases in administrative courts, 1991-1997 (by 
percentage) 
Year A 
1991 32 
1992 28 
1993 24 
1994 21 
1995 17 
1996 15 
1997 13 
B 
19 
19 
20 
20 
16 
15 
14 
c 
2 
2 
2 
A: Administrative actions confirmed by courts. 
B: Administrative actions overturned by courts. 
C: Administrative actions changed by courts. 
D: Suits withdrawn. 
D 
37 
38 
41 
44 
51 
54 
57 
E: Other. In 1995 this category consists of dismissed or terminated cases. 
F: Dismissed cases. 
G: Terminated cases or other cases not otherwise accounted for. 
Source: 9=l 00 W ~ ~ ~ 1992-1998 (China Law Yearbook). 
E 
10 
13 
15 
15 
16 
F 
9 
8 
G 
5 
7 
The susceptibility of judges to yield more to the wishes of administrative organs than 
to the rights of the plaintiffs during a trial is most often demonstrated by their 
tendency to allow plaintiffs to cancel administrative litigation suits without proper 
scrutiny and judicial approval. The ALL stipulates that once a suit has been filed and 
accepted by the court for hearing, it must be tried unless the plaintiff specifically 
requests the suit be withdrawn.26 If a plaintiff makes such a request, whether it is 
because the defending organ has decided to alter its specific administrative decision or 
for other reasons, the suit may only be withdrawn if the court agrees to it. The 
intention behind this clause is to further protect plaintiffs from pressure by the 
def ending organs during the conduct of the trial. The court should ensure that the 
proposed withdrawal has not been requested because the organ has threatened the 
plaintiff. If the court examines the case that has been proposed for withdrawal and 
26 AIL, Article 51. 
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ascertains that the administrative decision was illegally imposed in the first place, 
then it should disallow the withdrawal unless the defending organ alters the decision. 
Table 16: Withdrawn administrative suits, 1993-1997 
Year A (A*) (A**) B (B*) (B**) c 
1993 6662 (58%) (24%) 4888 (42%) (17%) 11,550 
1994 9564 (62%) (28%) 5753 (38%) (17%) 15,317 
1995 14,247 (55%) (28%) 11,743 (45%) (17%) 25,990 
1996 22,174 (52%) (28%) 20,741 (48%) (26%) 42,915 
1997 28,710 (57%) (32%) 22,025 (43%) (25%) 50,735 
Notes: 
A: Suits withdrawn on the initiative of the plaintiff. 
B: Suits withdrawn by the plaintiff after the defending organ alters the administrative decision. 
C: Total number of administrative suits withdrawn in the year. 
(A*) and (B*): Percentage of the total number of administrative suits withdrawn in the year. 
(A**) and (B**): Percentage of the total number of administrative suits tried by the courts in the year. 
Source: q:t 00~1$ if:~ 1994-1998. (China Law Yearbook) 
Instead, what often happens is that judges will defer to the defending organ by 
allowing indiscriminate withdrawal of suits, or by encouraging the plaintiff to 
withdraw the suit. 27 This led to the situation in 1994, for example, where 62% of 
withdrawn cases were withdrawn without the plaintiff obtaining the desired judicial 
remedy, and a comparable figure of 57% is recorded for 1997 (column A* in Table 16 
above). 28 
In the face of a negative interpretation of withdrawn cases by Chinese scholars, 
Minxin Pei uses official Chinese sources on administrative litigation suits, which now 
clearly separate the numbers of cases which are withdrawn by plaintiffs after 
27 Zhu Weijiu (ed), 
~M~~~·*-tt~~~~~~m*~T~~M~•m~ 
(Discussion of the Government Legal Supervision System - The Supervisory System Under the 
Socialist Market Economy) (Beijing: China University of Politics and Law, 1994), pp.388-390. 
Interviews with judicial personnel and legal academics also confirmed this pattern, Beijing, 1998. See 
also Jiang MiE_&'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.367. 
28 ~~fl Bg 1::'¥. ~ ~ JJ. ~ (The Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law) (Beijing: China University 
of Politics and Law, 1993). 
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administrative organs have changed their specific administrative decisions from those 
which are withdrawn under other circumstances,29 to make the following assertion: 
The decision to withdraw ALCs (administrative litigation cases) seemed to be based on 
rational reasoning, not merely fear of reprisal or distrust of the legal system. Plaintiffs 
decided not to pursue their cases against government agencies and officials in the court 
because of the high odds against winning.30 
Pei claims that these odds are about 38% in the government's favour compared to 
19% in the plaintiffs' favour. It is not clear how these figures have been obtained, and 
because the pattern changed dramatically from year to year it is more helpful to look 
at specific years. 
At this point our interest lies in how often the government wins and how often 
plaintiffs win, as some guide to the role of judges in the process. To obtain figures for 
government victories (Table 17), I have combined the figures from Tables 15 and 16 
of cases in which it is positively known that the government organ prevailed over the 
plaintiff. These consist of (from Table 15): A - administrative actions confirmed by 
the courts, E -other cases, F - dismissed cases, and G - terminated cases; and (from 
Table 16) A** - suits withdrawn on initiative of the plaintiff. 
29 See the sections on administrative trials in 9=f 00 ~~ff:~ 1994 (China Law Yearbook), and 
following years. 
30 Minx.in Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.844. 
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Table 17: Rate of government and plaintiff victories in administrative litigation 
suits, 1993-1997 (by percentage of the total number of cases tried by the court 
each year) 
Year Government wins 
1993 63% 
1994 64% 
1995 61% 
1996 57% 
1997 60% 
Source: 9:t IE ~ 4$ .if ~ 1994-1998. (China Law Yearbook) 
Plaintiff wins 
37% 
37% 
39% 
43% 
40% 
To obtain figures for plaintiff victories (Table 17), I have combined figures from 
Tables 15 and 16 of cases in which it is positively known that the plaintiff's aims 
prevailed. These consist of (from Table 15): B - administrative actions overturned by 
the courts, and C - administrative actions changed by the courts; and (from Table 16) 
B** - suits withdrawn after the defending organ alters the administrative decision. I 
have included administrative actions changed by the courts in the plaintiff's victories 
because for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995 court-revised administrative actions are 
included with the figures for administrative actions overturned by the courts, implying 
that such actions were changed in favour of the plaintiff. It should be pointed out, 
though, that it is not conclusive that such actions were changed in either the 
government's or the plaintiff's favour. Many changes were likely to have been merely 
due to a change in the law, regulation, clause or provision on which the administrative 
decision was based, thereby favouring the defending organ rather than the plaintiff. 
Thus the ratio of government victories may in fact be a few percentage points higher 
still. 
The pattern has remained stable for the years represented in Table 17 despite the 
significant changes represented in Table 15. In Table 15, the ratio of administrative 
actions confirmed by the courts fell by almost a half from 24% in 1993 to 13% in 
1997. Most of these cases went into the category of withdrawn suits, but it cannot be 
determined whether most of these suits were withdrawn on the plaintiff's initiative, or 
after the defending organ had altered its administrative decision. The most reasonable 
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explanation is an even spread to both sub-categories. In 1993, 58% of withdrawn 
cases were done on the plaintiff's initiative, and this changed only marginally to 57% 
in 1997 (Table 16). Likewise for suits withdrawn after the defending organ had 
changed its decision: in 1993, 42% of withdrawn cases came after the defending 
organ had changed its decision, and this increased by only one percent to 43% in 1997 
(Table 16). 
If we assume that the influx of cases was evenly spread across both categories, then 
the implications are two-fold. First, the courts have moved away from being 
predisposed to favour administrative organs by giving an outright confirmation of 
administrative action, and have moved instead towards mediating between the organ 
and the plaintiff. The claim that mediation is used with increasing frequency in 
administrative litigation suits is supported by legal academics in China, who assess 
the rate of mediation to be about 40%.31 This estimate would account for the 25% of 
the cases withdrawn in 1997 after administrative organs changed their decisions 
(Table 16 above), plus the 15% of case overturned or altered by the courts (Table 15 
above). 
Second, administrative organs have become more active and influential during the 
trial phase, either intimidating the plaintiff to withdraw the suit or making a 
concession to alter the administrative decision. Basically what happens is that the 
organ persuades the judge and the judge persuades the plaintiff by saying: "If you 
persist in this case it will do you no good, but if you withdraw the suit I can persuade 
the organ to alter its decision."32 It is acknowledged that it is better for the organs if 
they alter the decision themselves during the course of the trial rather than to be told 
to change it by the court. 33 
Alternatively, the influx of cases may not be evenly spread across both sub-categories. 
Either category A or B (Table 16) may have increased or decreased significantly at 
the expense of the other, but remained comparable overall. If judges have lost their 
initial flush of enthusiasm and determination that had been undergirding their rulings 
31 Interviews, Beijing, 1998. 
32 Interviews with legal academics, Beijing, 1998. 
33 Interview with lawyer and legal academic, Beijing, 1998. 
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in the first few years of administrative litigation (1989-1993), then it is quite possible 
that administrative organs have grasped this extra space to assert their wishes on the 
process. 
The net effect is that the government is more likely to win than the plaintiff, and 
judges assist this process. It is true, though, as Pei points out, that judges also play a 
significant role in mediating between the defending organ and the plaintiff to the 
advantage sometimes of the plaintiff. 34 But some Chinese legal practitioners assert 
that despite the positive sounding statistics of plaintiffs prevailing in 30%-40% of 
cases, this should not be taken as indicative of the success of the ALL in curbing 
illegal or unfair administrative actions. 35 The counter-claim is that all administrative 
litigation cases that come before the courts are cases where the administrative organ 
has acted illegally or unfairly and thus, they should all be overturned by the courts.36 
It is difficult to prove such a claim, but the weight of evidence leans against a positive 
interpretation of the figures. We know that many people only file an appeal as a final 
resort,37 we know that the raw numbers of administrative litigation cases accepted by 
the courts for trial are increasing each year38 - being indicative of continuing 
difficulties in securing legal and fair administrative decision-making, and we know 
that the problem of judicial independence has not improved significantly in the past 
few years. 39 
Local and regional variations in administrative litigation 
Local variations in the pattern of administrative litigation suits reveal differences in 
the strength of both courts and administrative organs throughout the country, and even 
from district to district within a city. Tables 18 and 19, for the most part, indicate 
comparable rates of withdrawn suits in Beijing and across the country, where it is not 
34 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997, p.845. 
35 There are reports of plaintiffs winning 70%-90% of their cases against government organs (FBIS-
CHI-96-238 "CHINA: Law Protects Farmers' Interests") in Jiangsu, Hunan and Sichuan in 1995 but 
such figures relate to cases which characteristically are group cases and have many parties as plaintiffs 
about one issue against one defending organ. Thus the high proportion of winning plaintiffs was 
obtained by including each winning plaintiff individually rather than by simply determining the number 
of suits in which plaintiffs prevailed over the government. 
36 Interviews, Beiiin~l998. 
37 ~ ~t:f St) :fl~,~ lJ, ~ (The Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law) (Beijing: China University 
of Politics and Law, 1993), p.264. 
38 9::t 00 ~ 4$ $ ~ 1989-1998 (China Law Year book). 
39 Interviews, Beijing, 1998. 
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specified whether the plaintiff or the defending organ benefited from the withdrawn 
suit. 
Table 18: Numbers of administrative litigation cases accepted, tried and 
withdrawn in Beijing City courts, 1991-1996 (withdrawn cases are also 
represented as a percentage of tried cases) 
Year Cases accepted Cases tried Cases withdrawn 
1990 25 24 13 (54%) 
1991 142 115 66 (57%) 
1992 231 212 114 (54%) 
1993 243 259 116 (45%) 
1994 290 270 125 (46%) 
1995 292 279 114 (41%) 
1996 430 421 154 (37%) 
Source: Deputy Professor of the National Judges Training Institute, Head of the Administrative 
Division of Haidian District in Beijing and Head of the Enforcement Division of Xuanwu District 
Court in Beijing, in Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.337. 
But by also considering the figures from Table 16 above, of the percentage of cases 
where it is known that the plaintiff benefited from the withdrawn suit, it becomes 
clear that the marked increase in suits withdrawn to the benefit of the plaintiff 
between 1995 to 1996 across China is not paralleled in Beijing (Table 19). This may 
indicate that administrative organs in Beijing are more powerful vis-a-vis the courts 
than elsewhere in China, or it may indicate the organs are particularly stubborn and 
inflexible in the face of administrative appeals. More will be said about possible 
explanations below, together with analysis of Table 20 which provides more detailed 
information about administrative litigation patterns in Beijing. 
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Table 19: Percentage of administrative litigation suits withdrawn in Beijing and 
across China 
Year Beijing National figures National figures 
(from Table 15) (from Table 16) 
1993 45% 41% 
1994 46% 44% 
1995 41% 51% 
1996 37% 54% 
Sources: Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.337, and Tables 15 and 16 above. 
Table 20 (below) - Beijing: What can we make of these figures and are they 
consistent with national patterns? 
17% 
17% 
17% 
26% 
First, the most striking feature is that there is a great variation among the districts over 
the seven year period represented. Some courts had static rates of acceptance of cases 
for trial, such as Shijingshan and Mentougou. Others, most notably Dongcheng, 
Xuanwu and Haidian, were increasingly active in trying administrative litigation 
cases. All of the courts experienced a raw numerical increase in the number of cases 
tried except for Miyun. 
Second, generally the number of cases tried is comparable to the number of cases 
accepted by the courts. Sometimes there are more cases tried than accepted, such as at 
Dongcheng in 1992, Chongwen in 1995, Xuanwu in 1995, Haidian in 1994 and 1995, 
Miyun in 1993, 1994 and 1995, 1st Intermediate in 1993, 2nd Intermediate in 1996 and 
the High Court in 1996. This is possibly explained by the extra cases being transfers 
from another court or district because the case had been filed at the wrong court 
initially. The exception to this pattern is Miyun court, which appeared to have an 
initial rush of enthusiasm to accept cases in 1991 when the Administrative Litigation 
Law was first implemented, but clearly there was interference from some quarter as 
only eighteen of the twenty-seven cases were tried. 
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Table 20: Administrative litigation cases received and tried in ten Beijing City 
courts, 1990-1996 (All the courts are county courts unless otherwise specified.) 
The first line of figures for each court is the number of appeals accepted, and the second line is the 
number of cases actually tried by the court. 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Dongcheng 3 12 14 16 18 45 
13 14 14 20 44 
Chongwen 5 9 14 31 10 18 
4 9 13 28 16 18 
Xuanwu 3 7 22 20 7 39 
3 6 22 20 8 35 
Shijingshan 4 8 8 12 4 
4 8 8 12 4 
Mentougou 2 6 2 2 8 
2 6 2 7 
Haidian 4 6 24 41 45 53 67 
5 25 36 46 60 59 
Miyun 4 27 30 15 11 13 13 
18 27 17 12 14 12 
1 ' 1 Intermediate 3 11 10 8 10 13 
3 7 11 4 8 13 
2nd Intermediate 5 12 
3 14 
High Court 2 4 
4 2 
Source: Deputy Professor of the National Judges Training Institute, Head of the Administrative 
Division of Haidian District in Beijing and Head of the Enforcement Division of Xuanwu District 
Court in Beijing, in Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.331. Note: The second 
Intermediate court was only established in 1995. 
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Third, the Haidian, Dongcheng and Xuanwu courts were the most active in trying 
administrative litigation cases. There may be several factors feeding into this. First, as 
was discussed in Chapter Six, cases are only accepted by courts if the judges are 
confident they can handle the case without getting into too much trouble with the 
defending administrative organ, so the judges at these courts may well be better 
educated and have more experience than at other courts. The proximity to some of 
China's best tertiary institutions and the sharing of knowledge that occurs between 
such institutions and surrounding administrative organs may also contribute to this. 
The Haidian court in particular appears to be very organised about its affairs, as it has 
published, for example, a volume of cases from its records of tried cases. 40 It has also 
been listed as an exemplary court along with Shanghai's Huangpu District court and 
Jiangsu's Changshu City, court for demonstrating outstanding levels of judicial 
justice, honesty, and service.41 
The second factor that may explain the level of activity in the Haidian, Dongcheng 
and Xuanwu courts is the correlation between anti-crime campaigns and the 
implementation of these campaigns by the public security organs in these districts. In 
1994 and 1995 national anti-crime measures were strengthened42 and culminated in 
the "Strike Hard" campaign of 1996. 43 Concurrent with such campaigns was the 
decision to strengthen management of the migrant population, which was perceived to 
be a major factor in public security issues.44 These campaigns were aimed primarily at 
criminal activities but there was an inevitable impact on the number of administrative 
penalties imposed by public security organs. In some districts more administrative 
penalties would have been imposed together with more criminal punishments, while 
in other districts the "strike hard" attitude would have meant that minor offences 
which would normally incur an administrative penalty were treated more severely and 
incurred a criminal punishment. This reasoning is informed by research carried out on 
40 Beijing City Haidian District People's Court,'$' ~IJ ~ 19~ ~ tff (Analysis of Selected Trial 
Cases) (Beijing: China University of Politics and Law, 1997). 
41 FBIS-CHI-1999-0323 "Supreme People's Court Work Report." 
42 FBIS-CHI-95-053 "Reportage on NPC Developments Before Closing - Ren Jianxin on Anticrime 
Measures;" FBIS-CHI-95-038 "Public Security Organs to Begin Anticrime Crackdown." 
43 FBIS-CHI-96-084 "PRC: Top Procurator Urges Crackdown on Major Crimes." 
44 FBIS-CHI-95-110 "Beijing to Increase Watch on Migrant Population;" FBIS-CHI-96-247 "CHINA: 
Study on Threat to Social Tensions Posed by Unemployment." See also Zhao Shukai "Criminality and 
the Policing of Migrant Workers", translated by Andrew Kipnis, The China Journal, 43, January 2000, 
pp.101-110. 
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sets of legal cases that arise from a specific event or product, called a "case 
congregation", and how such cases are handled over time, or their "careers".45 For 
example, the prosecutions and penalties imposed on people after the June 1989 
Tiananmen Massacre would form a case congregation. As such, how each case is 
handled is not just a matter of the legal situation of each case individually, but is also 
linked to many other factors, not least of which is that there were a lot of people 
demonstrating against the government in June 1989 but not all can be punished. Those 
who were punished are likely to have been punished more severely for actions that, 
had the events not ended in massacre, would not have been viewed so dimly by the 
state. Marc Galanter concludes thus that: 
External events and the litigation system are simultaneously connected and 
separated by the strategies of the actors. External changes affect the litigation 
system as they are filtered through the strategic considerations of the 
parties ...... so when we see changes in litigation over time, we see reflections of 
changes in the resources, alternatives, and strategies available to the players.46 
For example, the number of people detained for criminal and public order offences in 
1996 by the Haidian District public security organ was 5,750. This figure represents 
an 8.2% increase from 1995 and a 45% increase from 1994,47 and includes both 
criminal punishments and administrative penalties. Of these people, 60.4% (or 3,478) 
were itinerant workers from outside the city. Among these itinerants, 53.6% (or 
1,863) had administrative detention penalties imposed on them by the public security 
organ, and this figure represents 62.9% of the total number of administrative detention 
penalties imposed by the organ in 1996.48 
That there is a correlation between anti-crime campaigns and the number of arrests 
and detentions in China is not a new phenomenon.49 That the pattern is repeated in 
administrative disputes was confirmed in interviews with Supreme Court personnel 
45 Marc Galanter, "Case Congregations and Their Careers" in Law and Society, 24, 2, 1990, pp.371-
395. 
46 Ibid, p.394. 
47 Zhang Weigang and Guo Feng (Beijing City Public Security Bureau Haidian District Office), "The 
Present Situation and Countermeasures of Itinerant Population Management Work in Haidian District" 
in .Jh fi! -J::. ~~:Jg (Journal of Chinese People's Public Security University), 4, 1997, p.9. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See, for example, John F. Copper and Ta-ling Lee, Coping With a Bad Global Image - Human 
Rights in the People's Republic of China, 1993-1994 (Maryland: University Press of America, 1997), 
Chapter 5. 
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who admitted that China was still a long way from the time when a citizen could 
apply for administrative review or litigation at any time of the year, in any place, and 
gain redress without external factors such as campaigns affecting the case.so 
These figures from Haidian also demonstrate that some of these detainees are willing 
to use the legal system to defend their rights, albeit an abysmally small proportion. If 
1,863 administrative detention penalties were imposed on itinerant workers by public 
security organs in Haidian district in 1996, and this represents 62.9% of the total 
number of penalties imposed that year, then the total number of administrative 
detention penalties imposed by the organ that year was 2,962. Table 20 records that in 
1996 Haidian court tried 59 administrative litigation cases. Even if they were all 
public security cases, and this is unlikely, this represents an appeal rate of almost 2%, 
which seems very low. The actual appeal rate would be lower than this after 
administrative penalties from all administrative organs are included. By way of 
comparison, in an unspecified district in Anhui Province 2, 781 public order 
administrative penalties were imposed in 1994, resulting in four administrative 
litigation appeals to the court. This is an appeal rate of 0.14%. Likewise in 1995 in the 
same district, 2,492 public order penalties were imposed and eight were appealed, 
representing an appeal rate of 0.32%. The rate for 1996 was similarly almost non-
existent at 0.37%: 3,995 penalties and fifteen appeals.s1 
Table 21: Annual changes in administrative litigation appeal rates at three local 
Beijing courts 
Haidian Dongcheng Xuanwu 
1992: 400%; 1992: 1200% 1992: 100% 
1993: 44%; 1993: 8% 1993: 267% 
1994: 28%; 1994: 0% 1994: -2% 
1995: 30%; 1995: 43% 1995: -60% 
1996: -2%. 1996: 120% 1996: 337% 
The other interesting feature is that the anti-crime campaigns had varying effects on 
administrative litigation appeals in Haidian and other district courts in Beijing. The 
so Interviews, Beijing, April 1998. 
st Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.438. 
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annual percentage rates of change in administrative litigation appeals at Haidian, 
Dongcheng and Xuanwu District courts are shown in Table 21 (based on information 
in Table 20). 
The increase from 1991-1992 is best explained by the initial enthusiasm generated by 
the implementation of the ALL, but this slowed dramatically in 1993 at Haidian and 
Dongcheng, while Xuanwu had a slightly different pattern. It can be seen from Tables 
21 and 22 that the annual change in appeal rates at Haidian District court from 1993 
onwards is higher than the annual change in the rate of public order cases handled 
across the country. (Although we do not know the rate of penalty impositions after 
1993 because such figures began to be omitted from the 9:t 00 ~ 4$ if.~ (China 
Law Yearbook, probably because of the large number, it is reasonable to assume that 
the number of public order penalties kept pace with the number of public order cases 
handled.) The implication of this is that while anti-crime measures were strengthening 
nationally and more public order penalties were being imposed, proportionally more 
appeals were heard in Haidian and Dongcheng courts. This indicates that these courts 
were more willing to hear cases against government organs than other Beijing City 
courts. 
Table 22: Public order cases investigated and dealt with by public security 
organs across China, 1990-1997 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
No. of cases 
1,835,779 
2,240,648 
2,529,614 
2,839,124 
2,865,754 
2,968,220 
3, 117,623 
3,003,799 
No. of public 
order penalties imposed 
3,066,099 
3,404,907 
3,860,149 
4,279,039 
Source: 9=f 00 ~ 4$ if.~ 1991-1998 (China Law Yearbook). 
% change in 
no. of cases 
22% 
13% 
12% 
1% 
4% 
5% 
-4% 
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In 1996 there was a noticeable change in the pattern of cases heard at the three courts 
above which is most reasonably explained by the impact of the "Strike Hard" 
campaign. Conclusive deductions about the characteristics of administrative litigation 
appeals cannot therefore be made on the basis of annual national figures, even though 
there has been, for the most part, an annual increase in the raw numbers of such cases 
tried by courts in China.52 This annual increase may indicate merely that 
progressively more administrative penalties were being imposed. 
The fourth feature to be observed from Table 20 is that these ten Beijing courts do not 
record a steady annual increase in the raw numbers of administrative litigation cases 
tried over the seven year period. Most had initial jumps as the ALL was newly 
implemented but only Haidian came close to a steady annual increase, and this was 
disrupted in 1995. However, the annual figures for all ten courts combined do 
demonstrate an annual increase (Table 23). 
Table 23: Total number of administrative litigation cases tried in the ten Beijing 
City courts represented in Table 20, 1990 to 1996 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
No. of cases 
4 
33 
97 
123 
134 
146 
208 
This draws our attention to the importance of not just raw national statistics but also 
of local variations and what these reveal about factors affecting the implementation of 
the ALL. 
The fifth feature to be observed from Table 20 is that, taking the years 1994 and 1996 
as sample years, seven out of the ten courts recorded an increase in the number of 
administrative litigation cases tried. Significantly, though, many also had either peaks 
52 Minxin Pei, "Citizens v. Mandarins", 1997. 
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or troughs in the intervening year of 1995. This may be explained, again, by the 
strengthened national anti-crime measures that were implemented from 1994 
onwards. As for Haidian, Dongcheng and Xuanwu, if a district's public security organ 
is quite hard-line then it is likely that more detainees than usual were given criminal 
punishments during this campaign and also that the organs influenced the courts to 
accept fewer administrative appeals. If, on the other hand, a district's public security 
organ is more moderate then this may be reflected in relatively more administrative 
penalties being imposed and accepted for appeal. 
Another explanation offered to explain the increase in the number of appeals made 
(generally) in 1995 is the passage of the State Compensation Law in 1994.53 This 
undoubtedly had some effect but was not the sole factor. The analysis presented in 
Chapter Five (see the section on "Administrative Compensation") demonstrates that 
the passage of the Administrative Litigation Law itself had the biggest impact on the 
number of administrative litigation appeals made. Added to this is the fact that the 
number of appeals varied from district to district (in both Beijing and across China) 
and there is no clear pattern indicating that this was due to the passage of the State 
Compensation Law. A combination of factors is the most reasonable explanation. 
The situation in Guangxi 
The same investigative study group visited Guangxi in 1997 and found that even in 
the region's relatively economically developed areas and cities, knowledge of the 
ALL was not high. A questionnaire was conducted among 50 individual entrepreneurs 
located in a commercial market in Nanning City, of whom 36 responded. The 
respondents were asked: 
1. Do you understand China's Administrative Litigation Law? 
Nature of response 
Understand 
Have heard of it 
Don't know 
Percentage of respondents 
44.4% 
13.9% 
41.7% 
2. If your lawful rights and interests were illegally encroached upon by an 
administrative organ, would you apply for administrative litigation to a 
court? 
Nature of response 
I would dare to do that 
I would not be willing to do that 
I would not dare do that 
I would be unlikely to do that 
Percentage of respondents 
19.4% 
25% 
33.3% 
22.2% 
Source: Head of the Administrative Division of Nanning Intermediate Court of Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region, in Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.324. 
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From Question 1 it can be seen that among this group of individual entrepreneurs 
(getihu), knowledge of the ALL stood at only 45% after six years of the law's 
implementation. This is quite low among a section of the community who would have 
to deal with administrative organs - the industry & commerce organs - on a regular 
basis. 
The supervision of this small-business sector by the industry & commerce organs 
involves a threefold strategy: certificates must be obtained by the individual 
entrepreneur from the organ to do anything from start up the business, employ more 
or fewer people, change the nature of the business, move its location, or close the 
business. Added to this is the dossier(~~ dang'an) system, which is a system of 
filing not just the relevant certificates of the business, but also other information such 
as the individual entrepreneur's personal identification and copies of any violations 
that have occurred. On top of all this is the general system of supervision by industry 
& commerce organs, which includes supervising trademarks and advertising, and 
work practices in the market place such as the use of accurate scales to measure and 
. h d 54 we1g goo s. 
53 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers in China - Obstacles to Independence and the 
Defense of Rights (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1998), p.26. 
54 Wang Xuezheng (ed), I~ IT :iE)t ~ (Administrative Law of Industry and Commerce) (Beijing: 
China Personnel Press, 1993, pp.105-108. 
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If individual entrepreneurs violate an administrative law the range of penalties 
includes warnings, fines, confiscation of illegal income, orders to cease business, and 
cancellation of the business licence. If an individual entrepreneur is operating his or 
her business legally then he or she would at least have applied for a business licence 
and the administrative procedures for this should include making the entrepreneur 
aware of his or her right to administrative review and litigation. The figures quoted 
above do not definitely tell us that the industry & commerce organs are not doing this 
at all, but the figures are low enough to indicate that a very low level of emphasis is 
placed upon educating individual entrepreneurs about the legal aspects relating to the 
conduct of their business. 
The second question produced a disturbing reply. Only 19.4% of respondents actively 
saw themselves as ever using the system to challenge an illegal or unfair 
administrative decision. By far the greatest proportion (80.5%) either would not have 
dared or even thought about such a course of action. One individual entrepreneur told 
the investigation team in Nanning that he had been indiscriminately fined by the 
industry & commerce organs of the city many times. When asked why he did not 
apply to the court for administrative litigation, he replied: "Who would dare? If you 
off end an official from the industry & commerce organs how can you continue to do 
business afterwards?"55 This response is very similar to that obtained from the 1992 
polling of individual entrepreneurs, who noted they would bring a suit against an 
administrative organ if they had nothing else to lose. 56 The intervening five year 
period has done little to overturn this outlook. We do not know, of course, whether the 
same individual entrepreneurs polled in 1992 would have replied in a similar vein in 
1997, and it should be borne in mind that that the results from Question 2 above may 
be aberrant, but we will hold this in mind as we examine other pieces of evidence. 
The low regard that is held by administrative organs for the process of administrative 
litigation was discussed in Chapter Six. Further confirmation of this was uncovered 
by the investigation in Nanning, which reports an administrative case in which the 
55 JianQ. Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.325. 
56 ~ fo St; JI ;m !:3 lJl!. ~ (The Ideal and Reality of the Rule of Law) (Beijing: China University 
of Politics and Law, 1993), p.264. 
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plaintiff had been summoned to court to answer enquiries about the case. The 
defending organ, a public security organ, sent some of its personnel to the gate of the 
court to lie in wait for the plaintiff. When he arrived he was arrested by the public 
security organ, and thereby prevented from further pursuing his case at court. The 
investigation team reports that this kind of overt retaliation against plaintiffs is as 
common as the less physical modes of administrative resistance. 
One aspect not discussed yet is that of interference by local people's congresses. That 
this occurs should not be surprising, as the leadership and power structure in China 
overlaps Party, government and administrative posts. In an unspecified county in 
Guangxi, the Chair of the People's Congress Standing Committee did not like the fact 
that the county court had made unfavourable rulings against the county government in 
administrative litigation cases. The congress subsequently requested that the county 
court not accept any more administrative litigation cases in which the county 
government was the defendant. For several years after this the county court obliged 
the request. 
These kinds of events show, first, that outside interference in administrative litigation 
is often achieved through institutional rather than personal means. The chair of the 
congress wields a certain amount of power as a result of his personal authority, but the 
significant factor for state-society relations is that the vehicle through which the 
interference is effected is not a personal telephone call to the judge handling any 
particular case, but rather through the abuse of the institution he heads. This is 
certainly a more effective way to control administrative litigation than to keep tabs on 
every case that comes before the courts and then pressure the judge as necessary. This 
power is activated at one of the most significant points in the administrative litigation 
process for a plaintiff, that is, the phase of court acceptance of the case for trial. As 
has been said above, if a court accepts an administrative case for hearing this is a tacit 
admission that the administrative organ very likely committed an illegal act. It is also 
indicative that other sources of power in the area such as the Party and the congress 
approve of the case being handled by the court. 
Second, these events also show that rule by law may be achieved at one point but at 
the expense of rule by law at other points. In the case of the congress' interference, 
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the court may well have handled the administrative litigation cases that it did accept 
according to the procedures laid down in the ALL. But the fact that a whole batch of 
cases is simply excluded from this category at the outset (which, granted, is a 
violation of the ALL, Article 41) through external interference demonstrates that rule 
by law is being violated elsewhere in the political-legal system. 
Official acknowledgment of the importance and, to date, weakness of the phase of 
court acceptance of cases is demonstrated by official attempts to separate the 
processes of filing a case from the trial. The Supreme People's Court Report on work 
in 1997 states that a new system was tried during that year whereby the office that 
was responsible for placing a case on file for investigation (and prosecution) was 
separated from the office that was in charge of the trial.57 This system was continued 
throughout 1998 with further refinements being made by separating the trial from the 
execution of sentences, and the trial from adjudication supervision.58 
The situation in Hunan 
Tables 24 and 25 represent the responses from fifteen work units, such as public 
security organs, industry & commerce organs, health organs, city construction organs, 
tax organs, and local governments in Hunan Province given to the investigation team 
in 1997, about matters related to administrative litigation. Table 24 indicates the 
respondents estimated that when the ALL was first implemented (early 1990s), 
administrative trials only had a 35% impact upon strengthening the concept of the 
legal system, but that this increased to a 75% impact by 1997. Likewise, 
administrative litigation trials had a 46% impact upon work efficiency in the early 
1990s, but that this impact declined to about 5% by 1997. 
57 FBIS-CHI-98-084 "China: Supreme People's Court Work Report." 
58 FBIS-CHI-1999-0323 "Supreme People's Court Work Report." Adjudication supervision is the 
Chinese judicial process where a procuracy or any citizen (whether or not a party to the case) may 
request a court to re-open a legally effective judgement. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, "Adjudication 
Supervision and Judicial Independence in the P.R.C." in American Journal of Comparative Law, 39, 
1991, pp.95-119. 
Table 24: Views from 15 work units in Hunan as to the influence of 
administrative trials on administrative organs 
Area of influence Ratio of influence Ratio of 
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in 1992193 ( % ) influence now 
Concept of the legal system 
has to some extent strengthened 
Beneficial in maintaining 
administrative authoritativeness 
Influence on work efficiency 
35 
6.2 
46.4 
(%) (1997) 
75.1 
12.4 
5.4 
Source: Deputy Head of the Administrative Division of Hunan Province High-level Court, in Jiang 
Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 1998, p.348. 
Table 25: Views from 15 work units in Hunan as to the rate of implementation of 
judicial decisions on administrative trials by administrative organs 
Level of implementation 
Active execution 
Non-execution 
Resist execution 
Ratio in 1992/93 ( % ) 
34.5 
35.5 
14.5 
Ratio now ( % ) 
79.5 
12 
1.1 
Source: Deputy Head of the Administrative Division of Hunan Province High-level Court, in Jiang 
Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative report'', 1998, p.348. 
These two tables together do not present a positive picture of the progressive 
implementation of the ALL in Hunan Province. Table 24 reveals how the influence of 
the ALL has progressed from focusing on the minute details of the process of 
administrative decision-making to greater influence on strengthening the broad 
concept of administration according to law. This finding concurs with the figures on 
judicial recommendations referred to above where it was shown that these 
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recommendations are usually made about minor administrative processes relating to 
the imposition of administrative penalties, and that administrative organs have not 
improved their routine handling of these matters, even after seven years of judicial 
recommendations. 
Table 24 also indicates that there was concern in the early years of the implementation 
of the ALL that the justice process was overly interfering with administrative 
authority. This concern has not abated either: in Anhui Province in 1997, 51 % of the 
defending organs that responded to a questionnaire replied that administrative organs 
have a low view of administrative litigation because they are concerned it will 
interfere with administrative efficiency.59 The tension between administrative 
efficiency and administrative justice is common in all bureaucracies, and most 
Western countries recognise that justice costs a certain amount of time and money.60 
The outcome after eight years of implementing the ALL and education about it, is that 
administrative organs still have a suspicious attitude towards the rights of plaintiffs as 
they are laid out in the ALL. But significantly, this suspicion betrays an awareness of 
the rights-conscious aspect of the ALL and a clear recognition that citizens' rights 
come at the expense of administrative authoritativeness. 
The responses in Table 25 must be held in abeyance as they claim that nearly 80% of 
judicial rulings on administrative litigation cases are actively implemented by the 
organs. A similar ratio is claimed by administrative organs through a questionnaire 
conducted in Anhui Province in 1997. Responding organs claimed that in 76% of 
cases they consciously implement the judicial decision about the case.61 Such claims 
are contrary to the popular perception that one of the biggest problems in 
administrative litigation is the poor rate of implementation by administrative organs 
of judicial rulings.62 One way in which the figures in Table 25 may be accurate is if 
59 Director of the Research Office in the Hefei City Intermediate Court and Vice President of the 
Intermediate Court in Chizhou District in Anhui Province, in Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative 
Report", 1998, p.424. Note: Chizhou is a Tang Dynasty term for the area now covered by Guichi and 
Tangling in southern central Anhui Province. 
60 See, for example, Margaret Allars, "Managerialism and Administrative Law" in Canberra Bulletin of 
Public Administration, No.66, October 1991, pp.50-62. 
61 Director of the Research Office in the Hefei City Intermediate Court and Vice President of the 
Intermediate Court in Chizhou District in Anhui Province, in Jiang Ming'an (ed.), "Investigative 
Report'', 1998, p.434. 
62 This is an openly acknowledged problem. See: FBIS-CHI-1999-0323 "Supreme People's Court 
Work Report"; FBIS-CHI-2000-0319 "Supreme People's Court Report to NPC." 
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administrative organs routinely only execute the judicial rulings that are favourable to 
them. Working from national figures for 1997 (see Tables 15, 16 and 17 above), 
administrative organs win 60% of the cases so they will definitely implement this 
portion of judicial rulings. Of the remaining 40% that the plaintiff wins, 25% of these 
represent cases where the administrative organ has already altered its administrative 
decision, so the organ will be highly likely to implement this portion of rulings too, 
bringing the likely level of execution to 85%. Some in this latter group may drop off 
and the 14% of administrative decisions overturned by the court are possibly un-
executed too, thereby accounting for the claimed 20% level of non-execution in 
Hunan Province. 
The situation in Ningxia 
Ningxia is one of the smallest and least populated of China's provinces. We have 
figures relating to administrative litigation patterns in Ningxia and they evidence that 
the conduct of anti-crime campaigns influences the pattern of appeals. These figures 
also enable a comparison of some aspects of the behaviour of administrative organs 
during administrative litigation trials. 
In Table 26 it can be seen that the number of administrative litigation cases accepted 
by the courts in Ningxia varied considerably from year to year.63 Initially there was a 
steady decline in the number but this trend reversed after 1993. The greatest annual 
change occurred between 1995 and 1996 where the number of accepted cases rose by 
nearly 63%. The most likely explanation for this pattern is similar to that offered for 
the patterns in Beijing: the 1996 "Strike Hard" anti-crime campaign that had its 
origins in strengthened national anti-crime measures in 1994 and 1995 and culminated 
in the full campaign in 1996. 
63 Ningxia is used here as an example because relevant data is available. 
Table 26: Number of administrative litigation cases accepted by courts in 
Ningxia, 1991-1996 
Year 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Total 
No. of cases accepted 
111 
105 
93 
106 
116 
189 
720 
262 
Source: Judge of the High-level People's Court in Ningxia and Head of the Administrative Division of 
the Intermediate Court in Xining City in Qinghai Province, in Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative 
Report", 1998, p.357. 
Table 27 shows the numbers of administrative litigation cases that were withdrawn on 
the plaintiff's initiative during the course of a trial, together with cases withdrawn by 
plaintiffs after the defending organ had altered its administrative decision. These 
figures may provide some clue as to which organs more frequently alter their 
decisions during a trial and why. 
The first and most obvious feature of these figures is that the courts and plaintiffs did 
not appear to persuade administrative organs to alter the offending decision during the 
trials very much at all, especially in the early years of the system's implementation. 
This improved a little over the years, presumably as administrative organs became 
more accustomed to having to consider the legality of their decision-making. 
The second most striking feature is that the public security organs in this region did 
not alter their decisions very often, compared to the land management organs, and this 
did not change over the six-year period. This indicates the public security organs in 
this province either make fair and legal decisions most of the time, or take a 
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Table 27: Administrative litigation cases accepted and withdrawn in Ningxia, 
1991 - 1996 (Percentages are of the number of cases accepted in each category 
that year.) 
Year Accepted Organ Withdrawn Withdrawn 
by plaintiff after decision 
altered 
1991 25 PSB 9 (36%) 
41 Land 10 (24%) 
3 I&C 1 (33%) 
1992 21 PSB 4 (19%) 1 (5%) 
35 Land 10 (29%) 2 (6%) 
23 Construct. 3 (13%) 
1993 28 PSB 5 (18%) 
31 Land 3 (10%) 4 (13%) 
7 Construe. - 3 (43%) 
1994 34 PSB 6 (18%) 
36 Land 7(19%) 1 (3%) 
5 I&C 2 (40%) 
1995 38 PSB 8 (21%) 2 (5%) 
36 Land 6 (17%) 11 (31 %) 
5 I&C 
1996 57 PSB 15 (26%) 4 (7%) 
47 Land 1 (2%) 7 (15%) 
7 I&C 1 (14%) 
Source: Judge of the High-level People's Court in Ningxia and Head of the Administrative Division of 
the Intermediate Court in Xining, Qinghai Province, in Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative Report", 
1998, p.357. 
hard-line stance in court. Given what we know from other areas of the country about 
cases that are withdrawn on the plaintiff's initiative, that is, that in more than half the 
cases such withdrawals are made under coercion from courts and administrative 
organs (see Table 16 above), it is reasonable to assume that the public security organs 
in this region are very hard-line and coercive. Likewise, the industry & commerce 
organs appear to be quite inflexible in the face of administrative trials. 
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Third, it should be noted that even though public security organs applied pressure in 
court to get their own way, this does not necessarily mean that they did so in order to 
avoid altering one of their administrative decisions that should have been altered. It is 
possible that their decisions were legal but that because plaintiffs have a lot at stake in 
wanting to avoid administrative detention, they appeal more often. 
In contrast to the public security organs, the land management organs in 1995 and 
1996 were more inclined to alter their decisions during a trial and this may be related 
to the nature of the disputes and how they are resolved. The Land Management Law 
of the PRC stipulates that land disputes are preferably to be resolved through 
mediation with the parties concerned. It was shown in Chapter Two of this 
dissertation that many land disputes may be channelled by the local government into 
the mediation system and do not end up as administrative disputes. The background to 
such disputes is a predisposition to mediate, not least because many land disputes 
have a long, complex history and justice cannot simply be determined. It is highly 
probable that this mediation continues into administrative litigation, even more so 
than for cases involving other administrative organs, resulting in a higher rate of 
administrative decisions altered during the trial. 
Fourth, the figures in Table 27 indicate that in Ningxia the rate of withdrawal of 
administrative cases during trial is comparable to the national rate. Table 16 above 
shows that for the years 1993 - 1997 the percentage of suits withdrawn on the 
plaintiff's initiative was respectively 24%, 28%, 28%, 28%, and 32%. The 
corresponding percentages for Ningxia are 15% (1993), 28% (1994), 24% (1995), and 
21 % (1996).64 (These percentages are lower than those in Table 27 because not all 
cases accepted by the courts in Ningxia are represented in Table 27). 
64 Jiang Ming' an (ed.), "Investigative report'', 1998, p.357. 
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What are the consequences of maladministration for officials? 
The consequences of illegal or unfair administrative behaviour is an area that is not 
invisible in administrative justice materials, but is similar to bribery and corruption. 
Official acknowledgment of the problem occurs and reports of discipline and 
punishment are heard, but the problem still remains. An official may have any or 
several of the following penalties imposed on him or her: 
o An administrative sanction imposed by an internal order of his or her organ 
cB :iE>t ~ ?J\. xingzheng chufen). This may range from a demerit point on the 
official's work file through to demotion or dismissal. 
o An administrative penalty imposed by his or her organ, such as a fine 
cB :iE>t ~ W xingzheng chufa). 
o Civil responsibility where the official is sued by the individual, or 
o Criminal responsibility.65 
Reports are most common about illegal behaviour among the police, with other 
administrative officials virtually invisible in public acknowledgment of their 
maladministration. In 1994 the Supreme People's Procuratorate investigated and 
handled 409 cases of extorting confessions by torture, 4441 cases of illegal detention 
and 1772 cases of illegal search, and 65 cases involving 76 judicial officers who bent 
the law for personal gain or engaged in extortion or accepted bribes in civil or 
administrative cases.66 A few years later in 1998, more than 7,000 cases of violations 
by police personnel were investigated, and an undisclosed number of thousands of 
personnel were expelled from the public security organs. At the same time police 
affairs supervision bureaux were established in public security organs, the purpose of 
which is to conduct close, on-the-spot supervision of police personnel as they go 
about their duties.67 Such actions indicate the poor impact of laws such as the 
Administrative Litigation Law on administrative processes. To offset this dismal 
trend, it must be acknowledged that policing in the PRC is a dangerous business, with 
on-duty police deaths numbering 442 in 1998, and a further 7735 being wounded.68 
65 He Jiangui (ed), fJ ~;Rt W J.m 11'.: (A General Survey of Administrative Penalties) (Beijing: 
The Legal Press, 1991), pp.321-325. 
66 FBIS-CHl-95-052 "Zhang Siqing on Supervision Over Law Enforcement." 
67 FBIS-Clll-99-021 "China: Article Views Supervision Over Police Work." 
A FBIS-CHl-99-007 "China: On-Duty Policemen Deaths Total 442, 7735 Wounded in 1998." 
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About 14% of specific administrative decisions are overturned by the courts (Table 15 
above) and it is probably only this category of cases for which officials may run the 
risk of punishment, assuming that there is a high correlation between unlawful 
behaviour by officials and unlawful administrative decisions. Bearing in mind that 
this category of judicial rulings may well be ignored by administrative organs, it is not 
very likely that an administrative official will suffer any significant loss as a result of 
illegal or unfair administrative behaviour. 
The process of administrative litigation is not for the faint-hearted. The plaintiff faces 
formidable opposition by the defending administrative organ and its influence on the 
courts. The weakest point in the process is the phase of filing the case at court and 
waiting for notification of acceptance for trial. If a plaintiff gets his or her case 
accepted then the chances of achieving a better outcome are about 40%, so the effort 
is worth it if there is enough at stake. But getting a court to accept a case is the most 
difficult part. Once in court, the system is weighted against procedural justice and for 
substantive justice. This is openly acknowledged by the courts, which have recently 
pledged to change this long-standing practice of "stressing the tangible and neglecting 
the procedure" by strictly adhering to correct judicial procedure in handling cases. 69 
Even if the courts achieve this for their own work it will not necessarily have a 
positive impact on administrative procedures. Thus far the courts have had minimal 
impact on improving the procedures that administrative organs use in the course of 
their duties. Their influence is limited to the broad concept of administration 
according to law. 
What does this mean for the system of administrative law? When the theoretical 
background, history, development, and institutional context of administrative review, 
administrative compensation, and administrative litigation are viewed as a discrete 
system, what is it like for a person who wishes to challenge the system? What does 
the implementation of this system tell us about state-society relations? Has 
administrative authority weakened in the face of legal requirements, or is the new 
system another way the state uses to atomise and stifle complaints? These are some of 
the questions we will consider in the conclusion. 
69 FBIS-CHI-1999-0323 "Supreme People's Court Work Report." 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines the process of administrative review and litigation, from 
the background, history, development and provisions of the legislation, through to the 
practical steps involved in appealing for administrative review, compensation and 
litigation. Important features come to light which have been obscured by the usual 
academic focus on administrative litigation. The work's underlying principle is that 
the outcome of administrative litigation appeals is directly related to the outcome of 
administrative reviews and compensation claims, and that the system is best viewed 
as a whole. 
In Chapter Two it was shown that in legislative terms, the new system of 
administrative law improves on earlier provisions for redress of administrative 
grievances. It has the authority to curb unlawful or improper administrative decisions, 
and unlike the letters/visits system, it determines set procedures which administrative 
organs and courts must follow when handling cases. It is a process to be used for 
general administrative grievances, not ones such as trademark disputes which may 
require specialised knowledge. It is closely associated with public order management 
disputes, and the bureaucratic connection between the courts and police organs 
reinforces this association. However, it has been designed amid administrative turf 
battles and the pre-existing power of administrative organs is apparent in the 
legislation's provisions. 
The discussion of the 'balance theory' in Chapter Three is at the heart of the role of 
the new administrative law system. Balancing efficient management with control over 
the power of state organs requires administrative law to both regulate and supervise 
administrative behaviour. But the scope of the legislative provisions restricts the 
system's operation to the extent that the supervisory role is the minor one, and thus 
individual rights are undermined. The operation of the system, examined in Chapters 
Four through to Seven, demonstrates that an individual plaintiff, even if brave enough 
to challenge an administrative organ, has considerable disadvantages: administrative 
organs are known to not accept all the cases for administrative review that they 
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should, and the initial application phase often functions as a pre-emptive review, thus 
diminishing the value of the review; the applicant's right to administrative litigation 
appeal may not be adequately conveyed at the time an administrative penalty is 
imposed; and courts in effect may only recommend internal administrative 
improvements to an administrative organ and do not have power to enforce them. The 
impetus of the system is towards bureaucratic reform and improved regulatory of 
administration, but even in these aspects the results are disappointing. 
The system is not a wholly ritualised form of political behaviour through which the 
state seeks to maintain control over society. It provides redress in about 40% of cases, 
but the rate of application, for both review and litigation, is very low. It could be 
argued that this pattern merely indicates that a system of redress exists, but not that it 
functions effectively. The system provides measurable redress for some plaintiffs, 
although these cases are usually selected carefully from the range of appeals and tend 
to support the state's political or economic goals such as curbing excessive police 
brutality, managing the productive use of land, or controlling the imposition of illegal 
fees. In this sense it is a 'top-down' system, and in most cases, claimants can 
probably only hope to take advantage of the prevailing political climate. 
Lawyers play an increasing role, but not as advocates for the plaintiff. Their role as 
coordinators and mediators between the administrative organ and the plaintiff mostly 
supports an already powerful administrative organ. This tends to reinforce the 
atomisation of claimants and their isolation from wider political discourse, thereby 
strengthening the state's ability to further its own aims at the expense of the citizen's. 
The implementation of the new system of administrative law, like other forms of 
redress against the state, is subject to the ebbs and flows of political campaigns - and 
the transgressions against legal procedure that campaigns give rise to. There are more 
appeals against public security organs' decisions during the conduct of Strike Hard 
anti-crime campaigns than at other times. This can be partly explained by an increase 
in the number of administrative penalties imposed on the population during such 
campaigns. A full explanation, however, must account for the relationship between 
criminal and administrative measures, by acknowledging that the boundaries between 
them become blurred at times of heightened anti-criminal activity. The subversion of 
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individual justice by the state's political goals is not surprising. 1 But it continues to 
undercut the state's claim to rule by way of an impartial body of law. 
The courts have an emerging role in the new system of administrative law, but this is 
not accompanied by a parallel weakening of the state. The state's intention is to bring 
a greater degree of regularity to administrative decision-making. In this task, courts 
have new-found authority over a narrow range of technical legal issues, such as 
ensuring a decision is made according to the appropriate law. But this type of 
authority does not allow the courts to approach their cases primarily with the rights of 
the plaintiff in mind, but rather perpetuates the traditional role of the court as the legal 
bureaucrat. Courts also have the authority to ensure that administrative organs do not 
abuse their discretionary power to decide on suitable administrative penalties, and this 
is an area which, in time, might allow a more rights-based judiciary to emerge. The 
period covered by this study indicates this role is still in train. 
There are two specific ways in which courts operate vis-a-vis the new system of 
administrative law: they act as gate-keeper and mediator. They must identify the cases 
which the state is prepared to admit may be worth redressing. They have most 
influence in overturning clearly illegal decisions, but predominantly they only have 
the power to recommend that administrative organs improve minor administrative 
procedures. Courts initially favoured administrative organs in the litigation process, 
but now they increasingly act as mediators between the plaintiff and defending organ 
- especially in the key pre-trial phase. Mediated justice has produced some results in 
the plaintiffs' favour, but overall it tends to dilute the full impact of legal 
responsibility and to allow defending organs to avoid calling officials to account. 
There is no clear link in China between the level of professional legal education of 
judges and the justice dispensed; patterns vary from locality to locality and are more 
dependent upon political factors. Thus, increasing the level of judicial education will 
not necessarily give plaintiffs a greater chance of achieving justice at the hands of the 
state. This is borne out by the findings in Chapter Six. 
1 John Burns came to a similar conclusion in a study of pre-reform China: John P. Burns, Political 
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Moreover, there is already a bureaucratic backlash from administrative organs against 
perceived interference by the courts in efficient administration. The prevailing mood 
among both administrative organs and courts is that the low level of (non-legal) 
professional knowledge among judges in China hampers judicial supervision of 
administrative action. Enhancing the quality of judicial personnel is not seen as the 
solution, but rather even further limiting their role to reviewing the application of law, 
which will even further entrench the preeminent position of administrative organs. 
Further expansion of judicial authority over administrative organs in the near future is 
unlikely. 
Administrative organs retain their superior position, and those with a grievance 
against them face many disincentives to hold the state accountable. This is partly 
because the state has a disproportionate interest in the types of grievances handled by 
the system, such as public security and land management. Land management organs 
are more likely to negotiate and mediate an agreement than are public security organs, 
reflecting the history and complexity of land issues. Occasionally, jurisdictional issues 
between administrative organs are clarified by the courts, but this also reflects a state 
interest in efficient management. 
Administrative organs retain their right to promote efficient administration over and 
above the rights of individuals who are affected by the administration. The system is a 
tool of management, albeit an inefficient and periodically malfunctioning tool. There 
is a pressing need for standardisation of administrative forms to strengthen the 
concept of a public service in China. The current administrative system works against 
administrative justice by allowing loopholes to exist in favour of the bureaucracy. As 
the pre-existing legal milieu also favours administrative organs, defending organs can 
usually avoid accountability by pleading a lack of resources. The theoretical concepts 
underpinning the new administrative law system are also weighted in the 
bureaucracy's favour, as these assume that management is more important than 
constraining bureaucratic power. 
Participation in Rural China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). 
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The power of an administrative organ is not a major factor that determines the number 
of administrative appeals made against it. The public security organs and tax organs 
are similarly powerful, but the latter rarely show up in administrative appeal statistics. 
The prevalence of public security organs in administrative appeal cases highlights the 
ongoing problems in China associated with policing and suggests that further 
codification of the legal system and strengthening of the courts is unlikely to lead to 
major improvements in this area. The public security organs retain the most authority 
over their administrative purview. Appealing against a decision made by one of these 
organs is virtually a waste of time because the penalty will often have been served 
before the review is complete. Under the rubric of 'protecting social stability' the state 
continues to support the preeminent position of these organs and they have the right to 
enforce their administrative decisions prior to the judicial supervision phase. 
The power of land management organs, on the other hand, is more curtailed. By 
history and law they are predisposed to negotiate with complainants, and these factors 
are reflected in the administrative law system that requires them to obtain judicial 
approval to have one of their administrative decisions enforced. 
Neither type of organ, though, is more likely than the other to have their 
administrative decisions overturned by a court, despite local variations. This suggests 
that power in China still resides predominantly with administrative organs of any type 
rather than with courts or individual justice. 
Plaintiffs have the least amount of power during the application phase, as it is 
extremely difficult to get a case accepted for a hearing either by an administrative 
organ or a court. Indeed, in administrative review, the application phase often 
becomes a preemptory administrative review in itself. Basic administrative 
procedures, such as correct completion of forms, are often weak and undermine the 
justice of the process. At this stage the rubrics of 'important and unimportant facts' 
are often used by the organs to sidestep accountability. If the case is accepted, 
however, and goes to court, then the applicant has a 40% chance of gaining redress -
definitely worth the effort. 
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Despite this statistic, the concept of 'people sue officials' remains largely 
instrumentalist rhetoric in China. The pressure to reform, internationalise, modernise, 
professionalise and regularise led to the emergence of the system. But its untimely 
arrival in the late 1980s/early 1990s perhaps doomed its impact. Nonetheless, citizens 
have been granted avenues of appeal against the state, depending on the problem at 
hand, and this system fills a gap potentially useful to the least influential members of 
society. But precisely because it is designed to handle grievances that are especially 
sensitive to the state, this makes the task of a plaintiff doubly difficult. 
APPENDIX A 
Chinese-language originals of the forms used in imposing administrative penalties 
and conducting administrative review. 
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